Indian Council of World Affairs

Certain Latin American countries, such as Chile, Argentina, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador, are dealing with illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing[i] by the Chinese Distant Water Fleet (DWF) that has led to the depletion of marine reserves, harmed the ecosystem and affected the fishing industry. Additionally, it infringes upon the sovereignty of these countries. The region with its enormous coastline and extensive marine resources depends substantially on it. Around 85% of seafood in the region is obtained by artisanal fishing communities, while seafood makes up around 10% of daily nutrition. In addition, 4.5% of the region’s GDP is attributed to its marine industry. Hence, its discernible that the region depends a lot on its marine reserves. 

While IUU in Latin American waters is not a recent phenomenon, of late such instances have increased manifold, leading to confrontation[ii]between local fishing communities and the Chinese DWF. IUU activities by Chinese boats are organised, with various ships and boats of multipledimensions. Aninteresting aspect is the “floating cities,” or a group of fishing vessels that deploy many artificial lights for fishing[iii]. The floating cities usually number 600 ships and cover huge areas of the open sea and the sheer number outweighs local fishing communities thatdepend on small boats and trawlers for their operations, leading to depleted income. 

The effects of such illegal fishing operations are manifold. Not only does this affect the ecosystem of the region, but it has led to the steady depletion of marine reserves. It has also caused significant financial harm to fishing communities and to the economy of such countries. Illegal fishing also leads to a surge in demand for seafood and prices, thus depriving consumers in the region. 

IUU fishing goes beyond mere financial and ecological dimensions as it is a testimony to China’s larger geopolitical ambitions and highlights its ambition to gain dominance over open seas and theirresources. Ironically, even though China is a major partner to many Latin American countries and has invested in various economic projects, such illegal activities continue unhindered. Latin American countries that are affected by IUU fishing have on many occasions voiced their concerns, and their navies have challengedthe Chinese DWF, but the scale of illegal Chinese operations is so large and paradoxically organised that it turns out to be a herculean task to thwart it. 

This paper explains IUU fishing in Latin America by the Chinese DWF and its broader implications, responses and challenges. 

Illegal Fishing by Chinese Vessels in Latin America 

While many countries engage in fishing away from their coastal areas, the majority of IUU fishing worldwide is carried out by China’s DWF. An estimated 600 ships in China’s distant-water fishing (DWF)[iv]engage in IUU fishing near Latin American countries, particularly near the Pacific coastline of South America, notably near Ecuador, Chile, Peru and Colombia. In addition, such illegal operations have extended to the Atlantic coast of Argentina and Brazil. 

The world relies on marine resources for 20% of its nutrition, but as stocks deplete, competition increasingly heats up. China consumes the greatest quantity of seafood in the world, accounting for 45% of total worldwide tonnage[v].Furthermore, China is the world’s largest seafood producer, accounting for 35% of global seafood output in 2023 and its leading exporter. To cater to its domestic demand and maintain control over marine resources, the Chinese DWF plays a crucial part, which of course poses a rising transnational danger to the judicial use of resources while also infringing on other nations’ sovereignty. 

The Chinese DWF that regularly threatens Ecuador’s Galápagos Islands does more than just fish for predators. The vessels also discharge tonnes of rubbish into the sea, killing animals, polluting the seas and ruining an ecosystem that supports over 7,000 indigenous species[vi]. In 2023, over a hundred Chinese fishing vessels were discovered, capturing sharks from waters around the Galapagos Islands. To avoid detection, they were using deactivated transponders. Ecuadorian rules allow only artisanal fishing by a small number of native fishermen in the Galapagos as part of the country’s marine protected area resource management program. 

Since 2018, Chinese fishing vessels have spent a significant amount of time fishing in Argentina’s Exclusive Economic Zone and on the high seas, frequently with their transponders turned off to prevent detection. However, the danger has persisted ever since. Every year, the Chinese fishing fleet fishes outside Argentina’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). In 2016[vii], Argentine military boats sank a fishing trawler of the Chinese DWF after it was detected fishing illegally within the country’s exclusive economic zone. Chile, Brazil and Colombia have often reported squid fishing by illegal trawlers, long-liners and jiggers belonging to the Chinese DWF, which has increased over time. 

