An important element in India’s strategic outlook for the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), in recent years, has been an enhanced outreach to the island states in the region. India has been making constructive efforts to engage with these small island countries particularly in the areas of maritime security, maritime domain awareness, blue economy, connectivity and infrastructure.
The island nations of the Indian Ocean such as Maldives, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Seychelles and others, with their geo-strategic locations are attaining increasing salience among the regional and global powers. The IOR itself is emerging as economic and political centre of gravity in the context of the Indo-Pacific as the principal strategic reference point. The Ocean serves as one of the world’s busiest trade corridors with some of the most critical sea-lanes of communications for global commerce.
India, with its growing, economic and maritime military capabilities and strategic ambitions in the wider Indo-Pacific, is keen to strengthen partnerships with countries across the region. India’s re-energised focus on its relations with the islands of the IOR has been well received by most of these states. Maldives and Sri Lanka have announced commitment to their “India First” [i] policies which complements India’s “neighbourhood first” policy.
A major aspect of India’s island diplomacy has been enhanced diplomatic outreach to the island states. Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s tri-nation tour in 2015 to Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka was particularly significant. It was in Mauritius that he announced India’s vision of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) in 2015 as he stated “India is ready to help build economic capabilities and improve maritime security for our friends and partners” in the region.[ii] After his re-election for the second term in 2019, PM Modi’s first foreign tour was to the Maldives, re-iterating the focus on maritime neighbours in county’s foreign policy. Even amidst the pandemic diplomatic outreach continued with the External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visiting Mauritius, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Seychelles.
In light of the COVID 19 pandemic, India was quick to reach out to most of the island neighbours earlier providing medical assistance, critical drugs and supplying vaccines later.
What also cannot be denied is the India’s image of ‘first responder’[iii] in the maritime neighbuorhood, underlining its ability to be a ‘net security provider’ in the region in the IOR. India has been strengthening naval contacts with island nations providing regular patrolling, training to the personnel, and creation of intelligence monitoring posts, in Mauritius,[iv] Seychelles,[v] Madagascar,[vi] and Mozambique[vii].
This spirit of SAGAR was further enhanced under the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) announced by PM Modi at the East Asia Summit in 2019, with an aim to ensure safety and security of the maritime domain, and an endeavour to collaborate with like-minded countries in pursuance of this initiative.
India is an important development partner for most of these islands, with a transparent, need-based approach for an inclusive relationship. India announced a $500 million package in August 2020[viii] for the Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP), the project is said to be larger in scale than the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge.[ix] India is also building logistics support facilities at the remote Agalega Island in Mauritius as part of the agreement signed between the two countries in 2015. India and Seychelles have agreed for a joint project on the Assumption Island, and also to enhance defence and maritime security cooperation with $100 million Line of Credit.[x]
India has been making efforts to enhance joint capacity in marine domain awareness with like-minded partners. The mutual logistics support agreement between India and France signed in 2018, will give India potential access to French facilities in the Ocean like in Djibouti and Reunion.[xi] India has also agreed on a maritime pact recently with Oman, which will allow the Indian Navy access to the strategically located Duqm port.[xii]
A significant development recently has been setting up of a trilateral Secretariat for National Security Advisors (NSA) on maritime security cooperation between India, Sri Lanka and Maldives in 2020. A possible expansion of the forum to include Mauritius and Seychelles[xiii] would strengthen the joint capacity and capability of the grouping in dealing with common challenges to maritime security in the Indian Ocean.
Given the considerable economic and geostrategic importance, the island nations in the IOR are gradually becoming central to the regional security complex of the larger Indo-Pacific region. One of the key factors that have been consequential in influencing the regional geopolitics and bringing forth the significance of island countries in the larger security matrix of the region, has been China’s asymmetric rise and its increasing foothold across the IOR. China’s aggressive pursuance of its island strategy has led to a situation where the region is becoming increasingly securitised with other regional and extra-regional countries. Earlier this month, despite concerns around the rapid global spread of Omicron variant, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, paid visit to Maldives and Sri Lanka between 7-9 January 2022. In Colombo, he spoke of creating a forum for Indian Ocean “island countries” to promote common development.[xiv]
Chinese naval facilities along the crucial choke points, including Gwadar, Hambantota and its first overseas base at Djibouti, is not only to serve its economic interests, but also to give it strategic leverage. China has influence in many of the islands in the Indian Ocean including Sri Lanka, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Maldives. Most of these nations have a huge trade imbalance with China. Beijing’s willingness to invest had come as an alternative for island nations in the region, which were in need of such assistance. China has financed a number of projects like China-Maldives Friendship Bridge, Bagatelle dam in Mauritius, telecom networks in Madagascar. However, these projects have also resulted in huge debts that island countries owe to China. With the growing realisation about the broader economic, political and security implications of large-scale Chinese investments, the initial enthusiasm of island countries have gradually turned into concerns about viability and transparency of Beijing’s’ extensive projects in the region. However, at the same time, these islands cannot afford to isolate China given the deeper economic ties they have with the later.
