Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Nepalese Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s recent visit to China, along with the signing of the Belt and Road Cooperation Framework in pursuance of the 2017 Nepal-China BRI MoU, represents a strategic tactic aimed at balancing domestic politics as well as relations with neighbours. This initiative appears to be a calculated effort to reinforce his political relevance and to assert his influence by positioning himself as a leader with a compelling alternative vision and strategy that leans towards China. 

The Nepalese Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Oli was on his first bilateral visit to China from December 2 to December 5, 2024. This visit was anticipated to focus on converting the loan extended by China for the construction of Pokhara International Airport into a grant. Furthermore, it was expected that the signing of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) implementation plan would take place, alongside the initiation of significant new infrastructure projects and the acceleration of existing agreements between Nepal and China. 

On December 4, 2024, both countries signed a framework agreement on BRI Cooperation[i], thereby advancing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on BRI signed in May 2017. However, ambiguities exist about the financial modalities for implementing projects under BRI. Furthermore, there was no significant outcome for Nepal from the visit with regard to the conversion of the loan associated with the Pokhara International Airport project into a grant as widely expected. Additionally, no official aid was announced by the Chinese side. 

Subsequently, following Prime Minister Oli’s return, domestic discourse arose concerning the BRI cooperation framework and the fruitfulness of the visit. In this context, this issue brief examines the context and outcomes adjacent to the recent visit and assesses the potential implications for domestic level and future relations and cooperation with China. 

A “break from tradition” to visit China first! 

Rigorous discussions emerged regarding Prime Minister Oli’s visit to China, among foreign policy experts, media outlets, and political party leaders within Nepal and abroad when the news of the visit appeared. A group of experts suggested that Oli’s decision to visit China first signifies a departure from the established tradition of visiting India first.[ii][iii] It was also inferred that the political left in Nepal has always leaned towards China and this trend continues today as well[iv] which reflects Nepal’s increasing alignment with its northern neighbour. On the other hand, this shift was perceived as an assertion of Nepal’s sovereignty[v], with the argument that Nepal has the right to decide which countries to prioritise for visits, without strict adherence to tradition. Historically, there have been instances where leaders opted to visit China before India, based on specific contexts and choices. Additionally, China proactively invited the Nepalese Prime Minister, which influenced Prime Minister Oli’s decision to visit China first. 

Tact of Balancing at Home and with Neighbours! 

The internal political dynamics of Nepal complicated Prime Minister Oli’s strategy towards China, particularly when the ‘Nepali Congress (NC), which is the main coalition party, opposed securing any loan for projects under the BRI.’[vi]The NC has always preferred to pursue grant-based projects with China instead of signing new loan-based projects, and this time too the NC leadership remained firm on the same.[vii] Since the preparation of Oli’s visit to Beijing, the NC had advocated that, instead of pursuing new agreements, it would be more judicious for Nepal to concentrate on ensuring that China adheres to its prior commitments and obligations.[viii] Given the context, the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML)-led government along with its major coalition partner NC established a four-member task force to discuss and review the BRI implementation plan proposed by Beijing in 2020.[ix]

Academic and media analyses suggested that China-related concerns could significantly influence domestic political dynamics, potentially overshadowing the nation’s broader foreign policy objectives. Moreover, such inter-party tensions may result in the fragility of the coalition government, leading to political uncertainty and upheaval in Nepal. 

Despite these rising apprehensions, Prime Minister Oli has consistently reaffirmed his commitment to maintaining the stability and continuity of the coalition government for its full term. During his official address at Nepal-China Business Forum in Beijing on December 4, 2024, Oli stated that “Nepal has entered an era of political stability and socio-economic development. We have settled all major political issues and now focused on economic transformation….My government, formed in collaboration with two major political parties- NC andCPN-UML, is itself an assurance of political and policy stability.”[x]

Adding to this complexity, Prime Minister Oli faced criticism for choosing China for his first official visit, with accusations of playing the ‘China card’ once again. However, Oli on several occasions tried to indicate that he desires to pursue a balancing relations with both the neighbours - India and China. During the concluding session of the Kantipur Conclave on November 14, Prime Minister Oli underscored Nepal’s longstanding historical ties with India. He asserted that his visit to China would not adversely impact these bilateral relations. He stated that “we are a sovereign nation and we have never said that we won’t visit India,”…. we choose to go where it is convenient.”[xi]

On the other hand, he exhibited confidence regarding his visit to China, asserting that it would yield productive outcomes and significantly enhance development cooperation between the two nations.[xii] Oli expressed his determination, stating, “This is not a casual trip. I will personally report its success after my return.”[xiii] The signing of the BRI cooperation framework can be seen as a balancing act and tact both at home and with the neighbours.

