Indian Council of World Affairs

Background

On 11 July 2023, the NATO Leaders’ Summit was held at Vilnius, Lithuania. In the backdrop of the international community experiencing a fast-changing complex strategic environment, the Vilnius Summit was expected to welcome a milestone in the strengthening of the NATO alliance including with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the Indo-Pacific region. Building on the adoption of the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept at last year’s Summit in Madrid, which underscores the importance of the Indo-Pacific, the Vilnius Summit 2023 was to spearhead the importance of strengthening “dialogue and cooperation with new and existing partners in the Indo-Pacific to tackle cross-regional challenges and shared security interests”.^[1] Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan and President Yoon Suk-yeol of ROK were invited for the first time in 2022 as participants for the NATO Leaders’ Summit at Madrid. To build on the momentum and underscore the importance of strengthening cooperation with new and existing partners in the Indo-Pacific, the 2023 Vilnius Summit marked the second time when both leaders were invited again. The in-person attendance by Prime Minster of Japan and President of ROK also highlights their thrust to deepen ties with the world’s biggest military alliance.

Individually Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP)

For Japan and ROK, which represent Northeast Asia of the Indo-Pacific region, the NATO Leaders’ Summit offered some positive outcomes especially in the form of Individually Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP). The NATO alliance requires that cooperation with its Indo-Pacific partners is strengthened for any form of untoward developments in the region that impacts Euro-Atlantic security. Consequently, with the challenges posed by China, Russia-Ukraine conflict, climate change, supply chain crisis, and high-end technology issues, NATO has acquired greater salience in the Indo-Pacific region. It was particularly after the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, that the NATO alliance started to seek and develop cooperation mechanism foremost through the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP) with ROK in 2012^[2] and with Japan in 2014.^[3] This mechanism was derived through NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept to actively seek cooperative security and partnership with relevant countries that will engage actively to enhance international security.^[4] In 2023, the IPCP has been upgraded to ITPP for both Japan and ROK, as they pursue a more realistic approach amidst the unrelenting changes in the complex geopolitical environment.

ITPP with Japan

When it comes to Japan and NATO, it is considered to be the longest-standing “out of theatre” partnership, with informal contacts, and engagements that can even be traced back to 1979.^[5] Even though Japan fell outside of the geographical scope of NATO, its importance was always considered since the end of the Cold War itself. In the London Summit of June 1990, at the proceedings of the Summit, then Canadian Prime Minister Martin Brian Mulroney stated that Japan had sent out signals of its readiness, which should be reinforced with some measures to welcome Japan into the fold.^[6] However, due to the pacifist interpretation of the Article Nine in the Japanese Constitution, it meant that Tokyo was not able to commit to send troops for any legitimate missions outside the defence of its own country. Therefore, from the early 1990s till 2000s, Japan witnessed a somewhat of self-restraint that limited their involvement to humanitarian and reconstruction work.^[7] 

Thereafter, the advent of common global threats in the 21^st century geopolitics ushered in a requirement for NATO to branch out from its traditional partnership and establish stronger relations with non-NATO and non-EU countries, which shared core political values and could contribute to their missions and operations.^[8] Foreign Minister Taro Aso, who became the first Japanese Minister to address the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 4 May 2006, asserted Japan’s intention to work more closely with NATO in an era of common global threats.^[9]

It was during the NATO Leaders’ Summit at Riga, Latvia in November 2006 that the need for having more global partners to tackle global threats of terrorism and WMD was underscored by then Secretary General of NATO, General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.^[10] He was cautious in stating that such a development would not mean that NATO would turn into a global alliance. Right after the Riga Summit, Foreign Minister Taro Aso in a landmark speech on 30 November 2006 while ratifying Japan’s strategic foreign policy vision, described NATO as a partner for Japan in promoting freedom and prosperity along the rim of the Eurasian continent, while working side-by-side with NATO from the Indian Ocean to Afghanistan.^[11]

However, it was only after (late) Shinzo Abe’s second stint as the Prime Minister of Japan that the strengthening of cooperation and a mutual expansion of outlook moved forward between NATO and Japan in a substantive manner. The Joint Political Declaration between Japan and NATO released by Prime Minister Abe and Secretary General Rasmussen in April 2013^[12] identified that Japan and NATO build engagement “through enhanced political dialogue and greater practical cooperation,”.^[13]

In May 2014, the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) with Japan was formally established, and it laid out nine specific areas for Japan-NATO cooperation, including cyber, arms-control and non-proliferation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, and counter-terrorism.^[14] Japan also established an official mission to NATO in July 2018, by converting its Embassy in Belgium into the NATO Mission, which meant the Ambassador to Belgium often wore a dual-hat.^[15]           

