Indian Council of World Affairs

In recent years, a populist zeitgeist has clasped European politics. As evident in the recent EU elections, as well as the prevailing political instability in the aftermath of the national elections in Germany and France, the two power centres of the European Union, the right-wing populist parties, have emerged as favourites of the electorates. Consequently, the other mainstream parties have been forced to react to the agendas of these populist parties and sometimes adopt elements of populist rhetoric on issues like migration. 

It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the right-wing populist parties are now setting the agendas and dominating the public debates in Europe. They are no longer the fringe elements of European politics and are enjoying greater acceptability in many European societies. At the centre of this shift are leaders like Viktor Orban, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, amongst others. 

This short piece is part of a series of articles on these leaders who have gained immense popularity in domestic as well as broader European politics and have been reshaping the European debates on major issues, such as migration, security and even the very existence of the European Union. 

Viktor Orban, who first became the Prime Minister of Hungary in 1998, remains a controversial figure in European politics. His right-wing, nationalistic, anti-immigrant and alleged pro-Putin politics have kept Hungary out of mainstream European politics and have contributed to a much-stressed relationship between Brussels and Budapest on issues, such as immigration and the ongoing war in Ukraine.  This paper attempts to highlight the main political ideas of Viktor Orban and his role as a Prime Minister in guiding and shaping the domestic and foreign policies of Hungary. 

The Formative Years

Will you be surprised if I say that today’s Viktor Orban, who invokes the cultural-religious identity of Hungary and is now a more conservative figure in Europe, entered Hungarian politics as a young leader, always dressed casually in his denim with long hair and scruffy beard, advocating Soviet withdrawal, free and fair elections, and a transition to a multi-party democracy?

Orban started in politics as a liberal anti-communist activist while studying law in Budapest and later went on to study on a research fellowship at Oxford, supported by George Soros, who, ironically, remains a much-hated figure in Budapest now. 

In 1988, just when the Soviet Union was having its last breath, Orban founded the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), along with some other like-minded activists, to promote freedom and democracy in Hungary.[i] Since then, Viktor Orban has continued to be the undisputed leader of the party in terms of its programmes and policies. Today, the Fidesz, which functioned as a movement of young Hungarian liberals and opposed the ruling Hungarian Socialist Working Party, affiliated with the Soviet Union, is now at the centre of the populist reshaping of Europe. 

Originally founded as a youth organisation, Fidesz was transformed into a political party, contested the first democratic elections in 1990, and secured 22 seats of 386 in the parliament. The Fidesz leaders took the opposition seat and remained true to their image of young democratic leaders. Nothing changed in terms of how they dressed themselves even after formally venturing into politics. Orban, along with his other colleagues, kept his long hair and beard while wearing jeans and open-neck shirts.[ii] These young leaders continued pushing for liberal reforms while furiously condemning any hints of a nationalistic and antisemitic turn by the ruling party. However, within four years of poor electoral performance, Orban had changed, and with him changed Fidesz and Hungarian politics. 

Viktor’s U-Turn

As Hungary began to march towards a democratic path at the beginning of the 1990s, Orban’s strong influence on Fidesz began to be felt. In the next three years, Fidesz was transformed into a more nationalistic and centrist party, its liberal faces sidelined, and Orban emerged as its undisputed leader.[iii] Although disputes remain on why Orban chose to leave his liberal background and gradually shifted towards the centre-right, most political commentators believe that Orban’s dejection of liberalism was the result of practical political calculations. 

The existing political landscape in Hungary was already dominated by the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP), offering social and economic liberalism and the idea of social justice in domestic politics along with internationalism and a pro-European approach, which offered little space for the Orban-led Fidesz, which had also adopted the same ideals.[iv] Thus, Fidesz's performance in its first two elections in 1990 and 1994 convinced Orban to turn towards the centre-right of the political spectrum. As his politics progressed, particularly after his defeat in the 2002 national elections, Orban’s politics took a further right turn. Orban blamed the Hungarian media for his loss in the elections and made sure, after winning power back in 2010, that the media remained under his control. 

Once a liberal democrat, Orban, formally ingrained in the nationalistic-conservative ideas, is now the darling of the right and the far-right political movements across Europe. The same Viktor Orban, under whose watch Hungary became a part of NATO and saw its transition to a free-market economy to join the EU eventually, is now the cheerleader of the European populist and nationalistic right. 

