Skip to Main Content
हिंदी में
Southeast Asia and Geopolitics of Its Criminal Underbelly
Abstract: Criminal Syndicates in the Mekong Sub-region have now de facto control of parts of Southeast Asia, with the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ) in Laos becoming a hub. Given the gravity of the situation, there is a need for greater regional action against the threats that these groups pose, especially in cyberspace.
The Case of Singapore
The Protection from Scams Bill[i] was introduced in the Singaporean Parliament in November 2024. This piece of legislation on its own would not be very significant since a number of countries have some form of legislative or executive regulatory mechanism in place to oversee the cyber world. Though there are comments in the media that the bill seeks to give overriding powers to the government, it is also being seen as an earnest attempt by the state to take steps to secure its citizens from scamsters and their activities. For some time, the people in this city-state have been victims of cyber scams, and this trend is on an upward trajectory.
For instance, between 2019 and 2023, there has been a five-fold increase in the number of scams, from 9,500 to over 46,600. In the first half of 2024 alone, there were over 265,000 registered cases, with a cumulative financial loss of over $385.6 million for Singaporeans. It has been estimated that by the end of the year, the total monetary loss can be as high as $770 million.[ii] According to the authorities, one of the biggest challenges is not as much the superior cognitive skills of those who indulge in scamming people but the stubborn behaviour of the victims, who, as high as 86 per cent of them,[iii] insist that they are not being cheated of their money despite evidence showing otherwise.[iv]
This issue is not only isolated to Singapore but is also a global phenomenon. As per the multi-stakeholder organisation that combats international scams, the Global Anti-Scam Alliance’s conservative estimation, the total monetary losses from digital scams in 2023 were about $1.026 trillion, or about 1.05% of the global economy. According to the Global Anti-Scam Alliance, there are over 2 billion people who have been duped by online platforms, and only 0.05 per cent of the perpetrators are being apprehended.[v]
However, what makes the current piece of legislation in Singapore stand out is that the city-state is located in a region, Southeast Asia, that is becoming a hub for an assortment of criminal syndicates. The bill, thus acknowledges this fact and the need to deal with it.
Organised Crime and Southeast Asia
The greater region of Southeast Asia has a history of a criminal underbelly that dates back centuries. What is ironic is that the narcotic economy was not an endeavour of non-state actors but a state endeavour during the era of colonialism. It was the British and the British East India Company that monopolised the trade in opium. During the nineteenth century, opium, cultivated in India, was sold in China, with Southeast Asia being a conduit for this trade. This narco-economy was also the driving force behind the two Opium Wars between the Qing Empire of China and the British/ France alliance between 1839 and 1860. Ironically, it was the First Opium War that is now being recalled by the Chinese Communist Party’s historiography as the beginning of the Century of Humiliation.
During the cloud of the Second World War, the Kuomintang too had a hand in the opium trade[vi] to fund and sustain their resistance to the Japanese occupation of China. At present, much of the aggressive posturing by China is reactionary by Beijing to undo its perceived Century of Humiliation.
Contrary to the past, in recent decades, partially as a spinoff of the Vietnam War, the Indo-China region, under the euphemism of the Golden Triangle, had gained notoriety as a hub for sourcing narcotics and psychedelic substances. The narcotic syndicates that operate in the trisection of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand, along with other criminal cartels, are one of the chief sources that have been bankrolling the internal strife, such as the current one in Myanmar. Over the years, the nature of the narco-business in the region has seen a shift from an opioid-based heroin cartel to one that has also adapted to process synthetic drugs like methamphetamine (meth). And since the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar, synthetic drug cartels seem to be more active when compared to their opioid counterparts, as the former are easier to process, store, transport/distribute and consume.
At the same time, apart from the drug cartels, other criminal syndicates indulge in human trafficking, gun-running, mining and smuggling of timber, jade and other natural resources. The parallel/ illegal economy is not only limited to criminal ventures but also includes commercial activities like logging and mining, where the distinction between legal and illegal economic activities is blurred.
