Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction 

The ceasefire deal between Israel and Hezbollah, halting the recent conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, was finally successfully reached on 27 November 2024 after tough negotiations. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in October 2024 to neutralise Hezbollah had driven West Asia deeper into crisis, with the death toll in Lebanon reaching more than 3,800. The ceasefire was brokered by both the US and France ,the latter was added as a mediator to the deal only after it reversed and softened its stance on arresting the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, if he visited France, in accordance with the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for war crimes in Gaza. This swing in French foreign policy in the region is not new, and France has always had shifts in its policy towards Israel. This paper seeks to evaluate the reasons for oscillations in French foreign policy in West Asia. 

Changing French Policy in the Region: Determinants and Challenges 

In October 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron stressed the need for arms-exporting countries to contain Israeli actions in Lebanon by calling for a halt to “delivering weapons to fight in Gaza.” However, France backtracked from its obligations to arrest Netanyahu, as a signatory to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), by invoking “immunity” for the Prime Minister, as Israel is not an ICC member. France’s stance on Israel’s actions in Lebanon reflects an aspiration to not only lead Europe in diffusing tensions in West Asia but to carefully have a foot in both camps. This is why, after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denounced President Macron’s statements about an arms embargo as a “shame,” Macron’s office rushed to clarify and reaffirm the steadfast nature of French-Israeli friendship while banning Israeli defence companies from participating at the Euronaval Fair.[i]

The French foreign policy towards the Israel-Palestine issue has been a series of pendulum swings between Israel and Palestine since 1948. France’s interest and influence in the West Asian region have been shaped by its historical experiences in Lebanon, Syria and other countries in the region. French influence in West Asia had waned after the independence of Lebanon and Syria there, and former President Charles de Gaulle’s pro-Arab policy had helped rectify it in at least Lebanon as well as create goodwill with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and others by, for example, France’s support to the Arabs in the 1967 Six Day War. De Gaulle’s pro-Arab, which lasted from 1958 to 1969, sided with Arab countries over Israel in Israel-Arab disputes. De Gaulle had imposed an arms embargo on Israel during the war. France was the only major power that had an official pro-Arab policy geared towards the Arab countries instead of a broader West Asian policy. 

Nevertheless, France has always called for a two-state solution between Israel and  Palestinethat would be mutually beneficial. Coming to French-Israeli relations, France was one of the first countries in the world to recognise the state of Israel and reportedly helped Israel develop its nuclear programme, being their main arms provider during 1952–59. After De Gaulle resigned as the President in 1969, France moved away from the pro-Arab policy due to the backlash from the Jewish community and the change in its domestic politics. French society is known to host the largest Jewish and Muslim communities in Europe, which makes navigating the tricky waters of the West Asian dispute complex for France. 

Macron has maintained a delicate balance to not offend the sensibilities of either community, as the recent legislative elections have proved popular support for him is waning. While France’s left-wing leaders, like Jean Luc Mélenchon, firmly stand by the Palestinian cause, right-wingers like Marine Le Pen and her party, National Rallyhave shifted towards the Israeli side as part of her attempt to shed the party’s anti-Semitic image, such as by expelling her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, from his party after he repeated anti-Semitic statements. The strategy to move away from her father’s stance has paid off as Marine has gained an increased vote share in the 2024 elections in France and support from Lebanon’s Christian population, among other achievements. 

A key determinant in French foreign policy towards Israel is the European Union’s overall foreign policy that France has to align with. The EU’s central framework for dealing with West Asia is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process, which aims to promote economic, political and cultural cooperation. This partnership guides Europe’s policy towards countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Palestinian territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. West Asia is significant for Europe for its security interests and containment of the influx of refugees and terrorism from West Asia. Hence, Europe has been working towards encouraging democratic reforms in the region through the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Towards this goal, Europe has stipulated respect for human rights as a condition for financial support to the above-mentioned countries, and any violation would result in the suspension of trade and aid. However, the policy has had little success. For instance, bringing peace and stability to the region has not been largely fulfilled. Europe has not been able to negotiate the Israel-Lebanon borders or engage Syria successfully in this border dispute, even though it believes Syrian presence is key for a successful border negotiation. European success, except for macroeconomic stability, in these initiatives has been slow after the Arab Spring, and the lack of  EU’s unity is a major factor in bringing this about. 

Although there has been some cooperation in European countries when it comes to calling for an immediate ceasefire of hostilities by the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, and condemnation of the attacks on United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) by France, Italy and Spain in a joint statement as “unjustifiable”- the EU has remained divided in voting for a ceasefire in Gaza in the UN resolutions. In the ES-10/21 UN Resolution adopted on 27 October 2023 by the UN General Assembly, aimed at an immediate humanitarian truce in Gaza, eight members of the EU voted in favour of the resolution, while four opposed it. Other EU members abstained from voting altogether .France’s inability to influence the Israel-Palestine crisis is steeped in a broader European stalemate and has impacted its ability to take initiatives in this regard. 

Conclusion 

Macron’s statements about Israel’s war against Hezbollah and its active involvement in the peace process demonstrate a will of France to protect its interests in Lebanon. This does not mean, however, abandoning its carefully curated, balanced approach to taking sides in the conflict. Over decades, France has manoeuvred by taking active leadership in Europe. This has unfolded in the form of the Mediterranean Union, a union proposed by France that aimed to tackle security concerns in a more practical manner and the recognition of the rights of Palestine and the Palestine Liberation Organisation in peace negotiations in the EU at France’s behest. France is also one of the largest contributors to UNIFIL and architectural security in West Asia. Therefore, France might continue to pursue consolidation in the European policy to West Asia and the 2002 “Roadmap for Peace” for a two-state solution, aligning with France’s official policy. If France chooses to go with a more concise and proactive foreign policy, it would overcome the European divide in the foreign policy to Israel and Palestine and may help bring a timely halt to the hostilities.

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*Aishwarya Upreti, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

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Endnote

[i] Euronaval Fair is an international naval defense and maritime security related trade show, that brings together different countries around the world to exhibit their naval equipment. The 2024 Euronaval Fair was held in Paris.