Indian Council of World Affairs

24 February 2025 marked the third anniversary of the war in Ukraine, which began after Russia launched a “full-scale attack on Ukraine via land, air and sea.” Notwithstanding the several phases of offensives and counteroffensives led by Russia and Ukraine, no breakthrough has been achieved so far. As the newly elected President of the United States (US), Donald Trump upends his predecessor Joe Biden’s policy of supporting Ukraine; there are fresh conjectures regarding the future of peace in Ukraine. In this backdrop, this special report delves into the various dimensions of the Ukraine conflict. The first section delves into the roots and different phases of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. The second section highlights the various international peace mediation efforts in the last three years. The third section provides an analysis of the unfolding situation in the wake of transatlantic divisions with respect to the Ukraine peace process and concludes with outlining India’s position on the crisis.

Section I

Background

The war that began on 24 February 2022 in Ukraine was preceded by almost eight years of tensions between Ukraine and Russia. At the European Union’s (EU) Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit in 2013, then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych refused to enter into a planned Association Agreement, which entailed the country’s greater economic integration with Europe.[i] The failure of the EaP Summit paved the way for demonstrations in Ukraine that were divided by pro-Western and pro-Russian sentiments. As the situation deteriorated, President Yanukovych left the country on 22 February 2014 and sought refuge in Russia. In March 2014, Russia took over the Crimean Peninsula and organised a referendum in Crimea to showcase support for its occupation. The referendum was not recognised internationally and was followed by renewed Russia-Ukraine as well as West-Russia tensions. Since the developments of 2014, armed confrontation in Eastern Ukraine continued, as no breakthrough could be achieved despite the signing of Minsk Peace deals by Ukraine and Russia that were facilitated by France and Germany as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 

Amid the increasing tensions, sovereignty referendums were held in the Donbas region (Donetsk and Lugansk) of Eastern Ukraine, which primarily comprises of ethnic Russians, compounding the East-West divisions within Ukraine further. As a result, this region had continued to be embroiled in armed clashes since 2014. 

A new phase of the Ukraine crisis began in February 2022, after Russian President Vladimir Putin accorded recognition to the Donbas region and ratified “the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” with Donetsk and Lugansk on 21 February 2022[ii] and followed it up with a “full-scale attack on Ukraine via land, air and sea”.[iii]

A Long-Drawn Conflict: Different Phases since 2022 and Current Scenario 

The ongoing war in Ukraine has undergone various phases in the last three years. The first phase began with Russia’s attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and ended around 25 March 2022 when Russia announced the accomplishment of the “main objectives of the first stage of the operation.”[iv] Military activity from Russia reduced subsequently and several rounds of negotiations also took place between Russian and Ukrainian officials, the most notable being the Türkiye-brokered peace talks. However, the talks were halted following renewed tensions in the aftermath of the Bucha (a town in the outskirts of Ukraine’s capital Kyiv) controversy, where Russia was accused of committing war crimes.[v]

In mid-April 2022, Russia launched a new offensive in eastern Ukraine. By mid-August 2022, the war’s combat zone shifted to the southeast of Ukraine, including Zaporizhzhia, which hosts a nuclear plant. A major development that followed Russia’s renewed military operation was the counteroffensive launched by Ukraine in September 2022. Although Russia was able to control the situation later, the resistance from Ukraine was a defining moment of the conflict. Ukraine showcased resilience and even managed to regain control in the Kharkiv region during the counteroffensive. Following Ukraine’s counteroffensive, Russia launched a fresh offensive against Ukraine in February 2023 where it targeted the Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine. 

Ukraine launched another counteroffensive in early June 2023 to “break through Russian defences eastward in Donetsk province, including around Bakhmut, and southward in Zaporizhzhia province, which forms the land corridor to Crimea.”[vi] Notwithstanding the Western support, this round of the counteroffensive remained unsuccessful and Ukraine had to suffer substantial losses. Meanwhile, this was also a phase where Russia faced internal rebellion when the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) Group began to march towards Moscow after their head, Yevgeny Prigozhin accused the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) of launching attacks on their camps.[vii]

Following a phase of setbacks, Russia was able to reverse the situation in its favour and continued its offensives against Ukraine in the following months, a trend that continued till mid-2024. Some notable developments in this phase included the Russian occupation of Avdiivka in February 2024 which was followed by continuous Russian offensive operations to the west of Avdiivka; Russian offensive manoeuvres in northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024, and intensified Russian offensive operations around Toretsk and Kurakhove in June-July 2024.[viii] 

