Indian Council of World Affairs

The abrupt fall of the Assad regime in December last year came as a big blow to Russian interests in the Middle East as well as North Africa. The Russian intervention had stabilised the Assad regime in Syria and offered itself as a major security provider for many countries in North Africa, particularly the Sahel region. 

Russia used its military intervention in Syria, on behalf of Bashar al-Assad to increase its strategic presence in the Middle East and North Africa and boost its power projection at the international level. At the same time, through its direct involvement in the Syrian peace process, the Kremlin also emerged as a power broker in the region, making it an important player in the broader geopolitics of the Middle East. Besides the use of modern and sophisticated weapons helped Russia demonstrate its impressive firepower, which ultimately enabled it to earn major military export deals from weapon-importing countries. 

In an evolving Syrian landscape, Russia has immediate and long-term goals and interests. The immediate goal for the Russian leadership is to secure its military interest, particularly the naval base of Tartus, which has ensured constant Russian presence in the Mediterranean since the Cold War. In this context, one of the first requirements for the Kremlin is to cultivate a good working relationship with the new Syrian regime. This had become a pressing need given that the United States, Europe, Turkey and other Arab states have already started engaging with the new power centre in Damascus and some of them like Turkey, Qatar and Azerbaijan have also re-opened their embassy in the country.  This explains the first visit of an official Russian inter-agency delegation to the Syrian capital on 29 January this year.[i] The delegation was led by Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Foreign Minister and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Middle East and Africa. 

The Russian delegation which met the new leader of Syria had the same goal in mind as many other players: engage with the new government and gain some early influence, as the newcomers in Damascus are in desperate need of legitimacy, security, sanctions relief and aid for reconstruction. The good news for the Kremlin is that new rulers in Damascus have not yet demonstrated any significant hostility towards Russia, which ironically once bombed the same people that it is engaging now. Although the new leader of Syria, Ahmed al-Shara, emphasised[ii] the need to acknowledge past mistakes and requested compensation for the Russian-caused destruction in Syria, the Kremlin is at least welcomed[iii] in Damascus. 

The new Syrian leadership also understands the need to have Russia at its side, which, although engaged in its war in Ukraine, still has some influence left in the region. Of late, Russia has completely restructured its Wagner operations in Africa. It is now a major player in the region, particularly after the ouster of French and American troops from the Sahel. Thus, Russia may not only provide the necessary finance and capital for the reconstruction of Syria, but it can also help stabilise the new regime, which is still fresh out of the oven and needs to consolidate its position. The new leaders understand the fact that antagonising Russia, a military power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, may not be a wise thing to do at this juncture. 

The pragmatic approach undertaken by the new Syrian leadership has given Russia sufficient room to manoeuvre in its engagement with post-Assad Syria. In fact, in a recent development, the new Defence Minister has already hinted[iv] at the possibility of Russia keeping its strategic military bases in the country, provided it serves Syrian interests, days after the Al-Shara-led government cancelled[v] a port management deal with a Russian firm. Although the minister did not elaborate on the “Syrian interests” that could be served by Russia it could be possible that Russia may agree to fund the reconstruction of Syria and may help the new regime to rebuild the Syrian military in exchange for the military bases. Although the transition to the new government looks smooth the fact remains that the humanitarian situation in the country remains precarious with millions still in urgent need of support in terms of basic services and infrastructure.[vi] Syria also needs to provide for the returning refugees after a gradual improvement in the security situation. Russia, thus, may help the new regime to make the return of the displaced persons safe and sustainable by providing critical financial support.

As per some reports, Russia’s engagement in post-Assad Syria is not only restricted to keeping its military interests intact. The Kremlin wants to keep an eye on the constantly evolving domestic political calculus as it wants its supporters (from the Syrian opposition groups) to be politically represented in an inclusive transition of Syria to a new state. Thus, Moscow wants two groups, the Moscow Platform and the Cairo Platform[vii], to be represented in the National Dialogue Conference promised by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the interim President.[viii] The conference will be responsible for designing the future political programme of Syria, and thus, a seat for groups closer to Russia is highly desirable from a Kremlin perspective. Both the factions amidst the broader Syrian opposition to the Assad regime had participated in several UN-backed peace talks and had supported a negotiated settlement of the Syrian conflict rather than an abrupt downfall of Bashar al-Assad. 

It is a testing time for Russia’s diplomacy in Syria. It would be interesting to see how Russia navigates through many complexities in the Syrian transition process and carves a place for itself as a close and traditional friend in the new Syria. As of now, Russia is taking careful but important steps and is gradually engaging with the new regime to safeguard its status as a major player in the region. Initial reports hint that Russia has been successful in convincing the new regime to let it maintain some staff and equipment in the country. However, only time will tell how successful Russia has been in its diplomacy, but clearly, it has not given up on Syria.

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*Aman Kumar, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes 

[i] MFA. “Press release on the Russian inter-agency delegation’s visit to Damascus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, January 29, 2025, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1993528/ (Accessed February 02, 2025).

[ii] Sana. “Russian delegation visits Damascus, affirm respect for Syria’s sovereignty,” Sana News, January 29, 2025, https://sana.sy/en/?p=345511 (Accessed February 02, 2025).

[iii] Paul Sonne and Christina Goldbaum. “Russia seeking to salvage military bases, goes hat in hand to Syria,” New New York Times, February 02, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/02/world/europe/russia-syria-bases.html (Accessed February 05, 2025).

[iv] MT. “Syria could let Russia keep Air and Naval base, new Defence minister says,” The Moscow Times, February 06, 2025, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/02/06/syria-could-let-russia-keep-air-and-naval-bases-new-defense-minister-says-a87896 (Accessed February 08, 2025).

[v] Reuters. “Syria cancels port management contract with Russian firm, sources say,” Reuters, January 24, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-cancels-port-management-contract-with-russian-firm-sources-say-2025-01-24/ (Accessed February 02, 2025).

[vi] IHH. “Syria Situation Report”, Relief Web, 14 February 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/ihh-syria-situation-report-14-february-2025 (Accessed 15 February 2025)

[vii] The Moscow Platform and the Cairo Platform were one of the components of the Syrian Negotiation Commission which was formed in 2015 to represent a broad spectrum of the Syrian opposition forces. The SNC had the recognition of the UN as the sole representative of the Syrian opposition groups against the Assad regime. The Moscow Platform however have cancelled its membership in the SNC after the overthrow of the Assad regime, one of the negotiating parties. Both groups have supported the UN Resolution 2254 of 2015 which advocated ceasefire and political settlement of the Syrian civil war. Recently the SNC met the new leader of Syria and handed over all the documents related to the negotiation process to continue their work under the new realities in Syria.

[viii] Ragip Soylu. “Russia wants to reopen its embassy in Syria” Middle East Eye, January 29, 2025, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/russia-wants-reopen-its-embassy-syria (Accessed February 02, 2025).