Indian Council of World Affairs

The Syrian Arab Army could not survive a two-week combined assault of various opposition forces, and crumbled like a deck of cards leading to the end of the iron-fisted rule of the Assad family in Syria. The joint operation of the anti-Assad forces came at a crucial time when both Russia and Iran were preoccupied with their own regional conflicts. The Asad family, which had ruled Syria for the last fifty years amidst allegations of torture, human rights violations and use of harsh force against its own people, was the last surviving bastion against the Arab Spring that swept the Middle East in 2011. 

Basar al-Assad had managed to survive 13 long years of civil war with the support of allies like Russia and Iran, who heavily invested in the Syrian regime due to their own geopolitical interests in the region. Now that Assad is gone, probably forever, and Syria is transitioning to a new government, it would be crucial to see how Russia navigates these troubled waters. It is crucial to note that the Assad regime has decimated at a time when the broader Middle East is undergoing great churn due to the ongoing Israeli operations in Gaza and the broader Israel-Iran rivalry. 

To begin with, the fall of Assad regime is a clear blow to Russia’s interest in the Middle East. Kremlin had invested heavily in ensuring the regime’s survival, and even massive airstrikes against Syrian rebels when the assault began in early days of December. However, by the end of the first week, the Russian embassy in Damascus had already instructed its nationals to leave Syria in what was seen as a rare display of concern.[i]

The story of Russian intervention in Syria began in 2015 when Basar al Assad asked Kremlin to intervene in the ongoing civil war as his regime was on the verge of collapse. This was despite direct support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iranian and Russian-backed militias fighting on Assad’s side and a regular supply of Russian weapons. By March 2015, the Syrian government had already lost key provincial capitals like Idlib and Raqqa and was struggling to hold territories, such as Hama, Homs and Damascus countryside. The Russian intervention in the Syrian Civil War came at a crucial moment, as the Syrian government had lost control of almost 80% of its territories.[ii]

The Russian intervention helped stabilise the deteriorating situation for the Assad regime. Through massive targeted airstrikes on forces opposing the Syrian government, including the ISIS, the Kremlin achieved its immediate goals of resisting a regime change and delivering a significant blow to the ISIS.[iii] However, Russia’s goals in Syria far transcended these immediate goals as Kremlin looked for a more proactive role in the world order and to reassert its role as a major power.[iv] By establishing itself as a major power broker in the region and by preventing the collapse of the Assad regime, Moscow had expressed its willingness to resist the universalisation of the western liberal order through the use of colour revolutions, argued many Russian scholars. 

Now, with Assad’s regime gone, Moscow is looking towards a period of uncertainty as the new regime is still taking its shape. Moscow’s primary goal, in this context, lies in securing its naval and air bases—Tartus Naval base, which gives Russia access to the Mediterranean, and the Khmeimim Air Base, established in 2015—to ensure its continued presence in the country.[v] The setback for Moscow, because of the Syrian debacle, however, is not only limited to these immediate strategic interests. Its consequences could impact Russia’s broader strategy in Middle East as well as Africa, particularly the Sahel region. Russia’s capability to support its allies and clients, when Kremlin is busy with its own war in Ukraine, is an issue that directly impacts the credibility of Russia as a security guarantor for these friendly regimes. 

The good news for Russia is that the new Syrian regime, for now, has not demonstrated hostility against Russia, keeping the possibility of a Russian presence in Syria open. Russia, too, has realised the new realities and has begun engaging with the new leadership to protect its assets and interests in Syria.[vi] For some Russian analysts, the Syrian debacle is not a setback for Kremlin on the scale as initially envisaged.[vii] Yes, Russia has lost a valuable ally in the Middle East, but Kremlin can now direct its complete focus on the Ukraine campaign. Besides, Russia still has significant presence in Libya, and Moscow has restructured its Wagner operations in Africa. Russia has significantly improved its standing in Africa, which almost remains independent of its presence in Syria and even in Libya, where Russia continues to enjoy a favourable position. As far as the status of the Russian bases are concerned, they have not been entirely vacated and need to be tracked for future clarity. 

It is still too early to conclude that Russia has lost its footing in Syria. Yes, the loss of the Assad regime is a geopolitical setback, but the Kremlin seems ready to adapt to post-Assad realities in Syria. Its global aspirations and the renewed Russian engagement with the non-Western world, in the aftermath of its war in Ukraine, gives Russia to stay engaged in Syria. Besides, the concerns regarding the resurgence of the ISIS may prompt the new Syrian leadership to cooperate with Russia given the fact that Mosco has significant experience of fighting against the Islamic state. 

Assad, in anyway, had become a burden on Kremlin given his stubborn attitude towards questions of power sharing with the opposition and on many occasions did not listen to his Russian partners. He was presiding over a hollow state, mired by economic dilapidations, illegal drug trade, corruption and, despair and apathy for his loyalists in the bureaucracy and the army. Russia, historically, has enjoyed a good relationship with Syria and its people. There is no way it cannot build a new kind of relationship with the upcoming regime. Sacrificing some of its privileges during the Assad regime should not be a non-starter for Kremlin to engage with the new government of Syria.

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*Aman Kumar, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes 

[i] Indian Express. “Russia, Iran pull out nationals, India issues advisory as rebels continue rapid advance in Syria”, Indian Express, December 07, 2024, Russia, Iran pull out nationals, India issues advisory as rebels continue rapid advance in Syria | World News - The Indian Express (Accessed 15 December 2024)

[ii] Amatzia Baram. “Bringing Assad in from the cold”, GIS, May 10, 2023, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/syria-war-assad/ (Accessed December 15, 2024)

[iii] Dmitry Trenin. “Putin’s plan for Syria”, Russia in Global Affairs, December 18, 2017, Putin’s Plan for Syria — Russia in Global Affairs (Accessed 15 December 2024)

[iv] Natia Gamkrelidze and Neil MacFarlane. “How doe the events in Syria affect Russia ?”, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, December 11, 2024 How Do the Events in Syria Affect Russia? | The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Accessed December 15, 2024)

[v] Pjotr Sauer. “Moscow reaches out to new Syrian leadership in move to secure bases”, The Guardian, December 09, 2024 Moscow reaches out to new Syrian leadership in move to secure bases | Syria | The Guardian (Accessed December 15, 2024)

[vi] Donato Paolo Mancini. “Russia nears deal with New Syria leaders to keep Army bases”, Bloomberg, December 12, 2024, Syria: Russia Nears Deal With New Leaders to Keep Military Bases - Bloomberg (Accessed December 15, 2024)

[vii] Fyodor Lukyanov. “Events in Syria have highlighted the benefits of being a regional power”, The Profile, December 09, 2024 https://profile.ru/abroad/sobytiya-v-sirii-podcherknuli-preimushhestva-statusa-regionalnoj-derzhavy-1632096/ (Accessed December 15, 2024).