Moreover, this visit was unmistakably a strategic move to bolster his political significance anda powerful tactic to assert his political relevance in Nepal. By presenting himself as a leader with a compelling alternative vision and strategy tilting towards China, he confidently strives to carve out his place in the political arena. 

The Major Agendas and Outcomes of the Visit 

Signing of BRI Cooperation Framework Agreement 

During the recent visit, the primary agenda involved the signing of the BRI implementation plan which had been long anticipated following the original BRI MoU signed in 2017 and, ‘which remained confidential between the two parties for an extended period.’[xiv] Until the joint statement was published on December 3, 2024, there was a lack of clarity regarding the signing of the BRI follow-up. However, on December 4, 2024, a BRI cooperation framework between the two countries was concluded. Reports from various media outlets indicated that Nepal had initially proposed the phrase “grant financing cooperation modality”[xv] under BRI, which reflected its desire for more favourable terms. In contrast, the Chinese negotiators advocated for the term “assistance financing modality,”[xvi] suggesting a different approach to the financial arrangements. After discussions and negotiations, the two sides ultimately settled on the term “aid assistance financing,”[xvii] which sought to blend both perspectives and lay the foundation for their collaborative efforts moving forward. However, again it remains unclear whether Nepal will seek loan-based projects under BRI or pursue grant-based projects only. Likewise, it can also be interpreted as Nepal may seek both loans as well as grant-based projects. 

Moreover, there is currently a lack of clarity regarding the financial modalities associated with the BRI Cooperation framework. Nevertheless, following his return from China, Prime Minister Oli has consistently asserted that Nepal will refrain from seeking any loans for the projects associated with the BRI. Upon his return, he addressed journalists and stated, “This time we discussed about various projects under the BRI. We will hold separate discussions and consultations as well as agreements about those projects relating to its plan of implementation. What we are getting now (from China) is not a loan.”[xviii] He further added, “Every project under the BRI will be discussed separately between the two countries during its implementation.”[xix]

The ambiguities surrounding the term “aid assistance financing” in the BRI framework agreement, alongside Prime Minister Oli’s and Nepali Congress’s consistent stance against taking loans from China, necessitate an in-depth analysis of each BRI project negotiations that are set to take place in the near future. It also underscores the fact that the implementation of this cooperation framework will be shaped by the strategic choices of future governments. Their decisions will undoubtedly influence how this agreement is operationalised, making it imperative for stakeholders to remain vigilant and adaptable to potential shifts in policy and interpretation. 

During the preparation for Oli’s visit to Beijing, Nepal worked on an extensive list of initiatives to be executed within the BRI framework alongside other projects related to cross-border infrastructure and connectivity, including the execution of projects agreed upon during previous high-level visits.[xx] Within the framework of infrastructure initiatives, a significant undertaking involved the enhancement of the development of the Tokha-Chhahare Tunnel, as well as the construction of the Gyirong/Jilong/Keyrung/Kerung and Kathmandu Cross-Border Railways, which are essential for facilitating trade and transportation.[xxi]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nepal released the recently signed BRI Cooperation Framework Agreement on December 10, 2024. The draft outlines ten projects categorised under Infrastructure, Urban Development, Energy, Education and Health, Industrial and Trade Infrastructure, and Sports Infrastructure.[xxii] According to media reports, China has recently shifted its focus to smaller, more financially viable development projects, which has led Nepal and China to avoid major projects under the BRI, except for the railway and tunnel.[xxiii]