Amid these waves of offensives and counteroffensives, a phase that stood out began in August 2024 when Ukraine launched its first cross-border offensive against Russia in the Kursk region. Ukraine military used a combination of mechanised infantry and precision artillery to launch a sudden cross border attack on Russia where it was able to penetrate about 1,250 square kilometres, including the town of Sudzha. Ukrainian progress in the offensive was strategically significant as it was aimed at diverting Russian forces from the east of Ukraine. More significantly, the Ukrainian offensive was symbolic as it showed the country’s unprecedented ability to challenge Russia in a cross-border offensive.[ix] It was also instrumental in bringing back some focus back on the Ukraine crisis given that West’s attention was divided by the Israel Hamas war. For months before Ukraine launched the offensive, Western support had begun to dwindle. For instance, there were critical delays in Western aid to Ukraine. In addition, the Western leaders encouraged Ukraine to pursue ‘active defence” to resist Russian defences during this time. The Ukrainian offensive during this juncture altered the Western assessment[x] of the situation and encouraged stronger support for the country against Russia. 

In recent developments, Ukraine launched a new Kursk offensive on 5 January 2025 and followed it with another attack on 6 February 2025.[xi] Although the progress in the latest offensive is limited, it continues to serve as a distraction for Russian advances in the Donetsk region of Eastern Ukraine. Russia, on the other side, has amplified drone attacks against Ukraine in recent months, particularly over the last few days.[xii]

As the war completes three years, the various phases of the Ukraine conflict serve as important reminder in the global nature of regional conflicts- the supply chain disruptions since 2022 have been detrimental for the entire world, particularly the Global South. The conflict also serves an important lesson in the conduct of modern warfare. This includes the use of drones; PMCs/ use of foreign military personnel; digital/social media warfare; among others.[xiii] Meanwhile, the involvement of Iran, China and North Korea and their support for Russia have added another complex layer to the crisis. Notwithstanding their own interests and outlook, a common thread that binds these countries is their adverse relationship with the West, especially the US. In this respect, the crisis and emerging equations among these countries are also playing an important role in challenging the US-led world order. 

The global nature of the crisis has inevitably led to various peace proposals from countries across the world, albeit with limited success. Different peace processes that have followed the war and the reasons for their inadequate outcomes are outlined in the ensuing section.

Section II

With the beginning of Trump 2.0, the rhetoric regarding the peace process in Ukraine has gained momentum. Barring the initial rounds of peace negotiations in Belarus and Türkiye in the early stages of the conflict, there has been a near absence of credible peace talks since the beginning of the Ukraine war in February 2022. In this respect, the recently concluded Russia-US peace talks in Saudi Arabia mark a turning point with respect to the resumption of peace negotiations. However, the credibility remains questionable owing to the absence of Europe and Ukraine from the negotiating table. In this context, it is worth noting why “peace” has remained elusive in Ukraine despite a plethora of different peace plans/processes proposed by different countries across the globe. 

Diplomatic Initiatives: Overview of International Peace Mediation Efforts 

Russia-Ukraine Bilateral Talks and the Istanbul Communique 

The early peace talks between Russia and Ukraine had begun immediately after the war started as the two sides met on the Ukraine-Belarus border for the first round of talks on 28 February 2022. More such rounds followed for the next two months before the bilateral talks, where the two sides had almost reached a settlement in the Turkey-facilitated Istanbul Communique by the end of March 2022, abruptly came to an end after the discovery of alleged Russian war crimes in Bucha and the Western apathy towards a peace negotiation, where the West had little to no say.[xiv] Besides, the failure of the Communique can also be attributed to the ambitious nature of the talks where the two sides went on to address tenets of the post-Cold-War security architecture without first making progress on the immediate issues, such as ceasefire and humanitarian corridors.[xv]

The Istanbul Communique remains the closest the two sides have reached to a peace deal where Ukraine agreed to a neutral (with no ambition for membership in NATO or any other military alliance) and non-nuclear status (along with a limited military) in exchange for a security guarantee from Russia and the West, and a future EU membership.[xvi] Interestingly, the Communique also mentioned Crimea where both sides were expected to peacefully resolve this dispute within ten to 15 years. Thus, the Istanbul Communique was a significant milestone in the negotiation process where Russia conceded its opposition to an EU membership for Ukraine and any discussion on the status of the Crimean Peninsula in exchange for a neutrality clause for Kyiv. 

