Introduction
The exit of the United States (US) from Afghanistan and the seizing of power by the Taliban has raised security concerns in Southeast Asia as it could bring instability in the region. The unfolding political situation in Afghanistan has received reactions from some of the Southeast Asian countries that indicate a growing concern of its spill over effects into their domestic and the boarder regional security.
Reactions and Responses from Southeast Asia
Indonesia, which has the most populous Muslim country in the world, its government has been careful in determining its stance because the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan has received mixed reactions within the country.[i] In a statement by its Foreign Ministry issued on August 16, 2021, “..Indonesia is closely monitoring the swift development in Afghanistan.. (and) hopes for an Afghan-owned, Afghan-led political settlement…”[ii] On September 14, 2021, Indonesia announced US$ 3 million worth of aid to Afghanistan, which according to the Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, is for humanitarian assistance and development. The Foreign Minister also stressed that “..Indonesia continues to expect an inclusive government, protection of human rights, and an effort to prevent the spread of terrorism in Afghanistan…”[iii]
With experts warning that the return of Taliban could once again turn Afghanistan into a hotbed for terrorism, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, in an interview on August 26, 2021, stated that terrorism remains “a clear and present danger” in Singapore and the Southeast Asian region. The Minister also stated that since “..the Taliban is now in charge, they have got to take responsibility for the people and that the destiny lies in the hands of its own people and its own leaders...”[iv] Mr K Shanmugam, Singapore’s Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Law, on the situation in Afghanistan stated that the government is “..watching the unfolding developments .. closely (and).. while there is currently no information of a specific terrorist threat to Singapore arising from the situation there, we are concerned if it would provide fertile conditions for transnational militant organisations such as Al-Qaeda (AQ) and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to regroup or establish safe havens there, in the same manner that they had exploited other conflict zones like Syria/ Iraq. These terrorist groups can also be expected to propagate an ideological narrative based on the American withdrawal, to draw recruits there. The political instability may again attract radicalised individuals…”[v]
According to the Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah, the government is taking a very cautious approach in deciding its official stand on the Taliban government.[vi] While the Malaysian government has taken a cautious approach the Islamist party, PAS three days after the fall of Kabul uploaded a congratulatory message to the Taliban on various social media platforms. This was, however, widely condemned by the people who pointed to the Taliban’s past track record of human rights abuses.[vii] The Philippines response to the ongoing situation in Afghanistan has focussed on humanitarian assistance. The Philippines government was quick to express its openness to receive asylum seekers from Afghanistan and has also pledged monetary support for the United Nations (UN)-led humanitarian operations in the country.[viii] Philippines’ Permanent Representative to the UN, Evan P. Garcia announced the country’s financial contribution to the Flash Appeal of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to address the immediate humanitarian gaps in Afghanistan.[ix] While the Philippines has made significant improvements in their counterterrorism against Islamist militant groups since the 2017 Marawi Seige in Mindanao, it remains to be seen how the Philippines leadership will respond to the evolving situation in Afghanistan.