China’s DWF participates in a wide range of harmful activities in the waters of Latin America, such as overfishing, the intentional and unintentional capture of protected species, the use of trawls and sea nets[viii] and other practices that hasten fishery collapse, pollution from plastics and other waste and illegal fishing and entry into the region’s maritime protected areas and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). In Latin America, the Chinese fishing fleet mostly catches shortfin and giant squid, even during the breeding season. While some fishing vessels operate independently of one another, there is a unique phenomenon known as floating cities, which are made up of vessels clustered together in large formations and use artificial lights to attract marine life. These floating cities are often made up of more than 600 vessels and are more than a match for the patrol vessels of the navies of Latin American countries. 

Chinese fishing vessels park in open seas along sea boundaries and then cross the border into domestic waters to target other nations’ waterways. 

In addition to concealing their incursions, Chinese fishing vessels frequently offload their fish to container ships and refuel at sea rather than putting them into Latin American ports where they can be checked. To avoid inspections and the law, Chinese fishing vessels turn off their (AIS) Automatic Identification System and show a flag of convenience from another nation. The Chinese DWF fleet’s ownership and administration are complicated and opaque. Vessel ownership is severely dispersed among numerous tiny entities, and registration takes place in multiple jurisdictions. 

Patrol vessels frequently warn and chase such illegal ships, but the sheer number of them makes it difficult for them to ensure the sanctity of their territorial waters. 

Larger Implications 

Every year, an estimated 24% of the marine catch in Latin America goes unreported. Of this, 50% is traded illegally, resulting in direct revenue losses ranging from $4.3 billion to $8.3 billion[ix]. With an annual revenue of approximately $36 billion, it ranks as the sixth-largest criminal sector globally. While Chinese vessels make up three-quarters of all foreign vessels in Latin American seas, IUU fishing deprives these nations of 8%–15% of their yearly catch. For instance, one of the most prized and traded catchesissquid, which hasa short lifespan and breeding season and ishighlyexpensive in the international market. Illegal and unregulated fishing has led to a serious depletion of the squid population with virtually negligible chance for these marine creatures to replenish. It is believed that annually around 600,000 to 800,000 tonnes of squid are caught within the vicinity of Latin America. IUU fishing endangers ocean ecosystems, leads to marine pollution, inhibits sustainable fisheries, which are essential to global food security, and disadvantages artisanal fishing communities. IUU fishing is responsible for up to one of every five fish captured globally, costing the legitimate fishing sector over $8 billion each year in Latin America. 

IUU fishing frequently occurs with other illegal activities, such as human trafficking and forced labour. Such fishing vessels are frequently used to transport persons, narcotics and weapons, as well as commit piracy. IUU fishing activities are extremely sophisticated, and these activities jeopardise internationally recognised fishing regimes and pose challenges to international governance. 

Response and Challenges 

Latin American governments are concerned about IUU fishing by Chinese DWF and its impact, with several voicing their concerns. Additionally, they have condemned Chinese fishing vessels for using illegal fishing methods that destroy marine sustainability and deplete the primary fishing grounds. The responses from these countries include strengthening their navies and hemispheric cooperation and creating frameworks for combatting IUU. 

Latin American navies are rapidly deploying Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs)[x], which are multipurpose and well-suited for following or stopping illicit vessels. Such OPVs can transport helicopters and drones, and they are swift enough to scan broad regions. Argentina has modified its consequences for illicit fishing, including requiring violators to pay for losses and pursuing approaching vessels. It recently inducted four OPVs from France to boost its naval strength.Peru signed an agreement with South Korea to build a multi-role vessel and an OPV. It also inducted 8 Río Pativilca-class patrol vessels to monitor its waters. Chile’s National Fisheries and Aquaculture Service used an artificial intelligence system to recognise and categorise photos of captured fish, with the goal of fighting illicit fishing. Additionally, drone monitoring is used to track violators[xi]. Ecuador approved legislation in June 2024 requiring the Ministry of Defence to continually monitor vessels in the exclusive economic zone and on the high seas, as well as maintain regular communication to get up-to-date information on the whereabouts of foreign fishing vessels. Ecuador is in the process of constructing various multi-purpose vessels in association with other countries. COTECMAR, Colombia’s shipbuilding firm, is developing frigates and offshore patrol vessels for the navy. 