Recently, President Putin has suggested a revival of the talks based on the aborted peace deal and on the agreed terms of the negotiation that both sides had reached in the form of the Istanbul Communique. He has repeatedly accused the West of sabotaging the Istanbul negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. 

Third-Party Peace Initiatives

With the termination of the Istanbul talks, the direct negotiations between the two parties also came to an end and what followed was third-party peace and diplomatic initiatives. These peace plans have come from countries like China, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa. However, none of them have been successful in bringing the two parties to the negotiating table and have failed to gain any significant worldwide traction.

China put forward its 12-point peace proposal on the first anniversary of the war[xvii] and advocated principles like the cessation of hostilities, the facilitation of humanitarian corridors, the resumption of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the exchange of POWs and exercise of nuclear restraints. Although welcomed by President Putin as “a genuine desire” for peace[xviii], the peace plan remains a non-starter for the simple reason that it does not offer concrete steps needed to achieve peace and is more of a reiteration of China’s worldview as could be seen in Beijing’s call for abandoning a Cold War mentality, ending unilateral sanctions and ensuring the stability of industrial supply chains from which China has immensely benefitted. 

The Global South, comprising countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America, has been a vocal critique of the War and has been seeking a negotiated peace for obvious reasons like the disruption of the supply chains of energy, food and fertiliser that directly impact their economy and livelihood. At the same time, they have maintained their distance from the West and have declined to be part of the Western sanctions and weapon delivery programmes to Ukraine. Owing to their own needs of food, fertiliser and energy security countries like Brazil[xix], Mexico[xx], Indonesia[xxi] and some African[xxii] countries have come up with peace plans that have sought to end the war and bring normalcy in the global food and energy supply chains. These peace plans have primarily focused on facilitating confidence-building measures, such as ceasefire, dialogue and diplomacy, de-escalation, nuclear restraints and humanitarian assistance. Indonesia’s peace plan, presented during the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2023, goes a step further to propose a Korea-like peace stalemate where the two sides could reach a ceasefire at the present position and bring some sort of peace until a peace agreement is reached. 

Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula and the Swiss Summit 

President Zelenskyy forwarded his ten-point peace formula during the G20 Summit in Bali, where he made Russian withdrawal, complete restoration of Ukrainian territorial integrity (including Crimea) and security guarantees as a precondition for any peace settlement. Besides nuclear safety, food and energy security, including the restoration of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, the exchange of POWs and the prosecution of war crimes have also been emphasised. 

Based on Zelenskyy’s formula, a Swiss-hosted Summit on peace in Ukraine took place on 15 June 2024, which, despite the attempts of Ukraine and its Western partners, failed to bring anything significant. The Joint Communique issued could build a common understanding only on issues like nuclear safety, food security and the release and exchange of prisoners of war. It was rather a setback for the Ukrainian leadership that the issued communique was a weak document, which had failed to build a consensus among the participating nations (roughly 90 of the 160 invited) on the question of the Ukrainian territories currently under Russian occupation, and yet prominent countries of the Global South like India, Brazil and South Africa declined to sign the document. China had already boycotted the Summit. 

It can also be argued that by organising a one-sided Summit without the participation of the Russian Federation, the Swiss not only compromised on their neutrality but also lost an opportunity to play a more meaningful and effective role. Ultimately, the Summit became nothing more than a talk shop where only the broader issues of the war were discussed, leaving the immediate issues like ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian troops without significant attention. 

Trump’s Peace Plan 

The return of Trump to the White House has completely changed the dynamics of the war. President Trump, in his bid to end the war, has sidelined the European and Ukrainian leaders and has begun to directly negotiate with Russia. To the surprise of Europe and Ukraine, the negotiating delegation from Russia and the United States met in Riyadh for the first round of peace talks on 18 February to end the war. This peace talk had no representation from Europe and Ukraine. 

The two sides agreed to establish a consultative mechanism to address the irritants in their bilateral relations and appoint a high-level team to end the conflict in Ukraine. The beginning of a direct negotiation process between Russia and the US is a great strategic win for Russia, which has been projecting the war as the result of Russia’s disappointment with the broader post-Cold War security architecture of Europe. The recent successes of the Russian troops on the battlefield and the respective failure of the Ukrainian Kursk incursion have prompted Russia to negotiate from a position of strength. 