China-Nepal Cross-Border Railway Project 

Under Infrastructure and Urban Development Projects, a major initiative is the China-Nepal Cross-Border Railway Project. This proposed railway line aims to connect Keyrung in southern Tibet with Kathmandu, Nepal. The two countries signed an MoU on June 21, 2018, regarding cooperation on this railway project during Oli’s visit to China. The project involves the construction of 72 kilometres of rail tracks. The 2018 pre-feasibility study by the National Railway Authority of China found that approximately 98.5 per cent of the railway would consist of bridges or tunnels, with a construction cost of NPR 3.55 billion per kilometre.[xxiv] The report also highlighted that the Kathmandu section is located in a “collision and splicing zone” of the Eurasian Plate, presenting six major geological challenges, including hard rock bursts and large soft rock deformations, which lead to extremely high stress.[xxv] The report indicated that active fractures in high seismic zones could result in issues such as high ground temperatures, slope stability, and erosion.[xxvi] This indicated the complexity of the completion and functionality of the project and also the potential investment it would seek. 

Further, on October 13, 2019, the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure and Transport of Nepal and the Ministry of Transport of China signed an MoU[xxvii] to cooperate on the feasibility study of the China-Nepal Cross-Border Railway Project. According to the Chinese Embassy in Nepal, the feasibility study for this project has completed its on-site survey in August 2024, and all on-site exploration work is expected to be finished by the end of 2024.[xxviii] However, no report in this regard has been submitted yet.

Source: https://www.gototibet.com/travel-guide/tibet-travel-advice/china-to-nepal.html

This railway project has been characterised by some experts and political parties in Nepal as a transformative initiative. They argue that it will significantly enhance Nepal’s connectivity with China, potentially leading to substantial trade diversification and improved market access through Chinese land and seaports. However, several critical considerations must be addressed. 

Firstly, this project represents a significant financial endeavour that requires a substantial investment, which Nepal currently cannot afford, especially in light of its rising public debt. Consequently, Nepal is not in a position to undertake high-interest loans from China to fund the completion of this project. 

Secondly, it is noteworthy that India accounts for more than 60 per cent of the Nepalese goods’ market, with the majority of the remaining exports directed to Western countries. Conversely, Nepal imports more than 15 per cent of its total imports from China. Therefore, trade diversification via this proposed railway route appears to be impractical concerning Nepalese exports. 

Thirdly, the stagnation of industrial growth in Nepal further undermines the assertion that this railway project will be beneficial. Additionally, Nepal has previously encountered challenges with another loan-based project, the ‘Pokhara International Airport,’ from which no flights to abroad have commenced, and the country has yet to fulfill its repayment obligations for the loan associated with this project. 

In this context, the viability and potential benefits of the proposed railway project remain uncertain. Moreover, it is anticipated that, similar to the Pokhara Airport project, a condition of the loan from China may stipulate that bids for contracts be restricted to Chinese firms exclusively. However, it will be subject to further observation during future negotiations regarding the project’s implementation agreement. 

Tokha-Chhare Tunnel Project 

The joint statement between China and Nepal welcomed the signing of the Letters of Exchange for the Approval of the China-aid Project of Feasibility Study for the Tokha-Chhahare Tunnel.[xxix] The Tokha-Chhare tunnel constitutes a significant component of the Rasuwagadhi-Kathmandu Road, facilitating connectivity between Nepal and the Gyirong/Keyrung region of Tibet. Following the 2015 earthquake, the necessity for upgrading this route became evident. In this regard, the China Tibet Tinalu Company Limited commenced work on the 16-kilometer Syaphrubesi-Rasuwagadhi road section, aiming to transform it into a two-lane, all-weather highway.[xxx] However, this project was subsequently interrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic and remains incomplete to this day, as per the media reports.[xxxi]

Source:https://english.onlinekhabar.com/nepal-plans-new-road-tunnel-to-connect-kathmandu-with-china.html