In terms of human movement, the situation is not one of refugees or displaced people who have sought shelter in countries in the neighbourhood but labourers/ workers, who, more often than not are exploited by traffickers and deliberately employed predominantly in the sweatshops of Thailand and, to some extent, in China, Malaysia and Singapore too.[vii], [viii]
All these activities are interlinked in one way or another as they exploit the turbulent landscape of the region. The situation is further complicated owing to the limited writ of the local administrative machinery or in connivance with them and also the involvement of the militant groups that proliferate the region, the parallel/ illegal economy has been sustained for long.
However, one issue that is now coming to become another concern is not the outward movement of people, either as refugees or displaced persons or cheap labourers from unstable or economically weak areas of countries like Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, but the inward movement of people from various parts of the world to this region. This development, predominantly a recent phenomenon, has already come to shape the regional security landscape while posing serious and near-permanent ramifications for the world as the inward movement of people is closely associated with the mushrooming of cybercrime syndicates in the region. It is in this context that the internal developments in Myanmar are to be seen.
Between Crime and Politics: Myanmar’s Internal Strife
On an aside, since late October 2023, Myanmar has been grappling with a determined, well-armed and coordinated military offensive by some of its ethnic armed groups (EAGs). The military offensive by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, under Operation 1027 (Op 1027), which commenced on 27 October 2023, by the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), against the Tatmadaw-Myanmar and the junta, has a criminal undertone. While the EAGs, both under the Three Brotherhood banner and others, have long been resisting the Bamar-dominated Myanmar state and its military, the Tatmadaw, for long now, it was the mushrooming of the cybercrime syndicates that was the catalyst for Op 1027.
Owing to the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown, there was a surge in cyber scamming activities that predominantly targeted Chinese nationals in China. The preferred operations centres for these fraudulent activities were, by and large, along China’s border with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Despite repeated requests from Beijing, the junta was not in a position to reign in the scamsters in its lawless borderlands.[ix] Resultantly, Beijing encouraged the EAGs to initiate their offensive,[x] which had also seen some.
What is also noteworthy here is that the U.N. estimated that more than 200,000 people were forced to work in “scam centres”.[xi] It is estimated that at least 120,000 people in Myanmar, and another 100,000 in Cambodia, have been forced into work in these scam centres.[xii] These people, who hail from as many as 75 countries[xiii] across the world, have been duped into working in these scam centres by travelling to Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos on false promises of romance or high-paying jobs.[xiv] Indian nationals too have been rescued from these scam centres by the Government of India even while some continue to be held there.
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-golden-triangle-special-economic-zone/
Golden Triangle: Does Not Glitter but Bleeds
The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ) in the Ton Pheung District of Bokeo Province in Laos, bordering Myanmar and Thailand, is already becoming a thriving hub for an assortment of illegal activities with cyber-scamming, drug runners and human traffickers allegedly operating with impunity. Apart from these, other crimes, like trafficking in animals, money laundering and prostitution, including that of minors, are equally big. It is to be noted that the casino/ gambling industry in this SEZ is also associated with these illegal activities.