A look back at the presidential campaign of Trump shows that he wants to end the war as soon as possible even at the cost of Ukraine losing its territories to Russia. Trump’s advisors have already ruled out the possibility of Ukraine gaining NATO membership. Europe is nowhere seen in the negotiating process, and the US-Russia talks may likely result in a new security architecture for Europe where much of the security concerns of Russia will be respected at the cost of Ukrainian territorial integrity.

Failure of Peace Plans: Hard Lessons on Diplomacy?

Despite catastrophic consequences in terms of lives and materials, the two sides have failed to secure a mutually acceptable settlement without any bilateral peace talks and the resistance and distrust towards a third-party mediated peace deal. So, what has prevented the two sides from agreeing on the right kind of peace deal that would respect the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine and take cognisance of Russia’s genuine security interests?

To begin with, there runs a deep mistrust among the policymakers of each side about the true intentions and designs of the other party. These suspicions arise from valid reasons- (1)Russia’s breach of the Budapest Memorandum (1994), which gave Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan security assurances (not a guarantee) in exchange for them returning their Soviet-era nuclear arsenal (2) the six rounds of NATO expansion despite a promise (as claimed by Russia) by the Americans not to expand (the West denies giving any such commitment) and (3) statements by European leaders like Angela Markel where she claimed[xxiii] the Minsk Accords were signed to give Ukraine time to gain strength has fuelled Russia’s mistrust of the West. In this scenario, the two sides have felt that the other side would not keep its promise even after reaching a peace deal.

Failure to negotiate a peace deal also owes to the maximalist positions the two sides have adopted. While Ukraine has completely stopped bilateral peace talks with Russia, the Kremlin has continuously maintained that negotiations on the status of Donbas, Luhansk and Crimea are out of the question. Other reasons, such as the firm belief in the strength of their armed forces and the consistent quest for reclaiming captured areas and gaining new territories (Ukrainian offensives and the Kursk incursion) to gain the upper hand in future negotiations, a third-party proposal lacking specificity, a debilitated UN and a belief in the West that any peace negotiation that sacrifices Ukrainian territories in favour of Russia will normalise war as a means to settle disputes, have also contributed significantly to the continuation of the war. 

Trump by opening direct negotiations with Russia has complicated the negotiation process. The virtual absence of Ukraine and Europe, which were directly impacted by the war, gives no legitimacy to the peace talks in Saudi Arabia. It has been emphasised from the very beginning that any settlement of the war must incorporate the valid concerns of the warring parties. The two sides i.e. Ukraine and Russia are talking to two different stakeholders- US and Europe. There is still no direct communication between the two capitals. Besides the arrival of Trump on the scene has not only made the peace process complicated but also threatens to destabilise the Euro-Atlantic alliance thus further boosting European insecurities. The recent spat between Trump and Zelenskyy in the White House further complicates the peace processes Ukraine and its European allies have declined to accept any peace deal negotiated without their participation. Trump’s determination to hasten the peace talks even at the cost of Ukrainian sovereignty has caused great tension in the Euro-Atlantic alliance and may result in another arms race in Europe as the Europe’s defence vulnerabilities have been exposed in the wake of the ongoing war. The stress in the Transatlantic alliance followed by Trump’s bonhomie with Russia is not only proving detrimental for Ukraine but for broader European security and global peace stability. 

Within the context of failed peace efforts, the situation in Ukraine also contains valuable lessons for war diplomacy and negotiations.  The ongoing war is largely the result of a post-Cold War security architecture for Europe that developed without the Russian involvement and largely reflected Russia’s disagreements with several rounds of NATO expansion. While Russia had often called out the NATO expansion in the past, it sought written security guarantees from the transatlantic alliance for the first time in December 2021.[xxiv] Russian demands included a prohibition on any possible NATO membership to Ukraine. Russia also expected NATO to limit the deployment of its troops and weapons in Europe’s eastern periphery. The overarching communication gap between the West and Russia, and especially the failure to negotiate these security guarantees led to a new phase of the conflict when Russia launched a full-fledged war on Ukraine two months later.   

