Pakistan's Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar met Taliban's acting Foreign Minister in Kabul on 29 Nov 2022- making it the latest high-profile Ministerial visit to Afghanistan, whose ruling dispensation hasn’t been formally recognized by any foreign Government.[i] The timing of the visit is important as it took place amidst fresh clashes between Taliban and Pakistan border forces across the Durand Line and a day after the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or Pakistan Taliban – ended a ceasefire agreement with the Pakistan Government reached in June, with the help of Afghan Taliban.[ii]
Immediately after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan last year, Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Imran Khan made a euphoric observation stating Afghans have “broken the shackles of slavery.” Taliban’s triumph was seen as a strategic victory for Pakistan as it managed to establish a friendly Government in Kabul after nearly two decades. The optimism in Pakistan was however short-lived as cracks started to appear in the Taliban-Pakistan relations around essentially two issues: (A) the escalations across the disputed Durand Line. (B) Afghan Taliban’s alleged backing for TTP.
A. The Durand Line dispute
The 2,670-km Durand Line, named after British civil servant Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, who signed an agreement with Amir Abdur Rahman, the then Afghan ruler, on November 12, 1893, to establish a border between British India and Afghanistan. Successive Afghan governments, following the creation of Pakistan in 1947, have argued that the legitimacy of the line expired in 1993, as the validity of the agreement was for 100 years.
Source: National Geographic
The Durand Line not only divides the two countries but also cuts through the Pashtun tribal areas. In Pakistan, Punjabis and Pashtuns make up the two major ethnic groups along the Durand Line. Pakistan has a larger Pashtun population than Afghanistan has, it constitutes about 15 percent of its population, in Afghanistan, Pashtuns make up the largest ethnic group comprising about 42 percent of the country’s population.[iii] While Pakistan has recognized the Durand Line as its western border, no Afghan government (including the Taliban regime between 1996-2001) has accepted Durand Line to be a legitimate border with Pakistan.
As a result, Pakistan’s attempts to establish fences and border posts along the disputed border in the recent years have been met with stiff resistance from Afghanistan. At the end of last year, reports and videos were circulated showing the Taliban forces uprooting barbed wires erected by the Pakistan security forces in the eastern Nangarhar province along the Durand Line.[iv] Similar incidents were reported earlier this year, when the Taliban fighters were seen destroying fences and Pakistani check posts along the border in Nimroz province, which led Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi to acknowledge the presence of “some complication” in the Afghan-Pakistan border region.[v]
In the course of the past one year there have been several instances of clashes across the Durand Line between the Taliban and Pakistan military. However, in the month of November 2022, several fresh clashes between the Taliban and Pakistan’s border guards were reported, especially in the eastern and southern parts of the country.
Recent escalations across Durand Line
Reportedly[vi], military forces on both sides had open fired at each other over the ownership of the border village of Kharlachi in the Dand-e-Patan area of Paktia province in eastern Afghanistan, killing one person and injuring 14. Pakistani media, on the other hand reported, at least seven people, including women and children, have been killed across the Afghan border in Kharlachi and Borki in Kurram district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as a result of the clash.[vii] Earlier, on November 13, an armed man killed a Pakistani soldier at the southern Spin Boldak border. In response, Islamabad demanded the handover of the suspect to Pakistan and shut down its border for trade and transit. The border was eventually opened on November 21, after the suspect was handed over to Pakistan.[viii] There have been reports of shelling from Pakistani side in Dand-e-Patan, which have forced several families to flee their homes.[ix] In Paktia, dozens of residents held demonstrations against Pakistan’s actions and chanted anti-Pakistan slogans in protest of attacks on the district.[x]
In response to the recent escalation across the border, Kabul and Islamabad have formed a joint committee to assess the situation.[xi] The Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid speaking on the recent escalation stated, “We want to protect our soil and borders. Also, a committee from both sides – Afghanistan and Pakistan – is working. It will continue to meet to prevent such incidents in the future.”[xii] Reportedly, Kabul has appointed a committee of 15 tribal elders so that the issues between the two sides can be resolved through negotiations.[xiii] Afghan news media reported that the tribal elders are trying to solve the problems via negotiations and quoted a tribal elder stating in case the negotiations fail all tribes will stand with Afghanistan.[xiv]
B. Afghan Taliban’s alleged backing for TTP