Security Concerns for Southeast Asia
Radicalised Islamist groups have been operating in Southeast Asia for decades; the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which is responsible for a number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia, can be traced to the Darul Islam (DI) - a separatist Islamist organisation that waged an armed insurgency in the 1950s and 1960s. The DI movement sough to overthrow the governments in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, and Thailand so as to create a regional caliphate. Southeast Asia’s complex geography and porous borders, Islamic rebellions and persisting ethnic conflicts helped the Islamic revival, which began in the 1980s and gained momentum in the 1990s.[x] The Soviet-Afghan conflict drew an estimated 10,000 foreign fighters over a 10-year period (1979 – 1989), which also included several hundred Southeast Asians. Through their experience in Afghanistan, these Southeast Asian militants developed links to AQ and formed a fraternity of mujahideen (fighters). Upon their return to Southeast Asia, they continued to pursue a path of violence through membership in regional militant groups like JI, and imparted their operational skills to fellow members. According to Singapore’s Minster for Home Affairs, Mr K Shanmugam, at least 11 Singapore JI detainees were known to have attended military training in AQ camps in Afghanistan. Upon their return, several of them participated in terror plots targeting Singapore, including the collaboration with an AQ operative to mount suicide truck-bomb attacks against western embassies in Singapore.[xi]
In the post -9/11 years, Islamist terrorism in Southeast Asia has emerged as a major challenge taking on a transnational dimension. This transnational character was perhaps most profoundly demonstrated during the coordinated bomb attacks launched in Jakarta and eight other Indonesian cities on Christmas Eve in 2000. This attack was the first Al-Qaeda-inspired JI terrorist attack showing the transnational footprint of terrorist threat to the region. This was followed by the 2002 Bali bomb blast that killed over 200 people and is the deadliest act of terror in the Indonesian history pointing to Al-Qaeda’s global reach and local militant groups seeking foreign assistance and inspiration.[xii]
The emergence of the ISIS in 2014 and its increasing presence in the region had raised fears about more violence, shifting tactics, and the potential for new cross-border alliances.[xiii] ISIS through its media division Al-Hayat strategically targeted Southeast Asia, particularly vulnerable Malay and Indonesian Muslim communities. It encouraged localised sympathy and radicalisation efforts to combat the Southeast Asian anti-ISIS coalition consisting of the governments of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Within a year, around 450 Malaysian and Indonesian fighters and their families had travelled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS/Katibah Nusantara. From 2016 to 2017, various militant Islamist organisations in Southeast Asia also sought for recognition from and affiliation with ISIS.[xiv]
In the southern Philippines, specifically Muslim Mindanao, terrorism is most associated with extremist groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) founded by Abdurajak Janjalani in 1989 after returning from the Afghan-Soviet war. In May 2017, the ASG acting in the name of the ISIS seized Marawi, a lakeside economic hub in the Lanao del Sur province of Mindanao. It took five months for the Filipino military to regain control of the city displacing hundreds of thousands of people and killing thousands of combatants on both sides.[xv] While there is the decline of the ISIS, there is also the advent of ISIS-linked violence in Southeast Asia, where ISIS has inspired, directed, and funded violence by local affiliates and sympathisers. Malaysians served as foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria before returning and establishing militant Islamist groups at home. Malaysia’s geographical position in Southeast Asia, which is its proximity to prominent hot spots of militant Islamist movements along its borders with southern Thailand, Indonesia, and southern Philippines remains a significant concern. The threat of returning Malaysian militants from Syria and Iraq as well as external FTFs could use Malaysia given its geographical location and making it an access point for the terrorist organisation to conduct their operations in the region.[xvi] The recent fall of Kabul to the Taliban control has triggered the possibility of new era of transnational Islamist militant movement in Southeast Asia; however, it is probably too early to assess how the situation is going to evolve.[xvii]
Conclusion
While the developments in Afghanistan may not pose a direct and immediate threat to the existing insurgencies in Southeast Asia, the victory of the Taliban will likely be used to fuel the narrative that even “the US can be defeated”.[xviii] Therefore, the victory of the Taliban has been welcomed by many Islamist and mainstream Muslim organisations in Southeast Asia. This could trigger these organisations renewed commitment for Islamic priorities whereby it could lead to the resurgence of insurgency and independence movements with the objective of establishing an Islamic state or caliphate in Southeast Asia.
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*Dr. Temjenmeren Ao, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] “Indonesia holds fire on Afghanistan relations-awaits Taliban government”, Asia Pacific Report, September 2, 2021, https://asiapacificreport.nz/2021/09/02/indonesia-holds-fire-on-afghanistan-relations-awaits-taliban-government/, Accessed on October 13, 2021.
[ii]“Statement of the Republic of Indonesia regarding to the Development in Afghanistan”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, August 16, 2021, https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/2813/berita/statement-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-regarding-to-the-development-in-afghanistan, Accessed on October 13, 2021.
[iii]Devina Halim, “Indonesia announces $ 3M aid to Afghanistan”, Anadolu Agency, September 14, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/indonesia-announces-3m-aid-to-afghanistan/2364280#, Accessed on October 13, 2021.
[iv]Yen Nee Lee, “Foreign interference doesn’t work’: Singapore’s foreign minister weights in on Afghanistan crisis”, CNBC, August 26, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/26/singapore-foreign-minister-on-afghanistan-crisis-terrorism-threat.html, Accessed on October 13, 2021.