Additionally, another segment of this roadway, extending 32 kilometres and linking Tokha in Kathmandu to Chhahare in Nuwakot, encompasses approximately 4 kilometres designated for tunnelling under the framework of BRI cooperation. A feasibility study conducted by a Chinese team in 2020 affirmed the practicality of the proposed 4-kilometer tunnel.[xxxii] In 2023, the Government of Nepal allocated NPR 1 billion for the project to proceed with the construction after the completion of the detailed project report and an environmental impact assessment.[xxxiii] However, delays in advancing the project continue. This longstanding initiative is vital for improving Nepal’s connectivity to the north and could enhance tourism and trade with Tibet. However, it is essential to evaluate how much this can contribute to trade diversification for Nepal, particularly regarding its exports to China. Additionally, one must consider to what extent Nepal can address its significant trade deficit with China after the completion of the project. Nonetheless, the actual viability of the project is expected to be assessed only after negotiations for its implementation take place. 

Other Projects and Agreements 

In addition to the projects mentioned, several other infrastructure initiatives became part of the BRI cooperation framework. These include the Hilsa-Simikot road, the Kimathanka-Khandbari road, the Kimathanka Bridge, and the Integrated Check Post Project. The Jilong-Rasuwagadhi-Chilime 220 kv Cross Border Power Transmission Line was also agreed upon as part of the energy projects.[xxxiv]

Furthermore, within the education and health sectors, the Madan Bhandari University of Science and Technology and the Kathmandu Scientific Center and Science Museum were classified as key projects.[xxxv] Besides, a Project Development Agreement was also signed for this initiative under the category of Industrial and Trade Infrastructure.[xxxvi] This includes the China-Nepal Industrial Park in Damak, which is expected to foster industrial growth in eastern Nepal and significantly enhance the local economy and livelihoods.[xxxvii]

Further, under the Sport Infrastructure, the construction of the Jhapa Sports and Athletics Complex was agreed which aims to provide international-standard facilities for various sports in Nepal, including football, cricket, and athletics.[xxxviii]

An examination of the historical cooperation between Nepal and China, particularly regarding China’s developmental initiatives in Nepal, reveals that a significant number of these projects were previously discussed and proposed during bilateral visits between the two nations. However, the initiation of most projects remains pending, and those that have commenced with Chinese aid frequently encounter delays, such as obstacles in conducting feasibility studies, the preparation of detailed project reports, or sluggish progress in construction. 

The inclusion of both ongoing and proposed projects within the framework of the BRI suggests that China is inclined to offer support and assistance for development efforts in Nepal exclusively through this framework. This development indicates potential Chinese interests and influence tied to these projects, which may conflict with the authentic national, economic, and strategic interests of Nepal in the foreseeable future.

Additionally, the visit was also expected to advance the trade and transit agreement that was signed in 2016 and to explore the potential utilisation of a grant pledged by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit in 2019. However, no clarity has emerged regarding these issues following the conclusion of the four-day visit. 

Converting Loan Taken for Pokhara International Airport into Grants 

During this visit, Prime Minister Oli aimed to persuade China to convert a loan of approximately NPR 25.88 billion, taken in 2015 for the construction of Pokhara Airport, into a grant. This request was prompted by the airport’s ongoing struggles to generate revenue, as it currently does not operate any international flights. Since the project’s completion, regular international flight services have yet to begin, forcing the government to focus on increasing domestic flights instead. According to the agreement with China, Nepal is required to repay the loan within the next ten years, starting in 2026, which is expected to present significant challenges as the loan repayments come due. Additionally, it was anticipated that Nepal would seek air transport cooperation, particularly regarding flights from Pokhara International Airport and connections between various Chinese cities and Nepali cities. However, as of now, there is no indication of a commitment from the Chinese side. 

Why So Much Cry over BRI? 

The BRI is an ambitious project by China, aimed at establishing the country as a potential superpower, which is a key goal of Xi Jinping. Launched in 2013, the BRI revealed its action plan in March 2015, and Nepal officially joined the initiative in 2017. Many Nepalese scholars believe that China’s BRI could be a “game changer” for the country, as it has the potential to fulfil Nepal’s aspirations for enhanced connectivity and economic prosperity.[xxxix] It is widely understood that through various infrastructure development projects under the BRI, Nepal is poised to significantly diversify its trade and transit routes via China. This strategic expansion would leverage Chinese ports and railways, enabling Nepal to enhance its trading capabilities, some experts suggest. Additionally, this initiative is believed to reduce Nepal’s reliance on India for transit and trade, positioning the country for greater economic independence and growth. 