The Islamist militant group TTP – that has undertaken several deadly attacks in Pakistan since 2007. After the Peshawar military school attack in 2014, the Pakistan military cracked down on the TTP safe havens in the country, which forced many of the TTP members to flee to neighboring Afghanistan. Like Afghan Taliban, TTP is also a predominantly Pashtun group. Although it is unclear how much sway the Taliban has over TTP’s actions, but they released several TTP leaders from Afghan prisons after seizing power in Kabul and the TTP leadership is believed to have taken refuge in Afghanistan.[xv]
Intensification of TTP attacks in 2021 became a matter of grave concern for Pakistan. Over the years, Islamabad had maintained that the presence of the foreign forces in Afghanistan had fostered TTP insurgency. With the Taliban back in power in August 2021, it was hoped that the armed group would rein in TTP fighters, but the contrary happened. The TTP brought about a sharp increase in jihadi violence in Pakistan. In 2021, there were 294 attacks – a 56 percent increase since 2020 and 45 of those in December alone.[xvi] The attacks were carried out mostly in the tribal belt in northwestern Pakistan and in the restive southwestern province of Balochistan; targeting both security personnel and civilians. At least two of their assaults targeted Chinese workers and the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan; which made Pakistan’s principal ally China extremely anxious.[xvii]
Pakistan’s utter frustration with Afghan Taliban’s lackluster response to these challenges came out into the open in April 2022, when Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces of Khost and Kunar.[xviii] Although Islamabad maintained silence on the incident, media reports suggested the raid targeted the TTP operating across the Durand Line.[xix] The alleged Pakistani air raids sparked protests, with residents in Afghanistan’s Khost and Kandahar provinces taking to the streets saying those killed in the attacks were civilians. The Taliban responded by summoning the Pakistani Ambassador and warning Islamabad of “consequences” saying it would not tolerate “invasions” from its neighbours.[xx]
Scholars[xxi] argue that, the TTP in its recent years claimed to be an extension of the Afghan Taliban. It declared that the then leader of the Taliban, Mullah Mohammed Omar, was its spiritual leader and offered to support the Afghan Taliban’s war against the United States and its allies. Senior TTP commanders—including the group’s first supreme leader, Baitullah Mehsud —fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan before the TTP’s founding in 2007. TTP has sent fighters to Afghanistan from Pakistan and staged joint attacks with the Taliban. However, over time a shift in TTP’s approach was visible. In 2018, TTP formally excluded calls for global jihadi agenda or “greater jihad” in Afghanistan and decided to focus only on Pakistan.[xxii]
Among all the radical Islamist groups operating in the border region, the TTP is believed to be the closest to the Taliban because of their shared Pashtun ethnicity and kinship. Understandably, Islamabad has a strong incentive to push the Taliban to act against the TTP. But over the past one year of being in power, the Afghan Taliban seems to be less beholden to Pakistan than earlier period and have shown less interest to act on Islamabad’s request. It is also important to remember, the Taliban did not give away their “guest” Osama Bin Laden amidst acute international pressure 21 years ago, as that would have entailed violating a sacred principle of the Pashtunwali – the Pashtun code of life. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Taliban will hand over their Pashtun brothers in TTP to Pakistan, since maintaining the Pashtun unity would be vital for the Afghan Taliban.
The Afghan Taliban, however, brokered a short-lived ceasefire between TTP and the Pakistan government and mediated peace talks between them. Given Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in the course of the past twenty years since their ouster in 2001, Islamabad was partly hopeful that the Taliban regime would leverage its links with the proscribed group to broker a peace agreement. But the Taliban regime did not seem to be too keen to put overt pressure on TTP as it is was conscious that pushing the TTP too hard could propel it to move towards its enemy, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP). Additionally, Afghan Taliban is also aware that their influence over TTP can be utilized as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis Pakistan.
At a time when Pakistan is experiencing political turmoil domestically – with the Shehbaz Sharif Government struggling to deal with an economic crisis, the change in the military leadership, and Imran Khan’s “long march” (and his call for early elections) – these repeated tensions across the Durand Line and mounting TTP threats, have only added to the difficulty for Islamabad. It was therefore not surprising that the Pakistani Government had approached its neighbor to address its security challenges. As far as the Taliban regime in Kabul is concerned, opposing the fencing on the Durand Line and backing TTP, may surge their domestic support base, especially in regions where Pashtuns are in majority and the anti-Pakistan sentiments are stronger. Yet, it remains to be seen whether or not it would be a sustainable strategy as the land-locked country is too dependent on Pakistan for military, humanitarian, and government support in their fight for international legitimacy. With Rawalpindi’s close relations with certain factions within the Taliban, especially Haqqani Network and on the other hand, Islamabad’s dependence on Kabul to tackle TTP- most likely would encourage the two sides to chart the path of negotiation and dialogue; to address the contentious issues between the two countries.
