President Putin in his address to the Federal Assembly on February 21, 2023,[i] announced that Russia is “suspending” its membership from the New START Treaty.[ii] The New START Treaty between the Russia Federation and the United States entered into force on February 5, 2011, for ten years. Under the Treaty, the two nations had seven years to meet the Treaty’s central limits[iii] on strategic offensive arms (by February 5, 2018) and are then obligated to maintain those limits for as long as the treaty remains in force.[iv] In 2021, the Treaty was extended for five years, till February 4, 2026.
As the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the two nations, Russia’s decision has caused concern not just for the future of bilateral arms control but also for the global non-proliferation and arms control. Both Russia and the United States have two of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, and they are both on a path of modernising these weapons as part of their larger defence modernisation process. The Treaty not only puts a limit on warheads, it also has mechanisms for data sharing and inspections which build transparency, stability and predictability in the nuclear relationship, providing safeguards to ease tensions. Russia has maintained that it would like to preserve the Treaty but pointed out that the geopolitical realties have changed and the United States has violated the terms of the Treaty. The United States has on its part stated that it remains committed to the Treaty and would work with Russia to negotiate its extension.
New START, Arms Control and the Challenges Before them
Fundamentally, arms control refers to mutually agreed upon restraints or controls (usually between States) on the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, deployment and use of armed forces, small arms, conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Arms control includes agreements that increase the transparency of military capabilities and activities, with the intention of reducing the risk of misinterpretation or miscalculation.[v] It is a tool to build security doctrine and national security policy to address threats. Nuclear weapons have come to play an important role in the security dynamics of nations. Arms control has been at a crossroad with the dialogue between Moscow and Washington stalled, much before the current Ukraine crisis. The United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty[vi] in 2002, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty[vii] in 2019 and the Open Skies Treaty (OST)[viii] in 2020. The current decision by Russia has brought the focus on nuclear posturing, the risk of nuclear escalation and the use of Treaties to gain strategic advantages.
Within the New START, there is no legal provision for suspension. The Treaty would terminate three months after a notice of withdrawal was issued. Significantly, Russia has not withdrawn from the Treaty; but has “suspended” its involvement for the time being, and its Foreign Office stated that it would continue to comply with the provision of the treaty and continue to exchange information with the United States about ballistic missile tests, in order to maintain the necessary level of predictability and stability in the nuclear missile area. Secretary Blinken stated that the developments were “unfortunate and irresponsible…and (the United States) remains ready to talk about strategic arms limitations at any time with Russia irrespective of anything else going on in the world or in (United States-Russia)… relationship.”[ix] In the past Russia and the United States have continued to hold separate talks on nuclear arms control despite tensions in the relations, but such steps are not yet visible for the New START. In the current geopolitical situations it remains unclear how the two parties will take the Treaty forward. If the Treaty is not extended, the result would likely be that in the future, in the absence of other mechanisms, the two parties will have less clarity on each other’s nuclear arsenal. Without this information it is likely that both sides, under pressure, will increase their nuclear arsenal as they look at the military modernisation plans of the other, and this will not only be limited to the United States and Russia but also be applicable to China and other nuclear powers. Thus a renewed and unrestrained arms race could result which will not be limited to just to Russia and the United States but other existing nuclear powers and other threshold States. The crisis has invoked concern on norms against nuclear sabre rattling, the need for safe zones around nuclear power plants and most importantly the norm not to use or threat of use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state. In addition, arms control mechanisms are also facing Treaty violations and the sudden suspension of dialogue and withdrawals are leading to gaps in the security environment.
The Challenges before Arms Control
There are many challenges before arms control, which is witnessing a period of unpredictability. First, arms control stems from the need to maintain strategic stability or the absence of incentive for any party to launch a nuclear first strike. However, this strategic stability is increasingly becoming complicated with rising geopolitical fissures and global rebalancing. China’s increasing focus on nuclear force modernisation and use of disruptive technologies and Beijing’s refusal to participate in nuclear arms control highlights arms control’s current weakness. Focused and engaged policies that include a belligerent China will be essential to the maintenance and evolution of arms control in the future.
Second, the ongoing revolution in technology is fuelling both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. States are modernising and enlarging their arsenals to take advantage of increasingly capable precision guidance systems and new capabilities offered by emerging and disruptive technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI).[x] With dual use technology increasingly emerging in private sector, high-precision conventional weapons and the use of space-based missile systems, the new arms control treaties would have to look beyond limiting the number of warheads and missiles and build crisis stability mechanisms, inter-state nuclear communications and de-escalation mechanisms that include nuclear weapons states beyond Russia and the United States.
Third, there are different views on how to use this tool and its value for security. There are different views on the role of nuclear weapons in national security, the credibility of deterrence and no-first use policy and the ability to trust the adversary. States look at policies to effectively use nuclear weapons while simultaneously trying to achieve meaningful arms control outcomes. The politicisation of arms control has brought this duality to the forefront and has made the discussion how to proceed on arms control difficult.
Conclusion
The challenges to arms control are numerous. They range from the expansion and modernisation of existing nuclear arsenals, emergence of possible new nuclear weapons states, proliferation and the uncertain ramifications of emerging and disruptive technologies. Nonetheless, arms control agreements need to be pursued, as they encourage inspections, verification, exchange of data and certification of compliance with treaty obligations, all of which makes it less likely for states to use nuclear weapons. What is needed perhaps is a relook of the present systems and establish norms, standards and predictability which address both the current threats and the threats that will challenge international security in the future. It needs no emphasis that a conducive geopolitical environment, marked by cooperation and dialogue is a necessary prerequisite for the success of any arms control agreement.
*****
*Dr. Stuti Banerjee, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Kremlin, “Presidential Address to Federal Assembly 21 February 2023,” http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70565, Accessed on 28 February 2023
[ii] The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) was signed on April 8, 2010, in Prague by Russia and the United States and entered into force on February 5, 2011. New START replaced the 1991 START I treaty, which expired in December 2009, and superseded the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which terminated when New START entered into force. New START includes a main treaty text with a preamble and 16 articles; a protocol with definitions, verification procedures, and agreed statements; and technical annexes to the protocol.
[iii] Under the agreement, Moscow and Washington are committed to the following: deploying no more than 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads and a maximum of 700 long-range missiles and bombers; a limit of 800 intercontinental ballistic missiles in deployment; each side can conduct up to 18 inspections of strategic nuclear weapons sites yearly to ensure the other has not breached the treaty’s limits. Inspections under the agreement were suspended during the pandemic and have not yet resumed.
[iv] The US Department of State, “New START Treaty,” https://www.state.gov/new-start/, Accessed on 28 February 2023
[v] NATO, “Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in NATO, 27 February 2023,” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48895.htm, Accessed on 01 March 2023
[vi] The treaty barred Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles.
[vii] The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate and permanently forswear all of their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The treaty marked the first time the superpowers had agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons, and employ extensive on-site inspections for verification.
[viii] The Open Skies Treaty permits each state-party to conduct short-notice, unarmed, reconnaissance flights over the others' entire territories to collect data on military forces and activities. The United States withdrew from the treaty in November 2020, and Russia withdrew in December 2021, which left 32 state-parties remaining in the accord.
[ix] US Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks to the Press 21 February 2023,” https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-remarks-to-the-press-7/, Accessed on 28 February 2023
[x] Cédric Perrin, General Rappoteur, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “International Arms Control: Challenges Ahead Defence and Security Committee,” https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-11/014%20DSC%2021%20E%20rev.%201%20fin%20-%20ARMS%20CONTROL%20-%20PERRIN.pdf, Accessed on 01 March 2023