The Vilnius Summit in July 2023 ushered in a new era of cooperation between Japan and NATO with the signing of the ITPP, which provides the overall framework for practical cooperation. The transition to ITPP has outlined three strategic objectives for the 2023-26 period, including strengthening dialogue and consultations, enhancing resilience and boosting interoperability.^[16] It has identified four priority issues: (i) Emerging Security Issues; (ii) Longstanding Security Issues; (iii) Expansion of Cooperative Activities; (iv) Promotion of Fundamental Values.^[17] Within these issues, the ITPP has stated 16 goals which are:

Emerging Security Issues:

1. Cyber Defence
2. Strategic Communication
3. Emerging and Disruptive Technologies
4. Space Security
5. Climate Change and Security

 Longstanding Security Issues:

1. Maritime Security
2. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
3. Dialogue and Consultation

Expansion of Cooperative Activities:

1. Emergency Management
2. Science and Technology
3. Practical Cooperation for Interoperability
4. Capability Development and Interoperability
5. Resilience and Civil Preparedness
6. Public Diplomacy

Promotion of Fundamental Values:

1. Women, Peace and Security
2. Human Security

In its efforts of becoming a more proactive contributor to peace in the international community, while achieving its own security, as well as peace and stability in the region,[18] Japan has also been planning to reach the NATO benchmark of 2 per cent of GDP devoted to defence. If it is seen in context of the goals of capability development, interoperability, and standardisation, it unveils that Japan is aiming to adopt many of NATO’s standards, create a common understanding of each other’s assets and expand the scope of joint drills.[19] The ITPP between Japan and NATO is expected to scale up collaboration between the two beyond traditional security areas that extends to cyber, emerging and disruptive technologies and strategic communications.[20] This new focus is a signal towards not only a deepening relationship but also reflects the challenges in a new era of a multi-polar world which acknowledges the growing entanglement between the security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.

Quest for a Liaison Office in Tokyo

There was even much anticipation regarding the progress of the proposal for a NATO Liaison office in Tokyo, especially with the Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida being present at the Leaders’ Summit for the second year in a row.^[21] This proposal, however, appears to have for the moment been put on the back burner as the Vilnius Summit Communique did not mention the Tokyo office. The reported opposition to the NATO Liaison office in Tokyo by France and Germany as they felt the proposal would provoke China^[22] displayed emerging fissures in the NATO Alliance as regards sending signals to China.           

Such a development appears to be divergent from the Vilnius Summit Communique that highlights the stated ambitions and coercive policies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) challenging NATO’s interests, security and values.^[23] If the focus was on not provoking China, then having the Summit take place at Vilnius in Lithuania was a surprising move in itself. An EU member country, Lithuania in 2021 had undertaken an independent diplomatic decision to open a Taiwan Representative office that Beijing had strongly objected against, and to showcase its protests had imposed economically coercive actions upon Lithuania. In addition, this decision of omitting the very mention of a NATO Liaison office in Tokyo from the Vilnius Summit Communique appeared in contradiction with the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept as well, which states that China poses “systemic challenges” to Euro-Atlantic security, and the essential need to have full involvement of non-EU allies in EU defence efforts.^[24]         
China had warned against the opening up of the NATO Liaison office in Tokyo, stating “Asia lies beyond the geographical scope of the North Atlantic and has no need for a replica of NATO”, adding that Japan should “refrain from doing anything that may undermine mutual trust between regional countries and peace and stability in the region.”^[25]  However, it was French President Macron’s strong pushback, while stressing that France values its relationship with China, which ultimately resulted in the Liaison Office to be derailed for the time being.^[26] This development has been one of the biggest contradictions of the NATO Leaders’ Summit in 2023, as the Joint Communique had a greatly expanded criticism of China.

France itself had a very flexible membership in 1966 when it withdrew from NATO's integrated military command structure.^[27] It was only in 2009 when France officially re-joined NATO’s integrated military command structure.^[28] Considering the growing cooperation between NATO and the Indo-Pacific partners due to the emerging interconnections and common global security challenges, perhaps in the future negotiations, the NATO Alliance stakeholders could also arrive at some flexible arrangement for a Liaison Office in Tokyo considering the importance of Japan as a global partner and the geostrategic importance of the Indo-Pacific.