Hemispheric cooperation is another aspect of responses undertaken over the years against IUU fishing by the Chinese DWF[xii]. Panama, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, Costa Rica and Brazil all backed greater openness and monitoring via open data. Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Colombia released a joint statement declaring increased coordination to combat IUU fishing through information exchange. The US has also extended assistance in the form of resources and expertise. Since 2015, the US Coast Guard has given around 50 vessels to South American countries[xiii]. Additionally, it sends 15 training teams to the region annually to assist them in tackling IUU fishing. 

Although there are frameworks for combatting IUU fishing, implementation turns out to be difficult due to various reasons, such as lack of coordination and dynamics of relations among member states, and lack of effective enforcement of regulations. One of the key mechanisms is the Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA)[xiv] which has been ratified by 69 countries and which limits illegal fishing by denying such vessels access to port facilities and sale of illegal catch. Additionally, countries in Latin America have implemented a variety of measures[xv], including hemispheric fisheries patrols, which are occasionally conducted in collaboration with regional partners, bilateral fishing agreements, and Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO)[xvi]. 

Despite efforts by Latin American countries and in the larger context of the hemisphere, certain challenges are persistent. Dealing with IUU has proven to be significantly difficult for Latin American fleets, owing to structural limits, a preference for huge vessels, and insufficient power for extended operations. While these fleets have the capability for large-scale conflicts[xvii], they are still inadequate in terms of patrolling capabilities. Patrolling vessels are still scarce in relation to these countries’ extensive coastlines. Furthermore, large EEZs, oceanographic conditions like storms, disturbed logistics, fiscal constraints and technical gaps are also hurdles. Cooperation among countries in the region is also subject to bureaucratic logjams and differences in the naval capacities of participating countries[xviii]. 

China has repeatedly denied its role in fostering IUU fishing, and according to a white paper published in 2023, Beijing claims that it has strict policies to hinder IUU fishing and has implemented measures, such as restricting fishing during breeding seasons, limiting the amount of total permissible catch and cooperatingwith other countries and international agencies. 

There are, however, concerns emanating from Latin America, such as subsidies[xix] granted to the Chinese DWF thatmake it a formidable force, lack of sanctions or actions taken against erring vessels and lack of openness regarding operations in the EEZs of Latin American countries. Besides, the sheer size of the Chinese DWF, its requirement for marine resources, and the geopolitical ambitions of Beijing, coupled with economic relations, make it difficult for Latin American countries to tackle IUU fishing in its vicinity.

Conclusion 

Latin American countries, which depend on marine ecosystems, are facing a persistent challenge of IUU fishing by Chinese DWF, and yet solutions are limited. China denies its complicity even though it subsidises its DWF and encourages operations away from its territorial waters, leaving little room for cooperation between China and Latin America. China’s denial of involvement in IUU fishing precludes the possibility of dialogues and resolution in the matter. Apart from that, China’s position as an important economic partner makes it difficult for these countries to voice their concerns in a more assertive fashion. IUU fishing is not only responsible for depriving the region of its financial prospects but also harming artisanal fishing communities and the marine ecosystem. The Chinese DWF is also an aspect of Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions, which may later turn out to be a potential security issue for the entire hemisphere. While Latin American countries have responded in varying capacities, there is a need to boost naval capacities and ensure broader cooperation and enforcement of existing regulations to tackle IUU fishing.

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*Dr. Arnab Chakrabarty, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i]Illegal fishing violates laws and regulations and occurs when fishing operations go unreported or are misreported to authorities. Often such vessels engage in false flags to dupe naval forces and evade patrols.

[ii]In 2001, about twenty Chinese fishing vessels—typically classified as Distant Water Fleets (DWFs)—started to arrive in the Latin American maritime context. Since then, their numbers have been steadily growing, with the most recent estimates indicating that there are currently about 500 of them.