Another segment of experts and scholars contends that projects funded under the BRI are predominantly financed through loans. Given Nepal’s substantial existing debt, the nation is ill-equipped to assume additional debt burdens. Furthermore, the experiences of various countries, including Sri Lanka, Laos, the Maldives, the Republic of Congo, Tonga, and Pakistan, illustrate that BRI investments have precipitated significant financial difficulties.[xl]

Foreign Policy and Economic experts suggest that Nepal should refrain from pursuing loan-based investments under BRI and, instead, encourage the Chinese government to provide grants within the BRI framework.Additionally, if loans are deemed necessary, experts and political stakeholders suggest that the interest rates should not surpass those provided by other multilateral and bilateral development partners, including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank, India, and others. 

Prior to Mr Oli’s visit, there were calls from academics, media, and political groups to disclose the BRI-related documents, but they remained undisclosed. However, after the completion of the four-day visit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released the signed BRI Cooperation framework agreement on December 10, 2024. Upon returning from the visit to Beijing, Oli’s assertion that no loan agreement has been formalised with China, along with the ongoing ambiguity surrounding the financial modalities of the BRI cooperation framework, has generated considerable debate within academic circles and among political factions in Nepal. Several leaders within the Nepali Congress have expressed their dissatisfaction regarding the signing of the new agreement. In contrast, leaders from the UML have defended that the signed agreement was developed following consultations with the joint task force comprised of members from both the UML and the Nepali Congress. 

The BRI Cooperation Framework document, which was uploaded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website after the visit, is no longer accessible as of December 18, 2024. This situation raises concerns regarding the draft agreement and the intentions of the government among the public. Consequently, individuals have expressed their apprehension on social media platforms, highlighting their concerns in this matter. 

Given the historically limited transparency regarding BRI-related deals and agreements, it is imperative to go through thorough discussions and to engage diverse stakeholders in Nepal and solicit input from experts prior to finalising the implementation plan for any projects signed under the BRI Cooperation Framework. 

This approach aims to build public trust and establish consultative processes, which are essential for gaining legitimacy and ensuring smoother, more sustainable project implementation. 

Lastly, it is essential to acknowledge the potential risks associated with an overreliance on foreign assistance, particularly regarding the integrity of national decision-making processes. Dependence on external support can undermine a nation’s sovereignty, compromising the independent judgment necessary for crafting policies that genuinely reflect the desires and needs of its citizens. This scenario could impede the government’s ability to act in the best interests of its populace, ultimately resulting in decisions that may not align with the will of the very people it is intended to serve. 

Conclusion 

The preparations before Prime Minister Oli’s visit indicated intense discussion at the domestic level with the stress over considering Nepal’s current capacity to bear any loan for any developmental project under BRI and prioritising the potential areas of developmental investment which can secure revenue and can contribute to the growth. On the other hand,the outcomes of the visit leave with a lot of ambiguity over the BRI cooperation framework. It has further led to several speculations among media, experts and academia over the financial modalities and potential project-specific implementation agreements. 

The signing of the BRI cooperation framework represents a delicate balancing act, showcasing strategic tact both domestically and in relations with neighbouring countries. This visit of Oli was distinctly a calculated move aimed at strengthening his political relevance while simultaneously asserting his influence in Nepal. By positioning himself as a leader offering a compelling alternative vision and strategy that leans towards China, he seeks to establish his foothold within the intricate landscape of the political arena. 

However, given the context of Nepal’s expected graduation from a least developed country to a developing country in 2026, Nepal’s developmental needs are crucial in any bilateral and multilateral engagement of the country. This context necessitates a critical reflection on the government’s ability to sustain credibility and effectively manage at the domestic level while simultaneously cultivating relationships with key and trusted international development partners, particularly in an era where strategic engagement is vital for the country’s development and diplomatic standing.

