Myanmar marked the second year of the military-led (Tatmadaw) government in the form of the State Administrative Council (SAC) under the tutelage of its Chairman, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, after the army had staged a coup on February 1, 2021. Since the military takeover, the nation, especially the military administration, has been confronted with a plethora of resistance that counts among its ranks both ethnic armed groups (EAGs) and pro-democracy civilian resistance. The civilians who have picked up arms, mostly under the banner of the People’s Defence Force (PDF), which is seen as an extension of the government in exile – National Unity Government (NUG), in a bid to challenge the military takeover are largely from the majority Bamar ethnicity.
While addressing the Nation on the occasion of the 75th Independence Day, on January 4, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing said that the nation would be returning back to the democratic fold as a “genuine, discipline-flourishing multiparty democratic system.”[i] The Chairman of the SAC also said that, when the nation heads towards elections, it would be in accordance with the 2008 Constitution, and the “state duties” would be handed over “to the winning party in accordance with the democratic standards”.[ii]
By some accounts it is expected that the nation would be heading towards polls in August.[iii] However, the credibility of the electoral exercise has been questioned. An issue of concern is that the SAC has rewritten the rules and regulation under which the proposed elections are to be held. This itself may prove to be an obstacle for the NUG, which has already stated that the elections would be a ‘sham’[iv] political exercise. While EAG like the Chin Defence Force have already said that they will “not allow the terrorist military council, which is killing innocent people, to conduct elections.”[v] The present administration, on its part too has expressed concerns regarding holding election as intended. This is so, as the SAC alleges that the armed resistance has resulted in a disruption in collecting voter data.[vi]
In the meanwhile, the SAC on the second anniversary of the coup has extended the state of emergency for the third time, while at the same time stating that the elections would hold as planned. Nonetheless, the impact of this development on the elections cannot be ruled out.
However, to understand the rational as to why the military made a commitment to holding elections in 2023. it is important to understand fundamental character of the 2008 Constitution, which is elaborated in the subsequent sections.
Myanmar and its legacy of military administration
The formation of the SAC, under the leadership of Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, by and large is in line with the past practices of Myanmar. A nation that has been under military rule in one form or another since 1962 has seen repeatedly Generals and military-led administrations. Of note are the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) that administered the nation between 1988 and 2011.
The SLORC and its successor the SPDC were a product of the political turbulence of the 1980s, especially the public protest of August 8, 1988, more commonly referred to as the 8888 Uprising,[vii] and the subsequent experiment with electoral politics of 1990. The 1990 election, held under the watch of the SLORC, was not aimed at ensuring the return of civilian rule but was an effort of the Armed Forces to appease popular aspirations, without compromising their influence in the affairs of the state. However, the resounding victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi turned the tide. The Armed Forces were not only unprepared for a one-sided electoral victory of the NLD but also apprehensive of the rise of an alternative power centre, and a democratic one. At that stage the election resulted was put aside and the military administration continued.
Experiment with democracy
The military administration in the late 1990s, the Tatmadaw, had come around the view of having in place a compliant civilian government. Realising this the Tatmadaw proposed a “Seven Step Road Map to Disciplined Democracy” in 2003, with the aim of outsourcing the burden of administration to a nominal civilian establishment without relinquishing the writ of the Generals. It was under this principle that the 2008 Constitution was promulgated and under the name of the same Constitution that the nation went to polls in 2010.
In a bid to ensure that the military-sponsored political party, Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), secures a victory in the 2010 polls, the SPDC administration of the day had extended the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, who anyways was under near-continuous detention since 1990. It was under such a circumstance that Thein Sein, a former General, was sworn in as President in March 2011 with the support of the USDP. Nonetheless, by the time the nation headed to the 2015 polls, the Tatmadaw was seemingly seen as being accustomed to democracy. This was evident as the NLD did not only contest but also swept the elections.
However, it was not the return of an actual civilian government once again in 2021, after decades of military rule that was a concern for the Tatmadaw. On the contrary, it was the NLD outdoing itself in the 2020 elections that had again created apprehensions of a parallel/rival power centre in the making, resulting in the military coup. The allegation of electoral malpractices, by Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, foreshadowed the coup.
Two years of the coup and counting
Upon staging a coup, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing had promised that the nation would return to the electoral fold within a year. The realisation of this promise even in August 2023 will come with its own set of conditionalities.
The first would be the prevailing security environment. Even prior to the coup of February 2021 that had already seen considerable fissures in the ceasefire agreements that had been reached between the Tatmadaw and the EAGs during the tenure of the SLORC and the SPDC, which was followed by the Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong initiative of the previous NLD government. The coup has not only accentuated clashes in the nation between some of the EAGs and the Tatmadaw but also paved the way for some of the EAGs to welcome PDF volunteers as comrade in arms.
Second, a semblance of democracy of the past decade with enhanced telecommunication has resulted in the attitude of the people undergoing considerable change. With exposure to the outside world, the people of Myanmar, especially among the Bamar ethnicity, are now aspiring for a ‘pluralistic democratic’ government. It is this change in the attitude of the people that is feeding the PDF’s armed resistance against the SAC.
