The armed conflict between Sudan Armed Forces(SAF) headed by General Abdel Fatteh Burhan and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo erupted in Sudan on April, 15, 2023. According to World Health Organization more than 400 civilians have been killed and more than 4,000 civilians are wounded. The fighting has resulted in massive displacement- more than 80,000 Sudanese have fled to the neighboring states while 25 million people which is more than half of the people of Sudan needs humanitarian aid. This has not only disrupted Sudan’s transition to civilian rule but the warfare may also have far reaching consequences for an already unstable region.
In this context it is important to understand how did the military rivalries develop, what are the regional dynamics and role played by the global players.
How did Military Rivalries develop
The power struggle between Burhan and Dagalo has its roots in the in the late years of former President Omar al Bashir’s reign. Sudanese army - with a history of staging several coups - was traditionally the strongest state institution. However, Bashir was distrustful of the Army and divided the national armed forces into competing centers of power, so that Army could not topple his government. In 2013, Bashir formed para military force - RSF under Dagalo’s leadership, comprising the elements of the Janjaweed militia as well as the National Intelligence and Security Service[i]. He also created a separate command structure and funds for RSF[ii]. RSF served as a check to the challenges posed by the national army.
In 2019, after months of popular protests, against Bashir’s regime, Sudanese Army and RSF came together to oust Bashir and to seize power. An interim civilian military unity government was set up under the leadership of a civilian Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok.[iii] In August 2019, the civilian military unity government fixed the timeline for the complete transition to civilian rule. Meanwhile in 2021, the Army deposed the interim government, seized power and arrested Prime Minister Hamdok in a coup de tat. However, within a month Hamdok was reinstated as the Prime Minister. Hamdok and Burhan signed a controversial deal which stipulated that the 2019 constitutional declaration should be the basis of political transition. The civilian coalition, Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) did not recognize the agreement with the Armed forces. According FFC’s official statement, “We affirm our clear position - no negotiation, no partnership and no legacy for the putschists”.[iv] This led to widespread pro-democracy protests and under the mounting public pressure, Hamdok resigned. Since then, Burhan became the de facto President and the chairman of the Sovereign Council and Dagalo became the deputy chairman of the council.
Subsequently, the tensions between Dagalo and Burhan kept increasing and the framework agreement signed between Burhan, Dagalo and FFC in particular further aggravated their rivalry. The framework agreement recognized RSF as the regular entity and placed it under the direct control of the civilian head of the state during the transition period. This clause provided Dagalo autonomy from Burhan and the Sudanese National Army. The Framework agreement also required that RSF is to be integrated into the army but it did not specify the timeline. Burhan demanded two years’ timeline for RSF’s integration into the Army. Dagalo disagreed with the two-year time and proposed for a ten-year timeline for the integration. Burhan was unwilling to give RSF ten years for integration as it will provide RSF an opportunity to expand its autonomy outside the army.[v]Dagalo on the other hand accused Burhan of renouncing the agreement on the integration schedules. This deepened distrust between Burhan and Dagalo.
The Regional Dynamics
Sudan is located in a volatile region bordering the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region. In the recent years most of its neighboring states including Ethiopia, Chad and South Sudan have been affected by major political upheavals and conflicts. The conflict in Sudan has distressed its neighbors about shared Nile waters, oil pipelines, shaping of the new government and an emerging humanitarian crisis[vi].
In this context it is important to take note of the regional dynamics and the possibility of the spill over.
Egypt
Egypt has always supported Sudanese Armed forces led by al Burhan.[vii] In 2021 Burhan and Abdel Sisi signed an agreement to strengthen military cooperation between the two states. Military has played a dominant role in both Egypt and Sudan. Egyptian President Abdel Fateh al Sisi came to power through a military power grab by ousting a democratically elected President, while Burhan led a military takeover in Sudan in 2021.[viii] Thus Sisi, feels more comfortable in dealing with Burhan and considers him as the most likely guarantor of Egyptian interests, particularly, with regard to the negotiations over Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The construction of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam by Ethiopia on the Blue Nile poses an existential threat to both Egypt and Sudan as it will adversely affect their fresh water supplies. Both the nations have pushed for the regulation of the operation of the Ethiopian dam and any tension between Egypt and Sudan will disrupt their efforts to secure the deal. It is to be noted that RSF maintains closer ties with the Ethiopian leadership which is not in the best interest of Egypt. Therefore, Egypt considers Sudan as an indispensable ally in its dispute with Ethiopia and the emergence of a political regime in Sudan which is hostile towards Abel Sisi’s government may have serious repercussions for Egypt[ix]. On May, 9 2023, General Burhan thanked President Sisi for his support and stated that, “the Egyptian people are no strangers. In every ordeal that befalls Sudan, they are closer to Sudanese. They have our thanks and appreciation”[x].