*****

*Dr. Subodh Chandra Bharti, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i]The Kathmandu Post. “Nepal and China Sign BRI Cooperation Framework.” The Kathmandu Post. December 4, 2024. https://kathmandupost.com/national/2024/12/04/nepal-and-china-sign-bri-cooperation-framework (Accessed December 04, 2024).

[ii] Sanjeev Satgainya. “Eyes north, ears south.” The Kathmandu Post. November 7, 2024. https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2024/11/07/eyes-north-ears-south (Accessed November 8, 2024).

[iii]Jiba Raj Pokharel. "Prime Minister's visit to China:  Opportunity to emulate his illustrious predecessors." The Himalayan Times. December 4, 2024. https://thehimalayantimes.com/opinion/prime-ministers-visit-to-china-opportunity-to-emulate-his-illustrious-predecessors (Accessed December 4, 2024).

[iv] Sanjeev Satgainya. “Eyes north, ears south.” The Kathmandu Post. November 7, 2024. https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2024/11/07/eyes-north-ears-south (Accessed November 8, 2024).

[v] Rajendra Chapagain. "Sovereignty above all: PM Oli’s state visit to China." Nepal Press. December 1, 2024. https://english.nepalpress.com/2024/12/01/sovereignty-above-all-pm-olis-state-visit-to-china/ (Accessed December 1, 2024).

[vi] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury. "KP Sharma Oli-led govt may be at risk as Nepali Congress opposes BRI loan from China." The Economic Times. November 25, 2024. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com//news/international/world-news/kp-sharma-oli-led-govt-mmy-be-at-risk-as-nepali-congress-opposes-bri-loan-from-china/articleshow/115633865.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst (Accessed November 26, 2024).

[vii]ANI. “Nepal's ruling parties at loggerheads over BRI as Nepal PM announces to visit China on December 2.” ANI. November 22, 2024. https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/nepals-ruling-parties-at-loggerheads-over-bri-as-nepal-pm-announces-to-visit-china-on-december-220241122222328/ (Accessed November 23, 2024).

[viii]The Kathmandu Post. “Why go to China.” The Kathmandu Post. November 17, 2024. https://kathmandupost.com/editorial/2024/11/17/why-go-to-china (Accessed, November 18, 2024).

[ix]Anil Giri. “Taskforce begins review of Chinese draft of BRI plan.” The Kathmandu Post. November 22, 2024. https://kathmandupost.com/national/2024/11/22/taskforce-begins-review-of-chinese-draft-of-bri-plan (Accessed November 22, 2024).

[x] Government of Nepal. “Statement by Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Mr. K P Sharma Oli  at Nepal-China Business Forum.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal. December 5, 2024. https://mofa.gov.np/statement-by-rt-hon-prime-minister-mr-k-p-sharma-oli-at-nepal-china-business-forum/ (Accessed December 5, 2024).

[xi] The Kathmandu Post. “My visit to China won’t harm Nepal’s ties with India: Oli.” The Kathmandu Post. November 15, 2024. https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2024/11/15/my-visit-to-china-won-t-harm-nepal-s-ties-with-india-oli (Accessed November 16, 2024).

[xii]The Kathmandu Post. “Prime Minister Oli defends his China visit.” The Kathmandu Post. November 22, 2024. https://kathmandupost.com/national/2024/11/22/prime-minister-oli-defends-his-china-visit (Accessed November 23, 2024).

[xiii]Ibid.

[xiv] Vijay Kant Karna and Arpan Gelal. 2024. “Stalled Road to North: A Case of BRI in Nepal.” Centre for Social Inclusion and Federalism (CESIF) – now Known as Centre for Social Innovation and Foreign Policy. https://cesifnepal.org/uploads/attachment/bf09c40a15fe241dd783e0d110e8746f.pdf (Accessed November 12, 2024).

[xv]The Kathmandu Post. “Nepal and China Sign BRI Cooperation Framework.” The Kathmandu Post. December 4, 2024. https://kathmandupost.com/national/2024/12/04/nepal-and-china-sign-bri-cooperation-framework (Accessed December 04, 2024).

[xvi] Ibid.

[xvii] Ibid.