The autonomous GTSEZ, which was marketed as early as 2007 as an economic hub, is now, by some accounts, a de facto fiefdom of the Chinese underworld. Zhao Wei, a Chinese national, has been one of the biggest proponents of this SEZ and has gone on to say that this SEZ will be a “bigger contribution to the (Laos) country’s economic and social development.”[xv] Zhao Wei is not off the mark when he talks about the economic benefits, as it has been estimated that the criminal syndicates based in Mekong countries make over $43.8 billion a year, or about 40 per cent of the combined formal GDP of Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.[xvi]
Undertaking the gravity of the situation, the United States has imposed targeted sanctions upon individuals and entities that are identifiable with the criminal syndicates in this region. For instance, Zhao Wei and the Cambodian businessman Ly Yong Phat are sanctioned by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control on charges of drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, bribery, and wildlife trafficking, and trafficked workers are subjected to forced labour, respectively.[xvii], [xviii]
Instead of the sanctions acting as a deterrent, the contrary seems to have happened. Zhao Wei has gone on record to make the sanction a geopolitical contestation by accusing the US of “trying to contain China”.[xix] This comes at a time when there is a growing belief that the criminal syndicate with which Zhao Wei is associated acts as the de facto head of GTSEZ and other pockets in Southeast Asia.[xx] In addition to this most of the criminal networks operating in Southeast Asia have some Chinese connection.[xxi] They are either from China or people of ethnic Chinese descent, like the Big Four Families of the Kokang Self-Administrative Zone in northern Myanmar. These families, headed by Bai Suocheng, Wei Chaoren, Liu Guoxi and Liu Zhengxiang, are actively being hounded out for their illicit activities, such as telecom scams and gambling by Beijing.[xxii]
It is in this light that the ongoing internal strife within Myanmar is to be seen. It is to be noted that China is by far the most influential actor and can influence the governments in the Mekong sub-region to curtail illicit activities. However, geopolitical consideration has a role to play. According to the International Crisis Group, China is:
“… guided by strategic considerations, including its inclination to view economic investment, even if it is partly illicit, as something that can help build peace along its borders, and its desire to leverage enclaves in its neighbourhood controlled by pliant entities in order to project its power. It has thus far tended to focus on law enforcement only selectively, responding only when it considers its national interests under direct threat, including with crackdowns on online gambling and efforts to shut down online scam operations across Southeast Asia. At the same time, it has ignored much of the crime in locations controlled by entities and enterprises friendly to China.”[xxiii]
On the flip side, the US has already flagged the Chinese role in[xxiv]:
“… endangering democracy, good governance, and stability around the world by co-opting local elites, undermining law enforcement, weakening state authority, and threatening the US’ strategic interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific.
“China’s government and law enforcement, after failing to take this problem seriously for years, are now using the presence of Chinese-led crime groups in other countries to justify striking increases in the presence of China’s authoritarian police around the globe.”
However, the real issue is not limited to this bilateral contestation but covers a larger canvas. The most disconcerting is the criminal network, which is not completely to be seen as non-state actors, independent of state patronage. On the contrary, owing to the weak governance in parts of Southeast Asia and the fact that they have “acquired opaque influence over the governments of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos”,[xxv] these groups have already spread their criminal tentacles far and wide. However, thus far their criminal footprint, especially in the cyber domain, is limited to defrauding individuals.
However, it is only a question of time before the same network enters the world of cyber espionage, sabotage warfare by targeted hacking, and other forms of cyber disruption of state apparatus and essential public infrastructure. What would make such an endeavour ominous is the impunity with which such activities can be carried out and the inherent plausible deniability by state actors in such disruptive and destabilising behaviour.
Given the sensitivities attached to communication, information technology, data security and cyberspace, countries around the world have taken cognitions of the same. And it is in this light that the Protection from Scams Bill is to be seen. Given this backdrop, there is a greater need for cooperation and coordination between states and their respective law enforcement agencies to act against these syndicates before they turn out to be Frankenstein’s monster. It is also in this light that there is a need for greater convergence of attitudes, approaches and cooperation within the intentional community with regard to the evolving global cyberspace and data and information systems security architecture.
*****
*Dr. Sripathi Narayanan, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Singapore proposes unprecedented law to stop stubborn victims from sending money to scammers, The Straits Times, November 12, 2024,
[ii] Scam victims in S’pore lost $385.6m in first half of 2024 as number of cases hits high of 26,587, The Straits Times, August 22, 2024,
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/scam-victims-in-s-pore-lost-3856m-in-first-half-of-2024-as-number-of-cases-hit-high-of-26587, accessed on November 11, 2024.
[iii] Singapore proposes unprecedented anti-scam powers for police amid support, privacy concerns, South China Morning Post, November 20, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3287325/singapore-proposes-unprecedented-anti-scam-powers-police-amid-support-privacy-concerns, accessed on November 20, 2024.
[iv] Singapore proposes unprecedented law to stop stubborn victims from sending money to scammers, The Straits Times, November 12, 2024,
[v] The Global Anti-Scam Alliance, https://www.gasa.org/about, accessed on November 25, 2024.
[vi] Transnational Crime and Geopolitical Contestation along the Mekong, International Crisis Group, August 18, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/332-transnational-crime-and-geopolitical-contestation-mekong, accessed on December 5, 2024.