Orban, however, was not the only leader in post-Soviet space who changed his political orientation. Milos Zeman, the former President of the Czech Republic, and a liberal dissident who stood against the Soviet system, also charted a rightward path. Leaders in other countries, such as Poland, have also invoked populist ideas to win elections. These politicians used the post-2008 chaotic emotions to gain popularity in their respective countries, which had largely failed to facilitate a smooth transition from the Soviet to a post-Soviet democratic liberal system.[v]

Hungary: The Illiberal Democracy

In a speech delivered on 26 July 2014 to the ethnic Hungarian students in Romania, Orban, who has been accused of democratic backsliding in Hungary, propounded his idea of an “illiberal democracy,” which has become the official policy of his government.[vi] The annual speech was delivered roughly a month after Orban began his third tenure as Prime Minister of Hungary. His “illiberal democracy” manifesto sought to change the very nature of the Hungarian state and was a further blow to the already struggling relationship between Hungary and the EU. 

The need to overhaul the existing political structure had a context. The liberal Hungarian state that succeeded the Communist system, as per Orban, had failed to serve the nation’s interests, excluded the Hungarians living abroad from nationhood, did not protect community assets, and failed to save the country and its people from rising debt.[vii]

The core of his idea of illiberal democracy is the quest to find the most feasible method of governance, which should not necessarily be Western, liberal, or democratic.[viii] An illiberal democratic system, as envisioned by Orban, was aimed at “breaking with the dogmas and ideologies” of the West and laying the foundation of a new Hungarian state that is non-Western and non-liberal and yet globally competitive.[ix] For Orban, democracy and liberalism are not analogous but are independent of each other. A state can be democratic without necessarily following the tenets of Western liberal principles; this is simply the crux of his idea of “illiberal democracy.” 

However, Orban’s idea of democracy, which was originally conceived as non-Western and was bound to respect the ideals of freedom and human rights, has become illiberal in the literal sense. Even before he began to communicate his ideas of a new state, Orban began to consolidate his power right after winning his second term in 2010. His actions have been criticised for being responsible for weakening the democratic mechanisms of Hungary, tampering with press freedom, restricting civil society and even omitting the boundary between the party and the state.[x]

Orban: The Defender of Europe

Roughly a decade after the beginning of the migration crisis, the political dynamics in Europe have completely changed. The electoral success of populist and right-wing parties and leaders in countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Poland is largely attributed to the mismanagement of immigration, particularly the Muslim migration from the Middle East, in Europe. 

After the dreadful Charlie Hebdo terror attack, Viktor Orban was one of the 40 world leaders to have marched on the roads of Paris with approximately 1.5 million people as a gesture of solidarity with the French people. Approximately a decade afterwards, when a Saudi doctor rammed his vehicle into a Christmas market in Germany on 20 December 2024, killing at least five people and injuring 200 others, Orban blamed the EU policies on migration for the incident and claimed that such incidents started only after 2015, when Europe opened its door to illegal migration. 

Orban was quick to connect illegal immigration with organised crime and terrorism and offered his people security against the perceived economic, cultural, and public safety threats emanating from the Muslim migrants.[xi] Soon the contempt for immigrants turned into contempt for the European Union and its leadership, and it continues to facilitate the current Euroscepticism of Orban and the European far-right. Orban’s criticism of immigration was not only limited to political rhetoric. He has used his position as a head of an EU state and a populist leader to oppose and defy EU laws on immigration, advocated the construction of border fences, and heavily criticised the European liberal and left-wing political elite, whom he collectively referred to as “Brusselian bureaucrats” and civil activists.[xii]

One important aspect of his opposition to immigrants has been the public invocation of European Christian values and the need to preserve them. In an op-ed, Orban blamed the crisis on the EU’s “failed immigration policies” and said that the migrants come from a different culture and follow a set of values not compatible with Europe.[xiii] It is no more surprising that a person who opposed the Pope’s visit to Hungary in 1991 and mocked Christian Democrats in the parliament is now acting as the protector of Christian values. Christianity has played an important role in his politics since he migrated to the right. To strengthen his case, he remarried his wife in a church ceremony in 1996 and got his children baptised.

Media, Migration, Modifications and Moscow: The 4Ms of Orban’s Winning Cocktail

In 2022, Viktor Orban won his fourth consecutive election to lead Hungary. Since he was elected Prime Minister in 2010, after a gap of eight years, he has never looked back and has continued to win elections with a thumping majority. At the core of his winning strategy lies his populist policies, a well-managed media, electoral gerrymandering and even the ongoing war in Ukraine. 