[xviii]ANI. “Nepal PM Oli defends BRI agreement with China, rules out any loan agreement.” ANI. December 5, 2024. https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/nepal-pm-oli-defends-bri-agreement-with-china-rules-out-any-loan-agreement20241205203658/ (Accessed December 5, 2024).

[xix] Ibid.

[xx] Anil Giri. “Connectivity, infra projects top agenda of Oli’s China visit. “The Kathmandu Post. November 23, 2024. https://kathmandupost.com/national/2024/11/23/connectivity-infra-projects-top-agenda-of-oli-s-china-visit (Accessed November 24, 2024).

[xxi]Ibid.

[xxii]Government of Nepal. “FRAMEWORK FOR BELT AND ROAD COOPERATION between the Government of Nepal and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal. December 10, 2024. https://mofa.gov.np/framework-for-belt-and-road-cooperation-between-the-government-of-nepal-and-the-government-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ (Accessed December 10, 2024).

[xxiii] Kamal Dev Bhattarai. "What do we know about the new BRI deal?." The Annapurna Express. December 9, 2024. https://theannapurnaexpress.com/story/51531/ (Accessed December 9, 2024).

[xxiv] Anil Giri. “Kathmandu-Kerung railway chugs ahead as China tables report.” The Kathmandu Post. December 11, 2028. https://kathmandupost.com/miscellaneous/2018/12/11/kathmandu-kerung-railway-chugs-ahead-as-china-tables-report (Accessed December 11, 2024).

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi]Ibid.

[xxvii] Government of Nepal. “List of Instruments Signed and Exchanged between Nepal and China.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal. October 12, 2019. https://mofa.gov.np/list-of-instruments-singed-and-exchanged-between-nepal-and-china/ (Accessed December 11, 2024).

[xxviii]Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Nepal. “Work Shoulder to Shoulder on the Path to Modernization and Bring China-Nepal Community with a Shared Future to a New Level.” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Nepal. September 9, 2024. http://np.china-embassy.gov.cn/xwdt/202409/t20240930_11501413.htm (Accessed December 11, 2024).

[xxix] Government of Nepal. “Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and Nepal.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal. December 3, 2024. https://mofa.gov.np/joint-statement-between-the-peoples-republic-of-china-and-nepal-2/ (Accessed December 3, 2024).

[xxx]Saloni Murarka. "Nepal-China Striving for Common Ground." Nepal News. December 3, 2024. https://nepalnews.com/index.php/s/issues/nepal-china-striving-for-common-ground (Accessed December 11, 2024).

[xxxi] Ibid.

[xxxii] Makalu Khabar. “Agreement signed with China for Tokha-Chhahare tunnel construction.” Makalu Khabar. December 3, 2024. https://english.makalukhabar.com/2024/12/222731/ (Accessed December 11, 2024).

[xxxiii]Government of Nepal. “Budget Speech of Fiscal Year 2023/24.” Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal. May 29, 2023. https://mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/1688901593_TC%20-%20EDIT%20-%20FY2023_24%20Budget%20Speech_R2.pdf (Accessed December 4, 2024).

[xxxiv] Government of Nepal. “FRAMEWORK FOR BELT AND ROAD COOPERATION between the Government of Nepal and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal. December 10, 2024. https://mofa.gov.np/framework-for-belt-and-road-cooperation-between-the-government-of-nepal-and-the-government-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ (Accessed December 10, 2024).

[xxxv] Ibid.

[xxxvi] Ibid.

[xxxvii] Ibid.

[xxxviii] Ibid.

[xxxix] Vijay Kant Karna and Arpan Gelal. 2024. “Stalled Road to North: A Case of BRI in Nepal.” Centre for Social Innovation and Foreign Policy.https://cesifnepal.org/uploads/attachment/bf09c40a15fe241dd783e0d110e8746f.pdf (Accessed November 12, 2024).

[xl]South Asia Monitor. “China's BRI promised prosperity, gave debt trap to countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives.” South Asia Monitor. October 11, 2020. https://www.southasiamonitor.org/china-watch/chinas-bri-promised-prosperity-gave-debt-trap-countries-pakistan-sri-lanka-maldives (Accessed November 12, 2024).