On the other hand, the United States continues to be important player in the region, although with focus more on offshore balancing in recent years. US under the new Biden admiration has clearly articulated its continued commitment to the Indo-Pacific region alongside the growing realisation of relative neglect of the Indian Ocean within the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy. US has been critical of Chinese predatory loan practices to the islands in the region. Recently, the US and Maldives agreed on a Framework for a Defence and Security Relationship, in September 2020. This was a marked shift in Maldives which had developed close ties with Beijing under the previous administration of President Abduyllah Yameen.[xv] Maldives is a crucial part of China’s Maritime silk route vision.
The IOR therefore is becoming an increasingly contested space, with security balances in the region looking uncertain. There is an inter-weaving of geo-politics and geo-economics[xvi] in generating greater interests of major powerS to focus attention and resources in these island countries. While these small islands are looking for investment needs which can be met by one or the other major powers, but it is also important that they evaluate as to “where their strategic autonomy is more likely to remain secure”.[xvii]
India’s vision stands for a ‘for a free, open and inclusive’ IOR. With this vision, India has been stepping up its outreach to the small island nations in the region. Maritime security is an important dimension of India’s bilateral relations in the region. India endeavors to strengthen relationships with its maritime neighbors in a mutually supportive and cooperative manner.
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*Dr. Pragya Pandey, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
[i] Sri Lanka to adopt ‘India first approach’ as new policy, says Foreign Secretary Colombage, 27 August 2020, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/sri-lanka-to-adopt-india-first-approach-as-new-policy-says-foreign-secretary-colombage/489742/
[ii] Prime Minister's Remarks at the Commissioning of Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) Barracuda in Mauritius, March 12, 2015, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/24912/Prime_Ministers_Remarks_at_the_Commissioning_of_Offshore_Patrol_Vessel_OPV_Barracuda_in_Mauritius_March_12_2015
[iii] Securing India’s strategic interests by building capacity in India’s maritime neighbourhood, 3 December 2020 https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/securing-indias-strategic-interests-by-building-capacity-in-indias-maritime-neighbourhood/2142643/
[iv] PM Modi commissions India-built Mauritian naval patrol ship, March 2015, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-modi-commissions-india-built-mauritian-naval-patrol-ship/articleshow/46541931.cms?from=mdr
[v] EEZ Surveillance of Seychelles and Mauritius, November 2017, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/eez-surveillance-seychelles-and-mauritius
[vi] India activates first listening post on foreign soil: radars in Madagascar, July 2007, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/india-activates-first-listening-post-on-foreign-soil-radars-in-madagascar/205416/
[vii] INS Tarkash at Maputo, Mozambique, September 2019, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/ins-tarkash-maputo-mozambique
[viii] A tale of two bridges: India and China vying for influence in the Maldives, November 26, 2020
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/11/24/asia/maldives-india-china-bridges-intl-hnk/index.html
[ix] India announces $500 mn package for Maldives, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-announces-500-million-assistance-for-mega-infra-project-in-maldives/article32343775.ece
[x] India-Seychelles Bilateral Relations, mea, India, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%3A%2F%2Fmea.gov.in%2FPortal%2FForeignRelation%2FBilateral_Brief_feb_2020.pdf&clen=159943&chunk=true
[xi] Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region, March 10, 2018, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29598
[xii] India gets access to strategic Oman port Duqm for military use, Chabahar-Gwadar in sight, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-gets-access-to-strategic-oman-port-for-military-use-chabahar-gwadar-in-sight-5061573/
[xiii] Inauguration of NSA Trilateral Secretariat: A step forward for maritime security cooperation with Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, 4 March 2021, https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/inauguration-of-nsa-trilateral-secretariat-a-step-forward-for-maritime-security-cooperation-with-sri-lanka-and-the-maldives/2206173/
[xiv] No ‘third party’ should interfere in China’s Sri Lanka ties: Wang Yi, 10 January 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/no-third-party-should-interfere-in-chinas-sri-lanka-ties-wang-yi/article38217745.ece
[xv] US signs defence pact with Maldives, 13 September 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/us-signs-defence-pact-with-maldives-6594295/
[xvi] David Scott, “Small Island Strategies in the Indo-Pacific by Large Powers” The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (WINTER/SPRING 2021), pp. 66-85
[xvii] Shankari Sundararaman, “Diplomatic outreach to small states in Indian Ocean”, 1 December 2020, https://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2020/dec/01/diplomatic-outreach-to-small-statesin-indian-ocean-2230233.html