Press freedom under Viktor Orban has remained a much-discussed topic in the EU. Free media has consistently suffered Orban’s onslaught and has recorded an unprecedented decline since he came to power for a second term. A Joint International Press Freedom Mission to Hungary in 2019 concluded that the “Hungarian government has systematically dismantled media independence, freedom and pluralism; distorted the media market and divided the journalistic community in the country, achieving a degree of media control unprecedented in an EU member state.”[xiv]

Orban, on the other hand, has accused the domestic media and NGOs of leftist and liberal bias and propagating fake news and has made allegations against many Western media outlets for undermining his government. He used these allegations to bring together all the publicly funded TV and radio channels under one centralised media authority to better control these networks.[xv] In a recent action, following Trump’s decision to dismantle the USAID, Orban has expressed his decision to classify NGOs and media houses receiving US or international funding as foreign agents and to eliminate them through legal actions.[xvi]

Since 2015, Orban has made migration the central focus of his electoral campaign and has spent millions of euros on public information to shape the public debate on immigration in his favour.[xvii] The transformation of the media landscape has greatly helped Orban to penetrate his anti-immigration agenda deeper into Hungarian society. As part of the EU, Orban has consistently defied EU policies on migration and focused on his controversial immigration laws.[xviii] Even missing out on billions of euros from the EU has not deterred Orban from enacting draconian laws like criminalising lawyers and activists found helping asylum seekers. 

Orban has used his popularity and power to change electoral laws in his favour to such an extent that the opposition, even if greatly united, is finding it difficult to defeat him.[xix] The structural bias in Hungary’s electoral system now works against the opposition parties in such a way that Orban managed to win despite all pre-poll surveys (even pro-Orban) projecting his loss in the 2022 elections.[xx] One significant example of this electoral bias is the legalisation of the concept of voter tourism, which allows non-residents to register for the elections in Hungary using addresses in Hungary, cross the border on Election Day, and then return to their respective countries of residence after casting their vote.[xxi] It could be argued that the new voters could vote for anyone they like but it should be kept in mind that the opposition has no access to this new voter database and thus it cannot leverage the voter tourism law in its favour even if it wants to.[xxii] The electoral bias is complemented by massive electoral benefits in the form of social welfare to the potential supporters that include increased pensions, income tax exemptions and fuel and food subsidies. Besides, the Hungarian government has also been involved in alleged gerrymandering, where new electoral constituencies have been drawn and reorganised behind closed doors and in non-transparent manners to suit the needs of Fidesz. 

The war in Ukraine has also found a place in election debates, where Orban has labelled the opposition leaders as warmongers for supporting Ukraine.[xxiii] Promising to ensure a constant supply of cheap Russian oil and gas for his electorate, he has constantly portrayed himself as the candidate of peace and security while at the same time accusing the opposition of entering into secret deals with Zelensky, whom he describes as an opponent. Ukraine has also been accused of orchestrating “smear campaigns” against the Hungarian Prime Minister, and the all-weather “foreign influence in the domestic politics” narrative has also been invoked against Ukraine by citing reports of Hungarian intelligence.[xxiv]

Orban’s EU Politics

Orban’s shift in domestic politics has been coterminous with his shift in the politics of the European Union. In 2021, Viktor Orban announced his decision to quit the largest, oldest and most influential centre-right EU parliamentary group, i.e., the European People’s Party. Fidesz had been a full member of the EPP since 2000. The EPP has been known to support, uphold and preserve the European way of life and promote a united Europe rooted in fundamental values, such as human dignity and respect for human rights. The increased threat to Hungary’s democratic institutions had made the democrats uncomfortable, and the growing rift was increasingly visible when the then Polish PM, Donald Tusk, declared that “a true Christian democrat does not oppose the rule of law, an independent judiciary, the free press and NGOs and does not tolerate xenophobia and nationalism.”[xxv]

The troubled relationship between Budapest and Brussels had been on the rise since the beginning of the migration crisis, and many leaders of the EPP, even though conservative, did not agree with the aggressive hate campaign that Orban had launched against the migrants and the EU policymakers for facilitating that migration. By 2021, the differences between Orban and EPP, owing to the anti-EU and anti-Brussels rhetoric, had broadened to such an extent that the EPP passed a rule making it easier to expel member parties. Orban decided to leave the group before the EPP could expel the Fidesz, whose membership was already suspended by 2019 as a disciplinary action against Hungary for breaching the EU’s fundamental values.[xxvi]

