In a historic speech to German Bundestag last year on 27 February 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz referred to Russia’s attack on Ukraine as a turning point (Zeitenwende) for Europe and announced a radical shift in German policy.[i] This included Germany’s decision to increase its defence expenditure to more than 2 percent of GDP as well as its unprecedented decision to supply weapons to Ukraine. Echoing the sentiments of the “Zeitenwende” speech, Chancellor Scholz’s government released Germany’s first National Security strategy (NSS) on 14 June 2023. [ii]
The NSS had been under negotiation since December 2021 after Chancellor Scholz formed the coalition government[iii] but was delayed several times owing to inter-party and ministry disputes, particularly over the establishment of a National Security Council (NSC). NSC was intended to ensure a coherent foreign and security policy by streamlining decisions of different German ministries[iv] but there was a lack of consensus within the Chancellery and Foreign Ministry[v] over its location.[vi] The issue of NSC was ultimately dropped altogether as there was a growing pressure to draft a comprehensive security strategy amid the war in Ukraine.
The pressure on Germany grew with the progression of war in Ukraine as the country’s response was “seen to be far more muted than that of other allies” within Europe.[vii] Although Chancellor Scholz committed to unprecedented measures in support of Ukraine last year, the war also exposed Germany’s vulnerability owing to its dependence on Russian energy. It also brought to fore deficiencies in the German military as the country faced criticism for slow and inadequate delivery of weapons to Ukraine.[viii]
Objectives of the NSS
Within the aforementioned backdrop, Germany released the NSS with the objective of contributing towards development of strategic culture in Germany. The “overarching guiding principle” as stated in the strategy is to defend Germany against external threats. The strategy aims to be “robust, resilient and sustainable” and takes an integrated approach. This approach refers to “joining up civilian, military and police capabilities in crisis prevention, conflict management and peace building” to shape the country’s response at international and multilateral level.
The strategy also expresses its commitment towards European integration. It supports enlargement to include the Western Balkan states, Ukraine, Moldova and later Georgia. However, it also notes that if such an enlargement were to take place, the EU would need to undergo essential reforms in order to maintain coherence. One major institutional reform that Germany has been pushing for some time now is the need to switch from “unanimity to majority voting in foreign or tax policy fields”.[ix]
The strategy acknowledges the need for EU to act more “geopolitically and to uphold its security and sovereignty for the coming generations.” It reflects on the negative impact of COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine on supply chain disruptions that evolved into significant security risks. It also emphasises on the security risks that technology competition carries in the future.
Scope of the Strategy: Franco German Motor[x] and East-West Divide
The German NSS strategy singles out France as an important neighbour at the very outset and lauds their joint initiatives towards the ‘indispensable’ process of European integration post the Second World War. It, however, makes no mention of countries like Poland or other countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that have been critical of both Berlin and Paris for what they refer to as a soft stance towards Russia. It must be noted that Germany and France were also instrumental in the signing of (failed) Minsk agreements following the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. These accords were also seen as being favourable towards Russia by CEE. In addition, the CEE has also opposed the call for EU reforms by Germany, France and others.
It also mentions United States (US) as a close partner and reiterates Germany’s commitment to the transatlantic alliance but omits the United Kingdom (UK). It pledges support for “collective defence” and reiterates Chancellor’s Scholz’ prior commitment to allocate 2 percent of the country’s GDP to “Bundeswehr” (armed forces). It notes that this move would strengthen NATO as well as ensure security of Europe. Furthermore, the strategy notes that the country has created a special fund for the Bundeswehr which would also be used for investments in critical-infrastructure protection, cybesecurity, effective diplomacy, civil protection, stabilising partners, dedicated humanitarian assistance and development cooperation.
It refers to Russia as “the most serious threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.” It notes that since the beginning of Ukraine war, Germany has effectively “liberated” itself from dependence on Russian energy supplies and worked towards created alternatives. The strategy stresses that the country is now on a “path towards more security and less dependence” which implies that Berlin’s world focus more on security while making decisions on its economic policy. However, it does not make any reference to the Nord Stream pipeline that was frozen in the wake of Ukraine war.
The strategy terms China as a difficult partner but akin to its past rhetoric, the document refers to China as “a partner, competitor and a systemic rival” without whom “challenges and crises cannot be resolved.”[xi]
Conclusion
The beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war since 24 February 2022 led to a “Zeitenwende” moment in German foreign policy in many respects. From increasing defense spending to sending military supplies to war zones, Germany has made some very substantial changes in its foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. Notwithstanding the several delays in its release, the timing of the NSS is important as it reflects the guiding principles of Germany’s strategy amid the new and emerging geopolitical challenges globally as well as in its periphery.
The NSS outlines Germany’s evolving approach to security. Although Berlin has issued several policy documents dealing with security prior to the war, this is the first comprehensive security document released by German government so far. Furthermore, while the previous policy documents focused on defense, the new strategy focuses more on foreign policy. The strategy’s focus on France and omission of other countries from Central and Eastern Europe, including the Nordic-Baltic region, reflects the East- West divide within the EU.
However, the strategy has several limitations. Even though the NSS aims to be forward looking in scope, it refers mostly to existing issues such as climate change and conflicts like Ukraine, Syria and Iraq, Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region but, it does not allude to potential issues like Taiwan. Moreover, the relevance of Indo Pacific for Germany and Europe is mentioned once but not stressed upon in the strategy. Finally, although the document refers to promoting diversification by forging new partnerships in Asia and Africa, there is no mention of important countries like India or any other country from the Global South despite its growing engagement with the region.
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*Dr. Himani Pant, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Policy statement by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the German Bundestag, German Bundestag, 27 February 2022,
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-
of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378, Accessed on 23 June 2023.
[ii] National Security Strategy adopted by the German Federal Cabinet, Germany Federal Foreign office, 14 June 2023, https://www.nationalesicherheitsstrategie.de/en.html (Accessed on 16 June 2023).
[iii] Popularly known as the Traffic Light Coalition, it consists of Social Democratic Party, the Green Party and Free Democratic Party. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is a Social Democrat Party while German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock is from the Green Party
[iv] Germany ditches US-style National Security Council to relieve political deadlock, Politico, 18 February 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-coalition-spat-national-security-council-olaf-scholz/, Accessed on 26 June 2023.
[v] Refer to Note 3.
[vi] German government presents first national security strategy, Deutsche Welle, 14 June 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/german-government-presents-first-national-security-strategy/a-65908584, Accessed n 16 June 2023.
[vii]ChristophHasselbach, Ukraine: What is Germany's strategy?, Deutsche Welle, 30 May 2022,
[viii]Liana Fix, CFR Expert and Caroline Kapp, “One Year After: How Putin Got Germany Wrong”, CFR, 17 February 2023, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/one-year-after-how-putin-got-germany-wrong
[ix] German top aide: No EU-reform, no enlargement, Euractiv, 28 November 2022, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/german-top-aide-no-eu-reform-no-enlargement/, Accessed on 21 June 2023.
[x] The signing of Elysée Treaty by then German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French President Charles de Gaulle in 1963 was a defining moment in bringing about reconciliation between Germany and France. Since then the Franco-German motor has been seen as a major driver for European integration.
[xi] National Security Strategy adopted by the German Federal Cabinet, Germany Federal Foreign office, 14 June, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/-/2601730, Accessed on 16 June 2023