The failure to reach any breakthrough reflects the limitations of diplomacy (both bilateral and multilateral) in resolving a conflict. With respect to Ukraine, the communication gaps among different stakeholders have often resulted in a non-inclusive peace mediation process, resulting in a protracted conflict. As a result, the human cost of the war has been huge, but has been often sidelined amid political differences. The transactional nature of diplomacy has stood out, the most recent example of which is the proposed US-Ukraine minerals deal which allows US access to Ukraine’s deposits of rare earth minerals. The Reconstruction Investment Fund under the aegis of the deal stipulates that Ukraine would pay about 50 percent of the revenue to the US. In this sense, the deal allows Ukraine to repay the monetary and military aid it received from the US since the beginning of war with Russia.[xxv]

At the same time, the ongoing West-Russia tension has highlighted the glaring flaws in the international bodies such as the United Nations in mediating peace. It has also highlighted the complexities of a multipolar world system where different power centres have taken different stances on the war thus making a peace settlement difficult to reach. 

Within this backdrop, India stands out for engaging with all stakeholders and urging all parties for an inclusive diplomatic effort to resolve the crisis. It has also led the talk by providing generous humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of war.  

Section III

Conclusion

The war in Ukraine serves as an important lesson in understanding the global nature of regional conflicts. While the crisis has had inevitable consequences for the security architecture in Europe, it has also brought renewed attention to other flashpoints that may emerge in future. The most prominent theatre to consider in this respect is the Indo-Pacific region. China’s assertive posture in the region, accompanied by US-China confrontation and the budding Russia-China “limitless partnership” in the wake of West-Russia tension have implications for the evolving situation in the Indo Pacific. For instance, “while China remains an enduring challenge to the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy, North Korea has emerged as the most immediate challenge” in recent times.[xxvi] It is important to note in this context that unlike Ukraine which is no longer a nuclear state, major stakeholders in the Indo Pacific region are nuclear states, compounding the situation further in case of a conflict. 

The return of Donald Trump in the Oval Office has raised questions about Western support for Ukraine. President Trump’s criticism of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and push for direct peace talks with Russia marks a defining moment of the ongoing conflict. It has also brought back the focus on faltering transatlantic unity with respect to Ukraine, as well as overall security architecture. US Vice President JD Vance’s vocal criticism of Europe at the recently concluded Munich Security Conference; and the peace talks in Saudi Arabia with the conspicuous absence of European and Ukrainian stakeholders reflect the growing divisions between the US and Russia under Trump’s administration. In addition, there are also clear signs of Ukraine fatigue within Europe as the countries deal with domestic policy challenges. While the beginning of peace negotiations is a positive sign, any breakthrough remains dependent on the participation of all stakeholders, and the failed implementation of the two Minsk peace deals following the 2014 Ukraine crisis reflects an important reminder in this regard.

Indian Position

Given the global supply chain disruptions arising out of the crisis, regions across the world also have stakes in the early resolution of the conflict. The various international peace proposals discussed in this report highlight the global attention and stakes on the crisis. In this context, India’s stance merits special attention as the country has maintained a diplomatic balancing act throughout the crisis. India has maintained a principled and consistent position by advocating for dialogue and diplomacy to resolve the conflict. The Indian leadership has often called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and has engaged with the top leadership of Russia and Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict. This includes Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s telephonic conversations with both President Putin and President Zelensky. In addition, the Indian PM visited both Russia and Ukraine in August 2024 and reiterated India’s commitment and “willingness to contribute in all possible ways to facilitate an early return of peace”.[xxvii]  Indian External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar’s recent meetings with the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio as well as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Johannesburg reiterate India’s diplomatic efforts with all stakeholders. PM Modi’s famous statement “this is not an era of war” defines India’s approach not just to the crisis in Europe but also to the larger international politics where India has been vocal for cooperation and coordination as the guiding light for the global community. At the same time, India has also been conscious of its own development and security needs and, thus, chose the stand that suits its national interests. India’s role has been acknowledged internationally, the most apparent example being India’s successful G-20 presidency. At the G-20 Summit in September 2023 in New Delhi, India was able to negotiate for a joint declaration despite West-Russia tension over Ukraine.

*****

*Dr. Himani Pant, Research Fellow & Aman Kumar, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes 

[i] Pressure on Yanukovych, Deutsche Welle, November 28, 2013, https:// www.dw.com/en/the-pressure-on-yanukovych-increases/a-17257434 (Accessed on February 20, 2025).

[ii] President signed Federal Law on Ratifying the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and DPR and LPR, The Kremlin, http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/6783 (Accessed on

[iii] Address by the President of the Russian Federation, the Kremlin, February 24, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ news/67843 (Accessed on February 15, 2025).

[iv] Main objectives of first stage of special operation in Ukraine generally accomplished - Russian General Staff, Interfax, March 25, 2022, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/77393/.