Ethiopia
There has been a growing discord between Ethiopia and Sudan since 2020.[xi] The border dispute over Al Fashagha region and Ethiopia’s billion-dollar hydroelectric dam on Blue Nile has been the source of contention between Sudan and Ethiopia. In 2020 right after the outbreak of Tigray war, the Sudanese army attacked the disputed border region of al Fashagha farmland, evicting Ethiopian Amhara farmers[xii]. Ethiopian government maintained that Sudanese army forcefully attacked al Fashagha at the time when the Ethiopian armed force was distracted by the conflict in Tigaray. After al Fashaga’s reclamation by Sudanese army, the Amhara community build pressure on the Ethiopian government to respond militarily but Ethiopian military avoided direct confrontation[xiii]. Amhara militia, however, carried out sporadic attacks on the Sudanese soldiers. With the ongoing armed conflict in Sudan, Amhara militia could simply take the advantage of the situation by launching an attack on Sudanese army in the al Fashaga region.
Chad and Central African Republic
The crisis in Sudan poses a grave threat to Chad and Central African Republic, which have suffered from Sudan’s deadly conflict in the past. The three counties have in common a group of communities such as Rounga, Arab tribes, Zaghawa, Massalit and Tama.[xiv] Their movement across borders is not restricted by administrative boundaries. They have been mobilized by multiple militias despite their nationality. For Instance, Rebel groups in Darfur in Sudan have mainly mobilized Zaghawa ethnic group while Seleka rebellion in CAR has mobilized Rounga community in the past. Thus, it is important to look at how these cross-border communities position themselves as far as recent conflict in Sudan is concerned. Dagalo’s RSF is an Arab entity and has alienated Zaghawa ethnic community while al Burhan considers Zaghawa as their allies who are at loggerheads with Hemdeti. In Chad, the power has been held by Mahamat Deby for past two years and he belongs to the Zaghawa ethnic group while most of the senior members of the Chadian Transition belong to Arab community[xv]. As far as CAR is concerned some rebels are belong to the Arab community. The current crisis in Sudan is worrisome for both Chad and CAR as Chad is undergoing a contested political transition while CAR’s security challenges are still acute. Therefore, despite their neutral stand on the Sudan crisis there is possibility that Chad and CAR may become embroiled in the conflict. Thus, there is need to engage with the leaders of trans-border communities and to take measures to contain the possible spillovers.
South Sudan
South Sudan is another country which is most affected by the turmoil in Sudan. More than, 10,000 Sudanese refugees have fled to Renk province of South Sudan. On the economic front, the clashes between SAF and RSF at Port Sudan have damaged the oil pipelines- threatening oil exports. It is to be noted that, around 85% of governments revenue in South Sudan comes from oil exports. Besides, on April 19 2023, some of the RSF fighters entered South Sudanese provinces like Upper Nile State and Renk Country, which compelled the South Sudanese army to issue an ultimatum to the RSF fighters to disarm or leave[xvi]. This event demonstrated the risk of possible spillover of the conflict in Sudan.
Role of the External Actors
Each global actor has its own political interests in Sudan. In this context it is important to understand role played by the external actors in Sudan.
UAE
UAE has emerged as one of the key players as far as military confrontation in Sudan is concerned. Sudan’s engagement with UAE during Bashir’s regime has been restrained due to his support for the Islamists and his close ties with Iran and Qatar.[xvii] In 2019 UAE supported the military coup led by Burhan and Dagalo which led to the demise of Bashir and supported the new regime led by Burhan. Though UAE has adopted cautious approach as far as the current crisis in Sudan is concerned but it favored Dagalo over Burhan as Dagalo militia controls the lucrative Jebel Amer Gold mines which supplies gold to Emirates markets. Therefore, UAE has been using RSF to advance its interests in order to secure its access to Sudan’s natural resources and to restrain the influence of any other regional power.
Russia
Russia is another key player which is involved in Sudan. Wagner group had been active in Sudan during former President Bashir’s rule. The primary aim of Wagner group in Sudan is to protect its mineral resources particularly its gold mining resources and to smuggle them via UAE to Russia. Russia views Dagalo as its ally because of its control over the gold mines and it could help Russia to have long term access over Sudanese gold reserves.[xviii] Besides, Russia also aims to establish a Russian Naval base at Port Sudan. In 2020, Russia and Sudan signed an agreement to establish the Russian Naval base which would host a naval logistics center and nuclear-powered submarines.[xix] The military government led by Burhan was reluctant to revive the deal although, Dagalo urged the Sudanese authorities to revive the naval base accord with Russia. Russia therefore, perceives that an empowered RSF would be more interested to lobby for the construction of the naval base as compared to Burhan. Therefore, Russia will be more interested to shape the outcome of the ongoing crisis in Sudan in its own favour.