Third, the internal dynamics among the EAGs too have undergone considerable change. This is most visible in the dominance/prominence that some newer EAGs have come to gain at the expense of the older EAGs. This has resulted in the dynamics of the ongoing armed conflict undergoing a change. Owing to this, the SAC in late December 2022 extended the ceasefire agreement with some of the EAGs until the end of 2023.[viii] Though extending the ceasefire arrangement may be welcomed, the past year has also witnessed the spilling over of armed operations of the Tatmadaw along the border region of Thailand, Bangladesh and India.
Fourth, the issue of concern would be the nature with which the Tatmadaw has treated prominent members of the former government. Notably, 77-year-old Aung San Suu Kyi, the face of the democratic movement in Myanmar, is now to serve a cumulative prison term of 33 years on various charges. This acts as a barrier as this would limit her participation in any meaningful political process and also discourage the NLD/NUG from engaging with the Tatmadaw in a constructive manner. Independent of this, there are apprehensions that the revised election laws can be used by the SAC to debar the NLD/NUG by either being declared as unlawful or having linkages with terrorist organisations.[ix]
The fifth is the limited receptivity of the SAC towards the overture of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) “five-point consensus” for the return of normalcy. This not only limits peace building efforts by a neutral party but also limits Myanmar’s external engagement. This is so, as the nation has not only been subjected to sanctions from some quarters of the international community but ASEAN has also limited its engagement with this nation to a non-political level.
What next?
If the past is any guide, it is quite possible that the Tatmadaw would not relinquish its reins over administration. The promise for elections can only become an instrument to legitimise the existing administration. This is because of two reasons. The first is the fact that the elections, as and when held, will be keeping with the provisions of the 2008 Constitution. According to the provisions of the Constitution, a quarter of the representatives are to be appointed by the military chief, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. In practical terms this would mean that a political party that is aligned with the Tatmadaw would only require to secure another quarter of the parliamentary seats to form the federal government.
Second, the Union Election Commission (UEC) has said that the next elections would be under the proportional representation system instead of the present first-past-the-post electoral system.[x] This in turn would facilitate other smaller political parties, including those aligned with the military with more seats in the federal parliament when compared with the past two elections. It will also mean that the Tatmadaw, both directly and indirectly, would come with a greater say in the affairs of the state.
Lasty, with respect to the ongoing internal clashes, it is possible that the Tatmadaw would engage with individual EAGs and would also encourage them to enter into a ceasefire arrangement. It was a similar approach that was taken by the SLORC and the SPDC in the 1990s prior to introducing its road map to democracy.
*****
*Dr Sripathi Narayanan is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal
[i]Grant Peck, “Myanmar army leader touts election plan on Independence Day”, Associate Press, January 4, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/politics-myanmar-united-kingdom-min-aung-hlaing-san-suu-kyi-e4494652527c2e9c7ef5900a6c521d44, accessed on January 17, 2023.
[ii]Grant Peck, “Myanmar army leader touts election plan on Independence Day”, Associate Press, January 4, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/politics-myanmar-united-kingdom-min-aung-hlaing-san-suu-kyi-e4494652527c2e9c7ef5900a6c521d44, accessed on January 17, 2023.
[iii]Grant Peck, “Myanmar army leader touts election plan on Independence Day”, Associate Press, January 4, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/politics-myanmar-united-kingdom-min-aung-hlaing-san-suu-kyi-e4494652527c2e9c7ef5900a6c521d44, accessed on January 17, 2023.
[iv] Khine Lin Kyaw, “Myanmar Junta Plans Polls With Tough Rules for Political Parties”, Bloomberg, January 27, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-26/myanmar-election-junta-plans-poll-with-strict-rules-for-political-parties?leadSource=uverify%20wall, accessed on January 30, 2023
[v] Hein Htoo Zan, “Myanmar Regime Begins Compiling Voter Lists for Planned Election”, The Irrawaddy, January 11, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-regime-begins-compiling-voter-lists-for-planned-election.html, accessed on January, 31, 2023.
[vi] Ingyin Naing, “Uncertainty Shrouds Myanmar Elections”, Voice of America, January 24, 2023,
https://www.voanews.com/a/uncertainty-over-elections-in-myanmar/6932184.html, accessed on January 30, 2023.
[vii]Eli Meixler, “How a Failed Democracy Uprising Set the Stage for Myanmar's Future”, Time, August 8, 2018, https://time.com/5360637/myanmar-8888-uprising-30-anniversary-democracy/, accessed on January 11, 2023.
[viii]“Myanmar extends ceasefire period until end of 2023”, Xinhua, January 1, 2023, https://english.news.cn/asiapacific/20230101/12fede1a9b8a42b384ca4c787f0b18f0/c.html, accessed on January 5, 2023.
[ix] Khine Lin Kyaw, “Myanmar Junta Plans Polls With Tough Rules for Political Parties”, Bloomberg, January 27, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-26/myanmar-election-junta-plans-poll-with-strict-rules-for-political-parties?leadSource=uverify%20wall, accessed on January 30, 2023
[x]“On Myanmar Junta's Planned 2023 General Election”, The Irrawaddy, January 13, 2023
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/on-myanmar-juntas-planned-2023-general-election.html, January 15, 2023.