Indian Council of World Affairs

The first Russia–Africa Summit was held on 23–24 October 2019 in Sochi. It was a significant milestone in the Russia–Africa partnership and intensified the Russia–Africa partnership in many areas, including political, security, and economic cooperation, science and technology (S&T), humanitarian affairs, and cultural exchanges.[i] As Russia prepares for the second Russia–Africa Summit (27–28 July 2023) in St. Petersburg, this viewpoint highlights the drivers behind Russia’s growing engagement in the region.

Russia’s Growing Engagement with Africa

Russia’s engagement with Africa is not new, but it has seen a significant rise since 2014. The beginning of Moscow’s isolation from the West in 2014 gave a push to its policy of engagement with other partners, including Africa. The 2016 Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) prioritised “multidimensional interaction with African States both in bilateral and multilateral settings by improving political dialogue and promoting mutually beneficial trade and economic ties”.[ii] Since then, Russia has sought to step up “comprehensive cooperation” in the region and has also “contributed towards preventing regional conflicts and crises situations, as well as facilitate post-conflict settlement in Africa”.[iii] The ongoing conflict in Ukraine since February 2022 has pushed Russia to deepen its ties with the non-Western world. This, in turn, has facilitated further cooperation between Russia and Africa. Russia’s new FPC 2023 reiterates the importance of Africa by prioritising “inter-alia food and energy security, military and military-technical cooperation, security assistance to overcome armed conflicts, trade and investments, and humanitarian sphere”.[iv] This emphasizes Moscow’s priorities towards African states.

As mentioned earlier, the first Russia–Africa Summit in 2019 became a significant forum for further interaction and cooperation between Russia and Africa in all spheres.[v] The second Russia–Africa Summit in 2023 will mark another significant milestone in strengthening the Russia–Africa partnership. This Summit would help African states address their aspirations as outlined in Agenda 2063, the continent’s strategic framework.[vi] This was highlighted by Russian President Putin when he stated that “Russia will support Africa’s aspirations to pursue independent, sovereign, and peaceful policies” during the meeting with the Heads of State of Africa on 17 June 2023, who were visiting Moscow to hold peace talks on Ukraine.[vii]^,[viii] Primarily, Moscow is strengthening its partnership with Africa on a multilateral and bilateral basis as a fundamental means of fulfilling its interests.

Russia’s Interests in Africa

Russia’s interests in the region are multifaceted – political, economic, S&T, security, and humanitarian affairs. The following section highlights Russia’s increasing foothold in Africa amid the conflict in Ukraine:

Russia has political relations with all 54 African states. Russian embassies are present in 49 out of the 54 states.[ix]  Moscow seeks to strengthen its political interactions with Africa. The increasing political interactions between Russia and Africa are evident from the balanced approach of African states at the UN General Assembly voting regarding the conflict in Ukraine.

Most recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited four African states, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Uganda,[x] in July 2022. Six months later, in January 2023, Lavrov’s visits to Angola, Eritrea, Eswatini, and South Africa[xi] emphasise that Africa is an unchanged priority for Moscow. These high-level ministerial visits highlight the growing political engagements between Russia and Africa in light of the conflict in Ukraine and also in preparation for the second Russia–Africa Summit in 2023.

Russia is also enhancing its ties with South Africa through BRICS. The 15th BRICS Summit will take place in August 2023, and other African states, including Algeria, Egypt, and Ethiopia,[xii] are also interested in becoming a part of this bloc. Therefore, Russia and Africa are reaffirming their diplomatic relations through various bilateral and multilateral forums.

Moscow has increased its economic engagement with Africa since Western sanctions were placed on Russia in 2014 and 2022. Thus, Russia actively explores economic prospects in Africa, from commodity sectors like agriculture and hydrocarbons to technological industries.[xiii] However, Russia is not a leading trade partner of Africa but is exploring its markets and opportunities for economic engagement.

Africa is emerging as a ‘future market’ for Russian grain and agricultural equipment. This is a promising area where the Russia–Africa partnership can eradicate the hunger issue on the continent through productive engagements. The second Russia–Africa Summit in 2023 will outline more prospects for developing commercial ties.

S&T provides great potential for cooperation between Russia and Africa, as Moscow is known for its advanced technologies. Russia provides prospects for Africa to explore its expertise in the fields such as artificial intelligence, engineering, nanotechnology, agriculture, nuclear energy, and cyber security, which are important for developing knowledge-based economies. Further, S&T has a positive impact on educational cooperation. The Russia–Africa partnership in the field of education is built on “trust and mutual benefit”.[xiv] At present, around 35,000 African students are studying at Russian universities.[xv] Russia has reserved around 4700 seats for African students in Russian universities for the academic year 2023–2024.[xvi] Therefore, establishing close ties in the field of education provides a way for cultural convergence in the Russia–Africa partnership.