USA
US, at present seems to have limited influence to shape the events in Sudan. The US government has been working with the Arab states like Egypt and UAE to pressurize the warring parties to bring about ceasefire in Sudan however; US allies are supporting the different fractions as far as current conflict is concerned[xx]. For instance, Egypt is supporting Burhan while UAE is backing Dagalo. The transitional agreement and the security sector reforms that were backed by US in 2019 proved to be flawed. The central idea of the security sector reform was to unify SAF and RSF into a unified army but it was difficult to achieve as both the leaders were not willing to give up power.
India
India has always stood with Sudan especially through its humanitarian assistance. However, the most pressing challenge for India was to safely evacuate all the Indians who were struck in Sudan. On April 24, 2023, operation Kaveri was launched to bring back about 3800 Indian nationals from Sudan. India has also set up a separate control room to monitor the situation in Sudan and it has coordinated with all the stakeholders for its rescue operation such as UN, Saudi UAE, USA, Egypt and Djibouti.[xxi] India has successfully completed the operation.
The instability in Sudan is a matter of concern in particular for its neighbors. Given that neither Burhan nor Dagalo are willing to relinquish their power, and given the varying interests of the regional and external actors, Sudan seems to be heading for a prolonged period of conflict.
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*Dr. Gauri Narain Mathur, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Janjaweed are Sudanese Arab Militia group that operates in Sudan particularly in Darfur and Eastern Chad. They have also been active in Yemen.
[ii] Adam Fulton.’ Sudan Conflict: This is there fighting and What is at stake in the region?’ The Guardian. 16 April 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/27/sudan-conflict-why-is-there-fighting-what-is-at-stake
[iii]‘Sudan Crisis: What’s Next After one week of Deadly fighting?”. Aljazeera. 22 April 2023. ljazeera.com/news/2023/4/22/sudan-crisis-whats-next-after-one-week-of-deadly-fighting
[iv]‘Sudan’s Hamdok reinstated as PM after political agreement signed’. Aljazeera. 21 November 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/21/sudans-hamdok-reinstated-as-pm-after-political-agreement-signed
[v]‘ Stopping Sudan’s Descent into a Full Blown Civil War”, Crisis Group. 20 April 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/stopping-sudans-descent-full-blown-civil-war
[vi]‘ Why the Conflict in Sudan is worrying its neighbors’. Al Jazeera. 21 April 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/21/why-the-conflict-in-sudan-is-worrying-its-neighbours
[vii] Ibid
[viii] ‘ Sudan’s Crisis: Egypt’s dilemma over fighting’. Sudan Crisis. BBC News. 23 April 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65351460
[ix] Giorgeo Cafiero. ‘ Analysis: UAE, Egypt Closer to Different Sides in Sudan Conflict.’ Al Jazeera. 30 April 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/28/analysis-uae-egypt-closer-to-different-sides-in-sudan-conflict
[x] ‘ Sudan Burhan Thanked President Sisi and all of Egypt for helping Sudan’. Egypt Independent. 9 May 2023. https://egyptindependent.com/sudans-general-burhan-thanks-president-sisi-and-all-of-egypt-for-helping-sudan/
[xi] Ahmed Soliman. ‘ Coordinating International Responses to Ethiopia- Sudan Tensions’. Chatham House. 12 April 2023. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/04/coordinating-international-responses-ethiopia-sudan-tensions/03-untangling-ethiopia-and
[xii] Al Fashaq is a disputed area between Sudan and Ethiopia located on the Ethiopia- Sudan Border.
[xiii] Mat Nahsed. ‘Will Ethiopia and Eritrea be dragged into Sudan’s complex war?’ Aljazeera. 6 May 2023. ljazeera.com/news/2023/5/6/will-ethiopia-and-eritrea-be-dragged-into-sudans-complex-war
[xiv] Rehmadji Hoinathy and Yamingue Betinbaye. ‘ Sudan’s war poses a Great risk to Chad and CAR’. Institute for Security Studies. 8 May 2023. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sudans-war-poses-grave-risks-for-chad-and-car
[xv] Ibid
[xvi] Aly Vergee.’ Five potential Global Consequences of Sudan’s Escalating Conflict’. The Interpreter. 4 May 2023. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/five-potential-global-consequences-sudan-s-escalating-conflict
[xvii] Jean Baptisie Gallopin. ‘ The Great Game of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Sudan.’ European Council on Foreign Relations. https://pomeps.org/the-great-game-of-the-uae-and-saudi-arabia-in-sudan
[xviii] Catrina Doxsee. ‘ How does the Conflict in Sudan Affect Russia and the Wagner Group’. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 20 April 2023. sis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-grou
[xx] Justin Lynch. ‘ In Sudan, the US Policies paved the Way for War.’ Foreign Policy. 20 April 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/20/sudan-civil-war-biden-burhan-hemeti-foreign-policy/
[xxi] ‘ India Launches Operation Kaveri to Evacuate its Nations From Sudan.’ The Economic Times. 25 April 2023. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/latest-updates/india-launches-operation-kaveri-to-evacuate-its-nationals-from-sudan/articleshow/99733068.cms?from=mdr