[v] Ukraine: Russian Forces’ Trail of Death in Bucha, Human Rights Watch, April 21, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha(Accessed 20 February 2025).

[vi] Wa           r in Ukraine, Global Conflict Tracker, CFR, April 24, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine (Accessed February 20, 2025).

[vii] Message from Yevgeny Prigozhin, Telegram,https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1283; English translation available https://t.me/russiawire/3235

[viii] Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 6, Institute for the Study of War, 2025https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2025 (Accessed 18 February 2025).

[ix] Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive: Symbolic Gains, Strategic Costs? Geopolitical Monitor, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/ukraines-kursk-offensive-symbolic-gains-strategic-costs/January 13, 2025 (Accessed February 20, 2025).

[x] Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,  Institute for the Study of War, February 62025https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2025 (Accessed 18 February 2025).

[xi]Ukraine presses on in Kursk; Denmark warns Russia could wage war in Europe, February 13, 2025,  https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/13/ukraine-resumes-the-offensive-in-kursk (Accessed February 20, 2025).

[xii] Russia launches war’s largest drone attack on Ukraine, Kyiv says, Indian Express, February 24, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/russia-launch-wars-largest-drone-attack-ukraine-9852064/Accessed February 24, 2025).

[xiii] How Russia-Ukraine Conflict Changed the Nature of Warfare, The Geostrata, February 24, 2023, https://www.thegeostrata.com/post/how-the-russia-ukraine-conflict-is-changing-the-nature-of-warfare, (Accessed February 24, 2025).

[xiv] Antonio Troianovski, Adam Entous and Michel Schwirtz. “Ukraine Russia Peace is Elusive as ever. But in 2022 they were talking,” The New York Times, June 14, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html (Accessed September 05,2024).

[xv] Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko. “The talks that could have ended the war in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, April 16, 2024 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-could-have-ended-war-ukraine.

[xvi] Ibid.

[xvii] Aljazeera. “All you need to know about China’s plan for Russia-Ukraine talks,” Aljazeera, February 24, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/24/all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-plan-for-russia-ukraine-war (Accessed September 5, 2024).

[xviii] Phelim Kine. “US dismisses China’s Ukraine peace proposal as an attempt to distract,” Politico, February 24, 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/24/united-states-china-ukraine-00084384 (Accessed September 5, 2024).

[xix] Monica Hirst and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian. “How Brazil wants to end the war in Ukraine,” International Politics and Society, July 06, 2023 https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/democracy-and-society/how-brazil-wants-to-end-the-war-in-ukraine-6826/ (Accessed September 05, 2024)

[xx] TeleSUR. “Mexico’s Peace Proposal for Ukraine,” TeleSur, September 16, 2022, https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Mexicos-Peace-Proposal-for-Ukraine-20220916-0012.html (Accessed September 05, 2024).

[xxi] Kanupriya Kapoor. “Indonesia proposes demilitarised zone, UN referendum for Ukraine peace deal,” Reuters, June 03, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/indonesia-proposes-demilitarised-zone-un-referendum-ukraine-peace-plan-2023-06-03/ (Accessed September 05, 2024).

[xxii] Samir Bhattacharya. “Evaluating the African Peace Mission to Ukraine and Russia: What did it achieve,” Vivekananda International Foundation, July 10, 2023, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2023/july/10/evaluating-the-african-peace-mission-to-ukraine-and-russia-what-did-it-achieve (Accessed September 05, 2024).

[xxiii] TASS. “Attempt to ‘give Ukraine time’: Merkel on Minsk agreements,” TASS, December 07, 2023, https://tass.com/world/1547141 (Accessed September 05, 2024).

[xxiv] Agreement on measures to ensure the security of The Russian Federation and member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, MFA Russia, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/ rso/nato/ 1790803/?lang= en &clear_cache=Y (Accessed March 3 2025).

[xxv] European Pravda, The full text of the Ukraine-US Minerals Agreement, February 26 2025, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2025/02/26/7205922/ (Accessed 3 March 2025)

[xxvi] Swaran Singh, “Ukraine Crisis and US Indo Pacific Strategy” in Ukraine Crisis: A Point of Inflection for the Emerging World Order, Special Publication, Indian Council of World Affairs, 2022 (Accessed 3 March 2025)

[xxvii] India-Ukraine Joint Statement on the Visit of Prime Minister of India to Ukraine, PIB, August 23, 2024, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2048245 (Accessed March 3, 2025).