Russia is expanding its influence in Africa through military and military-technical cooperation. Russia is the largest arms supplier to Africa. It exports 49 % of its military equipment,[xvii] primarily to Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, and Zambia.[xviii] Russia has several military cooperation agreements with African states. Russia, amid the conflict in Ukraine, has signed military cooperation agreements with Madagascar (in January) and Cameroon (in April), and supplied military equipment to Mali (in August).[xix]  

This strategic effort by Russia is not only undertaken by the Ministry of Defence but also by Russian Private Military Companies, like the Wagner Group. Several countries, including Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, etc,[xx] have invited the Wagner Group to combat terrorist groups. Along with engaging in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, the Wagner Group also provides security and training services to African military personnel. They are funded by direct payments or resource concessions. Thus, Russia leverages the Wagner Group in conflict-ridden African states to strengthen ties and extract natural resources. Though Russia, does not have a military base in Africa, it is expanding its foothold in security cooperation by exporting arms and importing natural resources. Thus, Moscow is addressing the security vacuum in Africa by widening its influence in the military and security spheres.

Russia is also deepening its partnership with Africa by providing humanitarian assistance to conflict-ridden countries and regions affected by crises or suffering natural disasters. In addition, Russia provides personnel to UN Peacekeeping missions in Africa for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations.

Conclusion

To conclude, Russia is expanding its foothold in Africa through various forms of cooperation, including political, economic, S&T, security, humanitarian issues, and other fields, as Africa is important in the emerging multipolar world order. Following the first Russia–Africa Summit in 2019, the second Russia–Africa Summit on 27 – 28 July 2023 will be a significant turning point in further strengthening Russia–Africa relations. Thus, in the year 2023, Russia and Africa will further enhance their cooperation in all fields.

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*Sowmiya V, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views are of the author.  

Endnotes

[i] Outcomes of the first Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum. Roscongress to continue working on the African track until the next Forum, Russia-Africa, https://summitafrica.ru/en/archive/2019/summit-outcomes/, accessed on 20 June 2023.

[ii] The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2016, Voltaire Network, 30 November 2016, https://www.voltairenet.org/article202038.html, accessed on 21 June 2023.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, MFA Russia, 31 March 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/, accessed on 21 June 2023.

[v] Russia-Africa Summit, President of Russia, 24 October 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61893, accessed on 21 June 2023.

[vi] Agenda 2063, the continent’s strategic framework encapsulates Africa’s aspirations and key initiatives for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future.

[vii] Meeting with heads of delegations of African states, President of Russia, 17 June 2023, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71451, accessed on 22 June 2023.

[viii] The delegation included President of Zambia Hakainde Hichilema, Chairperson of the African Union and President of the Comoros Azali Assoumani, President of the Republic of Senegal Macky Sall, President of the South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa, Prime Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt Mostafa Mabdouli, Minister of State and Director of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic of the Congo Florent Ntsiba and Special Envoy of the President of Uganda for Special Duties Ruhakana Rugunda.

[ix] The Foundations of Russafrica, Valdai Club, 13 September 2022, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-foundations-of-russafrica/, accessed on 23 June 2023.

[x] Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media questions at a joint news conference with President of the Republic of Uganda Yoweri Kaguta Museveni following talks, Entebbe, MFA Russia, 26 July 2022, https://mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/1824012/, accessed on 29 June 2023.
[xi] Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s opening remarks during a meeting with President of South Africa, MFA Russia, 23 January 2023, https://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/1849379/, accessed on 30 June 2023.

[xii] Ethiopia applies to join BRICS group-Foreign Ministry, Tass, 29 June 2023, https://tass.com/world/1640481, accessed on 30 June 2023.

[xiii] Prospects for expanding Russia’s economic interaction with African countries, Valdai Club, 10 November 2022, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/prospects-for-expanding-russia-s-econom/, accessed on 23 June 2023.

[xiv] Prospects of Russian education were discussed at the International Parliamentary Conference “Russia-Africa”, The State Duma, 19 March 2023, http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/56635/, accessed on 4 July 2023.

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] Ibid.

[xvii] Rajen Harshe (2023) the significance of China and Africa in Russia’s foreign policy, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-significance-of-china-and-africa-in-russias-foreign-policy/, accessed on 25 June 2023.

[xviii] Jack Detsch (2022) Ukraine Has Ground down Russia’s Arms Business, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/21/ukraine-russia-arms-business-weapons-exports-africa/, accessed on 27 June 2023.

[xix] Abdelhak Bassou (2023) Military relations between Russia and Africa, before and after the war in Ukraine, Policy Center for the New South, accessed on 4 July 2023.

[xx] Rajen Harshe (2023) the significance of China and Africa in Russia’s foreign policy, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-significance-of-china-and-africa-in-russias-foreign-policy/, accessed on 25 June 2023.