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*Dr. Anwesha Ghosh, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] “Pakistan FM travels to Kabul, meets Taliban amid border tensions.” Al Jazeera, Nov 29, 2022. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/29/pakistan-foreign-minister-hina-rabbani-khar-taliban-afghanistan-kabul-border-tensions (Accessed on 1. 12.22)
[ii] “Pakistan Taliban Ends Ceasefire With Govt, Vows New Attacks”. The Diplomat, Nov 29, 2022. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/pakistan-taliban-ends-ceasefire-with-govt-vows-new-attacks/ (Accessed on 1. 12.22)
[iii] “Afghanistan and Pakistan Ethnic Groups. An ethnolinguistic map of showing different language and cultural groups across Afghanistan and Pakistan.” National Geographic, Aug 2022. Available at: https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/afghanistan-and-pakistan-ethnic-groups (Accessed on 28.11.22)
[iv] “Taliban tear down barbed wire fence put up by Pak forces as Durand Line border tension brews.” WION, Dec 22, 2021. Available at: https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/taliban-tear-down-barbed-wire-fence-put-up-by-pak-forces-as-durand-line-border-tension-brews-438954 (Accessed on 28.11.22)
[v] “After Taliban removed fencing from Pak-Afghan border, FM Qureshi admits there are 'complications'
Read more.” ANI News Agency, Jan 3, 2022. Available at: https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/after-taliban-removed-fencing-from-pak-afghan-border-fm-qureshi-admits-there-are-complications20220103182813/ (Accessed on 28.11.22)
[vi] “Pak-Afghan border re-opens as new clash erupts across Durand Line.” Afghanistan Times, Nov 21, 2022. Available at: https://www.afghanistantimes.af/pak-afghan-border-re-opens-as-new-clash-erupts-across-durand-line/ (Accessed on 25.11.22)
[vii] “7 injured near Kurram border following firing from Afghan side crossing in Kandahar province.” Dawn, Nov 20, 2022. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1722079 (Accessed on 25.11.22)
[viii] “Border clashes along Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan leave casualties.” The Khaama Press, Nov 20, 2022. Available at: https://www.khaama.com/border-clashes-along-durand-line-between-afghanistan-and-pakistan-leave-casualties/ (Accessed on 25.11.22)
[ix] “Afghani families displaced after Taliban, Pakistani military clash along Durand Line.” ANI News, Nov 23, 2022.
Available at:
https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/afghani-families-displaced-after-taliban-pakistani-military-clash-along-durand-line20221123230936/ (Accessed on 26.11.22)
[x] “Paktia families displaced by clashes with Pakistan.” The Tolo News, Nov 22, 2022. Available at: https://tolonews.com/science-technology-180867 (Accessed on 25.11.22)
[xi] “Pakistan-Afghanistan relations on boil? Fresh border clashes erupt along Durand Line.” Times Now, Nov 22, 2022. Available at: https://www.timesnownews.com/world/pakistan-afghanistan-relations-on-boil-border-clashes-reported-along-durand-line-article-95681376 (Accessed on 26.11.22)
[xii] Ibid
[xiii] “Afghani families displaced after Taliban, Pakistani military clash along Durand Line.” ANI News, Nov 23, 2022.
Available at:
https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/afghani-families-displaced-after-taliban-pakistani-military-clash-along-durand-line20221123230936/ (Accessed on 26.11.22)
[xiv] “Paktia families displaced by clashes with Pakistan.” The Tolo News, Nov 22, 2022. Available at: https://tolonews.com/science-technology-180867 (Accessed on 25.11.22)
[xv] “Taliban release TTP's Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, other terrorists from Afghanistan prisons.” India Today,Aug 18, 2021. Available at: https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/taliban-maulvi-faqir-mohammad-terrorists-afghanistan-prisons-kabul-1842162-2021-08-18 (Accessed on 07.12.22)
[xvi]Daud Khattak, “ Taliban Takeover In Afghanistan Bolsters Pakistan's Insurgency.”Gandhara.org, Jan 13, 2014. Available at: Taliban Takeover In Afghanistan Bolsters Pakistan's Insurgency (rferl.org) (Accessed on 1.12.22)
[xvii] “China Is Unnerved by Increasing Attacks on Chinese in Pakistan”. The Diplomat, September 28, 2021. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/china-is-unnerved-by-increasing-attacks-on-chinese-in-pakistan/ (Accessed on 1.12.22)
[xviii] “At least 47 dead in Afghanistan after Pakistan attacks: Officials.” Al Jazeera, April 17, 2022. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/17/afghanistan-death-toll-in-pakistan-strikes-rises-to-47-official (Accessed on 1.12.22)
[xix] Ibid
[xx] “Taliban summons Pakistan's ambassador over airstrikes in Afghanistan.” The Times of India, April 17, 2022. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/taliban-summons-pakistans-ambassador-over-airstrikes-in-afghanistan/articleshow/90890842.cms (Accessed on 1.12.22)
[xxi] Abdul Sayed, “The Evolution and Future of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 21, 2021. Available: The Evolution and Future of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Accessed on 1.12.22)
[xxii]“ Course of Action- Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan 1440-2018”. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Official website. Available at: Our Plan of Action - Umar Media-Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Accessed on 1.12.22)