The year 2022 marks the 50th anniversary of the normalisation of China-Japan relations. To celebrate this benchmark, Chinese President Xi Jinping plans to hold a face-to-face meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and jointly organise a series of celebratory events if the next wave of the pandemic is under control.[i] Both sides see this anniversary year as an opportunity to strengthen dialogue, deepen cooperation, enhance exchanges, manage differences, and confront global challenges together.[ii] Earlier, Xi, in his first congratulatory message to the newly elected Japanese Prime Minister, Kishida, agreed to work together on various issues and maintain dialogue on policy coordination for building peace and prosperity in East Asia.[iii]
As the world's second and third largest economies respectively, China and Japan understand the significance of trade ties. However, the rise of China and the geopolitical implications of its rapid military modernisation, enhanced cyber capabilities, and ambitious space programme shifted the balance of power in China's favour in East Asia. Against this backdrop, the big question is whether Xi's China and Kishida's Japan will find common ground to acknowledge their red lines in the security domain? In Xi-Kishida Era, China has accommodated the new change in Japan's policy to publicly raise their concerns vis-à-vis China's human rights violations, maritime assertiveness, and aggressive postures on the contentious Taiwan issue. Both leaders want to use their economic interdependence as a common means to different ends. For example, China intends to stop Japanese interference in the Taiwan issue; in contrast, Japan wants to check and balance Chinese aggressive military postures in the Taiwan Strait. It seems that the Taiwan issue will shape the future trajectories of China-Japan relations. China is concerned about the first-ever Japan-Taiwan inter-party diplomacy and internalisation of their mutual security interests on the Taiwan issue. On 27th August 2021, Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) held a 2+2 dialogue to upgrade party to party relations, which is not much different from the de facto diplomatic summit at the government level.[iv] On the other side, Xi has successfully implemented the National Security Law with respect to the increasing meddling in the internal affairs of Hong Kong. But, the contentious Taiwan issue will ultimately build Xi's political legacy as the paramount leader among the previous four generations of the political leadership (Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao) of the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, the paper analyses the trends, trajectories and the Taiwan issue in China-Japan bilateral relations.
Background:
On 29th September 1972, China and Japan normalised their diplomatic ties. In the 1970s, their dominant political factors were guided by the common threats of the Soviet Union. The textbook controversy in 1982, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's official visit to Yasukuni Shrine in 1985, the Kokaryo incident in 1987 and the Tiananmen incident in 1989 revealed inter-governmental frictions and simmering antipathy in China-Japan relations. The decade of the 1990s was marked by territorial disputes such as Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In a setback to diplomatic ties, the official visit of Japanese Prime Ministers Hashimoto Ryutaro and Junichiro Koizumi to the Yasukuni shrine and the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute led to the suspension of the official visits of state delegations between 2002 and 2006. Since then, maritime disputes have been anticipated by military conflicts and conflicting political interactions in bilateral relations. These key events and developments highlight that the fifty years of normalisation in bilateral ties were full of ebbs and flows.[v]
Security Considerations:
The recent opening in bilateral ties started with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Beijing visit in December 2018. Both Abe and Xi discussed economic cooperation and opportunities for building joint infrastructure projects in South-East Asia. Abe also raised Japanese concerns about Senkaku/Diaoyu Island, human rights, and several Japanese citizens' detention on espionage charges during his official visit. Abe's China Policy displayed restraint in criticism of Chinese maritime assertiveness and infringements of human rights while fostering dialogue on issues of common concerns, including trade and investments.[vi] Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga followed Abe's policies during his brief tenure. In reciprocity, China also sent their national team with sports officials to participate in the Tokyo Summer Olympics 2021. In a significant policy change, however, Japan has changed its China policy in raising security concerns publicly, which earlier used to be done behind closed doors. Under the Kishida administration, Japan's "diplomatic boycott" of the Beijing Winter Olympics 2022 and the recent adoption of a resolution in the lower house on the "human rights situation" in Xinjiang and Hong Kong confirm this change in Japanese policymaking.[vii] Nevertheless, it also appears that the bilateral trends demand a new policy framework through dialogues and discussions to safeguard common interests in multi-layered bilateral relations.[viii]
Xi and Kishida intend to build a stable relationship; however, their economic and security interests are non-related. In the economic realm, China exercises economic leverage due to the sheer size of its market. On the contrary, Japan is concerned about its over-dependence on the Chinese market, which can be used against its strategic interests later. Hence, Kishida plans to diversify its trade basket with other countries to safeguard its economic security. To reduce overdependence on the Chinese market, Japan announced subsidies to relocate its own 57 China-based factories to Japan and also setup 30 new companies in Southeast Asian countries.[ix]
In the security realm, China's New Coast Guard Law authorises the use of lethal weapons on foreign ships in disputed Chinese claimed territories. The increasing hike in the Chinese military budget compels Japan to approve a record defence budget and consider options to acquire military strike capabilities on enemy bases.[x] Kishida is revising the Abe era's National Security Strategy 2013 and working on two defence build-up papers to lay out plans to strengthen national security scenarios in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait.[xi] For these reasons, it seems that Japan will adopt a hardline approach in the security domain, including its policy coordination with the western world against China's human rights violations and maritime assertiveness in particular.