Although the pro-EU political groups from the centre-right to the centre-left managed to hold their ground, the 2024 EU parliamentary elections also saw the rise of far-right and populist parties. Even though the gains made by these parties fell short of the pre-poll projections, it came as a great moral booster for the far-right and populist leaders. The EU elections were followed by political instabilities in France and Germany, which continue to date. The far-right parties in both countries are riding on the waves of successful electoral performances and are enjoying greater popularity. Although Orban’s Fidesz managed to win 11 of 21 of the EU parliamentary seats, it was its weakest performance since Hungary joined the bloc.[xxvii] Yet this did not deter Orban from taking the leadership role of the far-right and populist parties in the EU Parliament. 

Following the elections, Orban mobilised the far-right and populist leaders across the EU to build a new coalition of the opposition called the “‘Patriots for Europe,” which replaced the Identity and Democracy, the former group of far-right parties in the EU parliament. Soon, with the inclusion of the French National Rally, the Patriots for Europe emerged as the third-largest group in the EU parliament. The other members include parties from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Poland and Estonia. 

These far-right, populist and nationalist parties are known Eurosceptics, although with varying degrees. They put great stress on the need to maintain the sovereignty of their respective countries and advocate restricting the power of the EU, which they believe is headed towards becoming a superstate under the current leadership. 

The formation of “Patriots for Europe” coincided with Hungary’s rotating presidency of the EU Council of Ministers beginning on 1st July 2024. Orban donned the Trumpian MAGA hat to set the EU agenda for the next six months as Hungary chose “Make Europe Great Again” as the motto of its presidency. The MEGA rhetoric encapsulates Orban’s vision of Europe and its core values — Christianity, strong nation-states, end to liberal EU policies on migration, resistance to bureaucratic overreach in Brussels, strengthening European border and improving European competitiveness. Although Orban declared the Hungarian presidency a “great success,”[xxviii] it proved to be largely confrontational and controversial as far as the broader EU-Hungary relations are concerned. Orban’s visit to Moscow and Beijing during this period further degraded the already stressed relationship between the EU and Hungary.[xxix] His meeting with President Putin was criticised by the EU as the bloc accused Orban of carrying out his policies without taking into confidence the interests of the EU and NATO. 

Hungary’s relationship with the EU under Orban has reached the level of diplomatic isolation of Budapest. Orban’s anti-EU rhetoric on the issues of immigration, his continued agitation against the bureaucrats in Brussels and his veto policy on the Ukraine War and NATO expansion have driven the pro-EU members towards bypassing Hungary on important initiatives and agreements. His uncoordinated and undeterred diplomatic outreach to Moscow, in the name of peace missions to bring an end to the war in Ukraine, has caused much uproar to such an extent that Hungary no longer remains a reliable partner for the EU. 

Conclusion

Trump’s MAGA current is now blowing across Europe threatening the very foundation of how European security was organised post-World War II. Leaders like Orban have found it feasible to attach themselves to this current as it not only threatens to weaken the traditional power centres in Europe and alter the European power structure but also validates to a larger extent the Hungarian domestic and European politics under Orban. Europe’s greatest fear that Trump will sideline it from the negotiations talk on the Russia-Ukraine war has now come true as Orban hopes for a possible integration of Russia in the European economy, security, and energy domain. If this happens, Orban’s position in the Hungarian domestic as well as foreign politics will further strengthen. 