[vii] Developing International and Internal Labour Migration Governance in Myanmar, International Labour Organisation,
https://www.ilo.org/projects-and-partnerships/projects/developing-international-and-internal-labour-migration-governance-myanmar#:~:text=International%20migration,%2C%20corruption%2C%20extortion%20and%20fraudulence, accessed on November 27, 2024.
[viii] Solving the Myanmar migrant surge, Bangkok Post, September 17, 2024, https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2866687/solving-the-myanmar-migrant-surge, accessed on November 27, 2024.
[ix] China tells Myanmar to ‘root out’ scam gangs, Bangkok Post, July 26, 2023, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2618314/china-tells-myanmar-to-root-out-scam-gangs, accessed on December 2, 2024.
[x] The Latest on Southeast Asia’s Transnational Cybercrime Crisis, United States Institute of Peace, October 30, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/10/latest-southeast-asias-transnational-cybercrime-crisis, accessed on November 20, 2024.
[xi] UN warns of growing tech threat from Southeast Asia’s cyber scam gangs, Voice of America, October 7, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/un-warns-of-growing-tech-threat-from-southeast-asia-s-cyber-scam-gangs/7813703.html, November 20, 2024.
[xii] Hundreds of thousands forced to scam in SE Asia: UN, BBC, August 30, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66655047, accessed on December 9, 2024.
[xiii] South-east Asian scam centres a growing regional security threat, The Straits Times, September 27, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-east-asian-scam-centres-a-growing-regional-security-threat, accessed on November 25, 2024.
[xiv] China tells Myanmar to ‘root out’ scam gangs, Bangkok Post, July 26, 2023, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2618314/china-tells-myanmar-to-root-out-scam-gangs, accessed on December 2, 2024.
[xv] Golden Triangle: How Crypto Scammers Found a Criminal Paradise in Laos, Bloomberg, August 19, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-golden-triangle-special-economic-zone/, accessed on December 6, 2024.
[xvi] Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia: A Growing Threat to Global Peace and Security, United States Institute of Peace, May 13, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/05/transnational-crime-southeast-asia-growing-threat-global-peace-and-security, accessed on November 27, 2024.
[xvii] Treasury Sanctions the Zhao Wei Transnational Criminal Organization, US Department of Treasury, January 30, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0272, accessed on December 9, 2024.
Treasury Sanctions Cambodian Tycoon and Businesses Linked to Human Trafficking and Forced Labor in Furtherance of Cyber and Virtual Currency Scams, US Department of Treasury, September 12, 2024, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2576, accessed on December 9, 2024.
[xix] Golden Triangle: How Crypto Scammers Found A Criminal Paradise in Laos, Bloomberg, August 19, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-golden-triangle-special-economic-zone/, accessed on December 6, 2024.
[xx] Inside the Dark World of Asia’s Golden Triangle, Bloomberg, August 20, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2024-08-19/inside-the-dark-world-of-asia-s-golden-triangle, accessed on November 25, 2024.
[xxi] Southeast Asia scam centers swindle billions, Voice of America, June 14, 2024,
https://www.voanews.com/a/report-southeast-asia-scam-centers-swindle-billions/7655765.html, accessed on, December 6, 2024.
[xxii] China's all-out effort to wipe out scam syndicate families in northern Myanmar, Think China, November 21, 2023, https://www.thinkchina.sg/society/chinas-all-out-effort-wipe-out-scam-syndicate-families-northern-myanmar, accessed on December 2, 2024.
[xxiii] Transnational Crime and Geopolitical Contestation along the Mekong, International Crisis Group, August 18, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/332-transnational-crime-and-geopolitical-contestation-mekong, accessed on December 5, 2024.
[xxiv] Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia: A Growing Threat to Global Peace and Security, United States Institute of Peace, May 13, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/05/transnational-crime-southeast-asia-growing-threat-global-peace-and-security, accessed on November 27, 2024.
[xxv] Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia: A Growing Threat to Global Peace and Security, United States Institute of Peace, May 13, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/05/transnational-crime-southeast-asia-growing-threat-global-peace-and-security, accessed on November 27, 2024.