Taiwan Issue:
China considers the growing Japan-Taiwan relationship a threat to its security and strategic interests. The Xi administration currently vouches for strategic patience on the Taiwan issue, but Taiwan remains an issue that can disrupt the China-Japan diplomatic ties. For example, in April 2021, China's Assistant Foreign Minister, Wu Jianghao, summoned the Japanese Ambassador to China and condemned former Prime Minister Abe's statements on the Taiwan issue. In recent times, Abe has been quite consistent in raising concerns against China's possible forceful reunification of Taiwan and the linkages of Japanese security with the Taiwan issue.[xii] China has been closely following the alignment and coordination between the United States and Japan over the Taiwan issue, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and human rights violations in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet. Nonetheless, China believes that the real instigator is the United States in East Asia; because Japan is still playing second fiddle to the United States.
The geographical proximity between Taiwan and the nearest Japanese habitat island- Ishigakijima, is just 200 miles, highlighting the related security interests of Japan and Taiwan. So for Tokyo, it is crucial to prevent the fait accompli problem of democratic Taiwan, i.e. China's forceful reunification of Taiwan. Therefore, China's aggressive military postures and increasing entries of fighter jets and bomber aircraft in Taiwan's air defence identification zone (ADIZ) have the propensity to destabilise East Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. For this reason, the Taiwan issue assumes immense significance in bilateral ties.[xiii] To better contextualise the Taiwan factor in China-Japan relations, one needs to look at the four political documents vis-a-vis Taiwan Issue briefly.
On 29th September 1972, a joint communiqué was signed between Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong to normalise their bilateral relations. According to the second point of the Joint Communique, Japan recognised the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. However, the People's Republic of China, in this joint communiqué, has reiterated in the third point that: "The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation." [xiv] Since then, China-Japan relations have focused on Hot Economics and Cold Politics formula that has been largely based on trade and investment, people-to-people contacts and multi-domain exchanges. Despite the basic premise of Japan's One China Policy, Japan and Taiwan share fundamental democratic values and economic, historical and cultural ties with each other. Japan understands that Taiwan, as a state, operates independently without any direct relations with China. Therefore, Japan consistently reiterates that the Taiwan issue should be resolved through dialogues and discussions to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the rise of China as Asia's largest economic and military power seems to have emboldened Xi on the Taiwan issue.
In the 17th Annual Beijing-Tokyo Forum 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed the need to discuss the status of the Taiwan issue within the four political documents signed in 1972, 1978, 1998 and 2008 to stabilise bilateral ties.[xv] The 1972 Joint Communiqué normalised bilateral relations that helped sign the Peace Treaties in 1978, the Joint Declaration of 1998 promised annual visits of both sides of leadership, and the 2008 Joint Statement to create a new era in bilateral relations based on common interests.[xvi] Many Chinese scholars believe that the Taiwan issue will determine the future trajectories of China-Japan relations. In a recent paper, an expert in Chinese strategic thinking, Professor Shi Yinhong, ruled out the possibility of building a stable relationship without Japan's adherence to the One China Policy, i.e., Taiwan as an inalienable part of China.[xvii] In the last fifty years, China has been biding time on the Taiwan issue; this is why Japan-Taiwan relations did not become a prisoner of Japan's economic engagement with China and security alliance with the United States. But now, it seems that the Taiwan issue would decide the future trajectories of their bilateral relations when Xi wants to build his political legacy with the possible forceful reunification of Taiwan. The Taiwan issue limits Kishida's diplomatic manoeuvring in contemporary China-Japan relations, so Japan will continue to reduce its overdependence on the American security blanket and strengthen its military simultaneously while finding ways to deal on a transactional basis with China.
The shifting geopolitics in the Indo-pacific, the ongoing strategic competition between China and the United States and the rising tension in China-Japan relations underscore the changing dynamics in China-Japan bilateral relations vis-à-vis Taiwan. In his latest research paper, Professor Yang Bojiang, a Japanese expert in the Chinese Academy of Social Science, argues that Japan primarily uses the United States-Japan Security Treaty to strengthen its involvement in the Taiwan issue. The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978 and subsequent diplomatic documents do not mention the United States-Japan Security Treaty and its role in Taiwan. Therefore, Japan is increasingly finding ways to strengthen its involvement in Taiwan and minimise its implications for Japanese strategic and security interests.[xviii] Indeed, China is concerned about the growing Japan-Taiwan-United States triangular engagements and their implications for the Taiwan issue; this is why the Xi administration is trying to mend its bilateral relations with the Kishida administration in the near future.