[v]“Written Reply to Parliamentary Questions on the Implications on Security in Singapore and the Neighbouring Region Given the Situation in Afghanistan, by Mr K Shanmugam, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Law”, Ministry of Home Affairs, September 14, 2021, https://www.mha.gov.sg/mediaroom/parliamentary/written-reply-to-pqs-on-the-implications-on-security-in-singapore-and-the-neighbouring-region-given-the-situation-in-afghanistan/, Accessed on October 13, 2021.
[vi]“No rush in deciding stand on Taliban govt, says Saifuddin”, Malaysia Now, September 1, 2021,https://www.malaysianow.com/news/2021/09/01/no-rush-in-deciding-stand-on-taliban-govt-says-saifuddin/, Accessed on October 13, 2021.
[vii]Syaza Shukri, “The Difference sides of Malaysia’s Response to the Taliban, Stratsea, September 5, 2021 https://stratsea.com/the-different-sides-of-malaysias-response-to-the-taliban/, Accessed on October 13, 2021.
[viii]“UNHCR PH lauds Philippine government’s openness to accept Afghan asylum seekers”, UNHCR, August 19, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/unhcr-ph-lauds-philippine-government-s-openness-accept-afghan-asylum-seekers, Accessed on October 13, 2021.
[ix]“Philippines Pledges Support for Afghanistan during UN flash Appeal”, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, September 14, 2021, https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/news-from-our-foreign-service-postsupdate/29457-philippines-pledges-support-for-afghanistan-during-un-flash-appeal, Accessed on October 13, 2021.
[x]Jurgen Ruland, :The Nature of Southeast Asian Security Challenges”, Place of Publication?https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/projekt_papiere/R_land_Southeast_Asian_Security_Challenges_ks.pdf, Accessed on October 12, 2021.
[xi]“Written Reply to Parliamentary Questions on the Implications on Security in Singapore and the Neighbouring Region Given the Situation in Afghanistan, by Mr K Shanmugam, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Law”, Ministry of Home Affairs, September 14, 2021, https://www.mha.gov.sg/mediaroom/parliamentary/written-reply-to-pqs-on-the-implications-on-security-in-singapore-and-the-neighbouring-region-given-the-situation-in-afghanistan/, Accessed on October 13, 2021.
[xii]Joseph ChinyongLiow, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia, (Routledge: Oxon, 2015), p. 363-364.
[xiii]Superintendent Craig Riviere, “The Evolution of Jihadist-Salafism in Indonesia, Malaysia and The Philippines, and its impact on security in Southeast Asia”, Indo-Pacific Strategic papers, The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Australian Defence College, November 2016, http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Riviere_IPSP.pdf , Accessed on October 9, 2021.
[xiv]Samuel Henkin, Marcu A. Boyd, and Adam Martin, “Southeast Asia after the Caliphate: Identifying Spatial Trends in Terrorism and Radicalisation in Malaysia”, Statistics, Politics and Policy, August 24, 2020, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/spp-2020-0001/html, Accessed on October 13, 2021.
[xv]Joseph Franco, “Philippines: Addressing Islamist Militancy after the Battle for Marawi”, International Crisis Group, July 17, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/philippines-addressing-islamist-militancy-after-battle-marawi, Accessed on October 12, 2021.
[xvi]Samuel Henkin, Marcu A. Boyd, and Adam Martin, “Southeast Asia after the Caliphate: Identifying Spatial Trends in Terrorism and Radicalisation in Malaysia”, Statistics, Politics and Policy, August 24, 2020, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/spp-2020-0001/html, Accessed on October 13, 2021.
[xvii]Cameron Sumpter and Joseph Franco, “Islamist Militancy in Indonesia and the Philippines: Domestic Lineage and Sporadic Foreign Influence”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, September 15, 2021, https://icct.nl/publication/islamist-militancy-in-indonesia-and-the-philippines-domestic-lineage-and-sporadic-foreign-influence/, Accessed on October 12, 2021.
[xviii]Cameron Sumpter and Joseph Franco, “Islamist Militancy in Indonesia and the Philippines: Domestic Lineage and Sporadic Foreign Influence”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, September 15, 2021, https://icct.nl/publication/islamist-militancy-in-indonesia-and-the-philippines-domestic-lineage-and-sporadic-foreign-influence/, Accessed on October 12, 2021.