*****

*Aman Kumar, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i] Paul Hockenos. “Hungary’s Descent Into Dictatorship,” Foreign Policy, December 06, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/06/hungary-viktor-orban-democracy-dictatorship-illiberalism-eu/?tpcc=recirc_trending062921 (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[ii] Bulent Kenes. “Viktor Orban: Past to Present,” ECPS, August 2020, https://www.populismstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ECPS-Leader-Profile-Series-1-2.pdf (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[iii] Patrick Kingsley. “How a Liberal Dissident Became a Far-Right Hero, in Hungary and Beyond, The New York Times, April 06, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/world/europe/viktor-orban-hungary-politics.html (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Patrick Kingsley. “ How a Liberal Dissident Became a Far-Right Hero, in Hungary and Beyond, The New York Times, April 06, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/world/europe/viktor-orban-hungary-politics.html (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[vi] Viktor Orban. PM Speech at the 25^th Balvanyos Summer Free University and Student Camp, July 26, 2014, https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Amnesty International. What is going on in Illiberal democracy Hungary? Amnesty International, May 31, 2028, https://www.amnesty.nl/actueel/what-is-going-on-in-illiberal-democracy-hungary (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[xi] Bulent Kenes. “Viktor Orban: Past to Present,” ECPS, August 2020, https://www.populismstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ECPS-Leader-Profile-Series-1-2.pdf (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] Matthew Karnitsching. “Orban says migrants threaten Christian Europe”, Politico, September 03, 2015, https://www.politico.eu/article/orban-migrants-threaten-christian-europe-identity-refugees-asylum-crisis/ (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[xiv] Conclusion of the Joint International Press Freedom Mission to Germany, December 03, 2019, https://ipi.media/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Hungary-Conclusions-International-Mission-Final.pdf (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[xv] Bulent Kenes. “Viktor Orban: Past to Present,” ECPS, August 2020, https://www.populismstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ECPS-Leader-Profile-Series-1-2.pdf (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[xvi] Justin Spike. “Hungary’s Orban says he will do away with pro-democracy and right groups receiving U.S. aid,” Washington Post, February 07, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/07/orban-hungary-eliminate-ngos-usaid/c1eb0f48-e533-11ef-ab83-bb30e4340014_story.html (Accessed February 08, 2025).

[xvii] Andras BIRO-NAGY. “What makes Orban win,” Foundation for European Progressive Studies, June 08, 2018, https://feps-europe.eu/makes-orban-win/ (Accessed February 08, 2025).

[xviii] BBC. “Hungary’s Viktor Orban to defy EU over immigration law,” BBC, December 22, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59748173 (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[xix] Kim Lane Scheppele. "How Viktor Orbán Wins." Journal of Democracy, vol. 33 no. 3, 2022, p. 45-61. Project MUSE, https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2022.0039 (Accessed February 08, 2025).

[xx] Ibid.

[xxi] Matt Apuzzo and Benjamin Novak. “In Hungary, Viktor Orban Remakes an Election to His Liking,” New York Times, 31 March 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/31/world/europe/hungary-viktor-orban-election.html (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[xxii] Kim Lane Scheppele. "How Viktor Orbán Wins." Journal of Democracy, vol. 33 no. 3, 2022, p. 45-61. Project MUSE, https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2022.0039 (Accessed February 08, 2025).

[xxiii] Balint Magyer and Balint Madlovics. “Manipulated election entrenches Hungary’s autocracy,” The Strategist, April 05, 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/manipulated-election-entrenches-hungarys-autocracy/ (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[xxiv] TVP World. “ Hungarian intelligence accuses Ukraine of smear campaign PM Viktor Orban, TVP World, February 06, 2025, https://tvpworld.com/84895594/hungarian-secret-service-says-ukraine-smearing-orbn (Accessed February 08, 2025).

[xxv] Michal Goestkiewicz. “Poland, Hungary: How two close allies came to be estranged,” DW, February 02, 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/poland-hungary-how-two-close-allies-came-to-be-estranged/a-71530372 (Accessed February 08, 2025)

[xxvi]MAÏA DE LA BAUME and LILI BAYER, “Hungary’s Orban clings on to Europe’s power centre,” Politico Europe, March 20, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/orbans-party-suspended-from-european-peoples-party/, (Accessed February 08, 2025).

[xxvii] Justice Spike, “Hungary’s Orban shows weakest performance in EU elections in 20 years, opening path to pro-EU rival”, Associated Press, June 10, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/hungary-orban-eu-election-517b6b290d566ed4110f77f4a83ca3bb (Accessed February 08, 2024).

[xxviii] Hungarian Presidency. “Viktor Orban: A presidency marked by tremendous success,” HU24EU, December 19, 2024, https://hungarian-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/viktor-orban-a-presidency-marked-by-tremendous-success/ (Accessed February 08, 2025).

[xxix]Malek Fouda. “Hungary’s controversial presidency of the Council of the European Union comes to an end,” Euronews, December 31, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/2024/12/31/hungarys-controversial-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-european-union-comes-to-an-end (Accessed February 08, 2025).