Conclusion:
On its 50th anniversary, there is no fundamental breakthrough in contemporary China-Japan relations. Xi and Kishida administrations plan to set forth a forward-looking policy framework, but it is yet to be seen how they will work on the content of the next political document. Xi wants to guide bilateral ties to avoid any Japanese intervention in the Taiwan issue. At the same time, Japan desires to maintain economic engagement with China but finds it difficult to do so because of China's increasing defence budget and aggressive postures on the Taiwan issue, which poses a security threat to Japan. The main challenge for both neighbouring nations would be to develop a next political document to build mutual trust and confidence in the bilateral relations.[xix] It seems that the Xi administration wants a continuation of managed hostilities on the Taiwan issue.[xx] Like Jiang Zemin in 1998 and Hu Jintao in 2008, Xi would be keen to unveil the next political document to further engage Japan in a network of partnerships despite longstanding contentious bilateral issues. Thus, it would be worth waiting for the next political document to make an informed assessment of continuity and changes in contemporary China-Japan relations.
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*Dr. Sudeep Kumar, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
End Notes
[i] The Japan Times, China considers in-person event to mark normalisation of ties with Japan, Tokyo, 19th January 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/01/19/national/china-japan-normalization/ accessed on 31st January 2022.
[ii] FM: China, Japan should hold on to right direction for bilateral ties, Beijing, 19th November 2021, https://english.www.gov.cn/statecouncil/wangyi/202111/19/content_WS6196e334c6d0df57f98e527e.html accessed on 31st January 2022.
[iii] The Japan Times, In first talks, Kishida and China's Xi agree on need for dialogue, Tokyo, 9th October 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/10/09/national/kishida-jinping-first-talks/ accessed on 31st January 2022.
[iv] Lin Lan, The Global Times, Japan won't end up well if it plays tricks on Taiwan question, Beijing, 26th August 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1232600.shtml accessed on 31st January 2022.
[v] Yinan He, 40 Years in Paradox: Post-normalisation Sino-Japanese relations, Taipei, 1st December 2013, https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6314 accessed on 20th March 2022.
[vi] Tobias Harris, The Surprising Strength of Chinese-Japanese Ties, New York, 4th May 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-05-04/surprising-strength-chinese-japanese-ties accessed on 31st January 2022.
[vii] Wataru Suzuki, Japan adopts Xinjiang resolution but sidesteps criticism of China, Tokyo, 1st February 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-adopts-Xinjiang-resolution-but-sidesteps-criticism-of-China accessed on 1st February 2022.
[viii] The Asahi Shimbun, Building trust among the people can help improve Japan-China ties, Tokyo, 5th November 2021, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14475068 accessed on 31st January 2022.
[ix] Simon Denyer, Japan helps 87 companies to break from China after pandemic exposed overreliance, Washington D.C., 21st July 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japan-helps-87-companies-to-exit-china-after-pandemic-exposed-overreliance/2020/07/21/4889abd2-cb2f-11ea-99b0-8426e26d203b_story.html accessed on 31st January 2022.
[x] Tobias Harris, The Surprising Strength of Chinese-Japanese Ties, New York, 4th May 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-05-04/surprising-strength-chinese-japanese-ties accessed on 31st January 2022.
[xi] The Japan Times, Japan to revise National Security Strategy in late 2022, Tokyo, 7th November 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/11/07/national/security-guideline-revision/ accessed on 31st January 2022.
[xii] Xinhua, China summons Japanese ambassador to lodge representations over Japan's decision to dump nuclear wastewater, Beijing, 16th April 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/16/c_139883230.htm accessed on 31st January 2022.
[xiii] Ben Dooley and Hisako Ueno, The Island Paradise Near the Front Line of Tensions Over Taiwan, 16th December 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/world/asia/ishigaki-japan-missiles-taiwan.html accessed on 31st January 2022.
[xiv] Cross-Strait Security Initiative: Policy and Perspectives, Center for Strategic & International Studies, https://www.csis.org/programs/international-security-program/isp-archives/asia-division/cross-strait-security-initiativ-4 accessed on 31st January 2022.
[xv] Xu Keyue and Xing Xiaojing, Wang Yi offers 5 suggestions on improving China-Japan ties at Beijing-Tokyo Forum, Beijing, 25th October 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202110/1237267.shtml accessed on 31st January 2022.
[xvi] Ken Moriyasu, China watches 'new neighbour' Kishida with cautious optimism, Tokyo, 9th October 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-watches-new-neighbor-Kishida-with-cautious-optimism accessed on 31st January 2022.
[xvii] Oyama Yoshihiro, China reaches out to Japan to mark diplomatic milestone, Tokyo, 18th January 2022, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/1864/ accessed on 31st January 2022.
[xviii] 杨伯江, 中日邦交正常化与台湾问题处理再考, 东北亚学刊2022年第1期, http://ijs.cass.cn/xsyj/xslw/zrgx/202201/t20220127_5390744.shtml accessed on 1stFebruary 2022.
[xix] Kawashima Shin, Beyond Abe Diplomacy: Charting a China Policy for a New Era, Tokyo, 18th September 2020,https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00626/accessed on 31st January 2022.
[xx]June Teufel Dreyer, Tokyo Beijing and New Tensions Over Taiwan, Pennsylvania, 19th January 2022, https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/01/tokyo-beijing-and-new-tensions-over-taiwan/ accessed on 31st January 2022.