[iii] Guillermo Saavedra. (2023). Chinese fishing vessels’ ‘floating cities’ prey on Latin American seas. Dialogo Americas. Accessed December 23, 2024. https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/chinese-fishing-vessels-floating-cities-prey-on-latin-american-seas/.

[iv] Neal Kuo. (2024). US, Argentina to cooperate, combat illegal Chinese fishing. Voice of Americas. Accessed December 22, 2024. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-argentina-to-cooperate-combat-illegal-chinese-fishing/7547142.html.

[v] The Economist. (2024). South America governments are trying to curb illegal fishing. Accessed December 17, 2024.https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/10/05/south-american-governments-are-trying-to-curb-illegal-fishing.

[vi] ALSUM. (2024). Pesca ilegal factor irritante en la relación económica entre China y América Latina. Accessed December 14, 2024. https://alsum.co/noticias/pesca-ilegal-factor-irritante-en-la-relacion-economica-entre-china-y-america-latina/.

[vii] CADAL. (2024). La pesca China amenaza la soberanía marítima de Perú. Accessed December 16, 2024. https://www.cadal.org/publicaciones/articulos/?id=16985.

[viii] Julieta Pelcastre. (2024). Chinese Fishing Fleet under the Limelight in Latin American Waters. AccessedDecember15, 2024. https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/chinese-fishing-fleet-under-the-limelight-in-latin-american-waters/.

[ix] Ian Urbina et. al. (2024). How Chinese fishing vessels dominate domestic waters across the globe. TIME. Accessed December19, 2024. https://time.com/7006513/china-illegal-fishing-ocean-investigation/.

[x] Wilder Alejandro Sanchez. (2024). How Latin American Navies combat illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing. CSIS, Accessed December 12, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-latin-american-navies-combat-illegal-unreported-or-unregulated-fishing.

[xi] Gonzalo Torrico. (2021). South America plans regional response to China’s squid fleet. Accessed December 17, 2024. https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/south-america-plans-regional-response-to-china-s-squid-fleet.

[xii] Evan Ellis. (2020). Do Latin American waters continue to fall prey to China’s fishing? CSIS. Accessed December 27, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/do-latin-american-waters-continue-fall-prey-chinas-fishing.

[xiii] Hernan Medrano Marin. (2024). Pesca ilegal: el impacto de la flota China la pota peruana y el llamado de alertas. El Comercio. https://elcomercio.pe/lima/sucesos/embarcaciones-chinas-en-mar-de-peru-la-polemica-por-su-ingreso-a-puertos-peruanos-pesca-ilegal-de-pota-y-evasion-de-controles-por-que-subio-el-precio-de-la-pota-marina-de-guerra-barcos-chinos-noticia/?ref=ecr.

[xiv]The PSMA requires fishing vessels to obtain permission to dock at other countries’ ports and give information about their activities. Permission to dock can be denied if a vessel is found to be involved in IUU fishing practices.

[xv] Evan Ellis. (2018). Chinese continue rampant fish poaching in Latin American waters. Accessed December 26, 2024. https://www.newsmax.com/evanellis/latin-america-fishing-china/2018/12/13/id/894322/.

[xvi]Paola Rosenberg. (2024). La pesca incontrolada China alerta a los gobiernos con los principales caladeros amenazados. Universidad de Navarra. Accessed December 22, 2024. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/la-pesca-incontrolada-china-alerta-a-los-gobiernos-con-los-principales-caladeros-amenazados-3. https://www.infobae.com/america/.

[xvii] Felix Arias Schreiber. (2023). La pesca ilegalChina en el mar peruano: ¿que representa para el Perú y sus trabajadores?Infobae. AccessedDecember21, 2024.

[xviii] SANHV. (2024). El oscuro negocio de la pesca China en aguas Argentinas. Sin Azul no hay Verde. Accessed December23, 2024. https://sanhv.org/el-oscuro-negocio-de-la-pesca-china-en-aguas-argentinas/.

[xix] InSight Crime. (2024). Gamechangers: How IUU fishing plundered Latin America’s oceans. Accessed December26, 2024. https://insightcrime.org/news/gamechangers-2021-iuu-fishing-plundered-latin-americas-oceans/.