ITPP with ROK

ROK has been an active “global partner”^[29] of NATO since 2005.^[30] Over the years, the two have worked bilaterally on a number of shared security challenges. This NATO-ROK partnership is also a part of NATO’s broader relations with its partners in the Indo-Pacific region. There is a mutual convergence on committing to enhance political dialogue and practical cooperation, which includes joint military exercises in order to uphold and strengthen the rules-based international order.[31]

The framework for cooperation and political dialogue between NATO and ROK was set through the signing of the IPCP on 20 September 2012, which was their first Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP) at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.[32] The IPCP outlined seven areas of cooperation^[33], certain specific areas of cooperation that ROK and NATO have been working on include: “non-proliferation, cyber defence, counter-terrorism, security-related civil science projects, interoperability, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence, as well as civil preparedness, resilience and disaster relief”.^[34] In May 2022, South Korea also became the first Asian country to join NATO’s cyber-defence unit based in Estonia.[35] This membership to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) comes at an opportune time when cyberthreats are causing great damage to not only individuals but also separate nations and also transnationally, requiring close international cooperation.[36]

As a result of the evolving policies for strengthening partnership and cooperation, on 26 September 2022, ROK decided to designate its Embassy to Belgium as the country’s Mission to NATO following the agreement by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).^[37] On 22 November 2022, ROK held an official ceremony marking the establishment of their diplomatic mission to NATO.^[38]

The ongoing partnership with NATO gained further momentum when NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and President Yoon Suk-yeol of ROK adopted the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) on 11 July 2023 at the side-lines of the Vilnius Summit. The ITPP with ROK expands cooperation in 11 areas such as dialogue and consultation, cooperation in anti-terrorism efforts, disarmament and non-proliferation, emerging technologies, cybersecurity and public diplomacy.^[39] This was an upgradation from the previous Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP) established in 2012, which earlier outlined cooperation in seven areas.^[40] It also comes at the backdrop of ROK having stipulated NATO as an important partner in their 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy document.

Giving reference to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the current NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg emphasised that security is not regional but global, and had commended South Korea for its support to Ukraine.[41] He also expressed concern about North Korea’s provocative behaviour, including nuclear activity and ballistic missile tests that violate multiple UN Security Council resolutions. ROK has been desiring to enhance cooperation with like-minded countries and groups including NATO especially when the UN sanctions over North Korea has been stalled by China and Russia.[42] The Secretary General welcomed NATO’s deepening partnership with Seoul, including the new partnership programme between the Alliance and South Korea.[43]

With the global security environment in a flux, and full of increasing uncertainties, ROK has been shedding its strategic ambiguity especially since the induction of the current administration under President Yoon Suk-yeol, who has adopted a more proactive policy to elevate South Korea as a Global Pivotal State. President Yoon Suk-yeol has applied a pragmatic approach in reconciling with Japan through a future-oriented outlook and revived the US-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation to further galvanise security of the Korean Peninsula. The NATO ITPP deal also signals how President Yoon Suk-yeol is perhaps eyeing the importance of the European market for ROK’s burgeoning defence industry.[44] ROK is demonstrating that it is willing to walk the tightrope to actively seek out agendas for cooperation and play a larger role in shaping discussions regionally as well as globally.[45]

Reactions and Concerns

Japan and South Korea’s attendance at the NATO Summit, and its deepening alliance with NATO has raised concerns of China, Russia and North Korea. In its press release, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation stated that NATO is spreading itself to the Indo-Pacific using “far-fetched pretext that developments in the region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic Security”.^[46] In March 2022, Russia had already labelled Japan and South Korea as “unfriendly countries” because they joined the sanctions regime against Russia.[47]

China’s response to the Vilnius Summit also came about on the same lines as of Russia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC firmly opposed the portrayal of China as major challenge to NATO’s interests and security.[48] Whereas, regarding the eastward movement of NATO, the Spokesperson of the Chinese Mission to the EU stated that “any action that jeopardises China’s legitimate rights and interests will be met with a resolute response.”[49]

North Korea on the other hand, test fired its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in three months amidst the NATO Summit in Vilnius on 12 July 2023.[50] There is also a concern that as ROK grows closer to Japan and NATO, it would encourage Russia and China to more actively support North Korea.[51] However, with China and Russia continuing to override sanctions against Pyongyang, it is likely that Seoul considers its growing partnerships with Japan and NATO as means to secure its own peace and prosperity.

Conclusion

In the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China’s increasing assertiveness, and North Korea’s constant provocation, Japan and ROK are no longer showing inhibitions in terms of securing themselves from any external aggression. Their behaviour is being determined by their perception of threat, which is a function of aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions.

The substantive engagement of Japan and ROK in the NATO Leaders’ Summit, along with the signing of the ITPP has signalled that Tokyo and Seoul are aware of their security dynamics and are going forward in coordinating responses against any threats. Japan and ROK’s advancing efforts with NATO need to be seen in context that they are central to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific particularly due to the North Korean conundrum, the Taiwan Straits, and the South/East China Sea issues. The unpredictable and fast-changing security environment has created a geopolitical overlap between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific geostrategic framework.[52]

***** 

*Dr Tunchinmang Langel, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal
Endnotes
[1] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2022. “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, 29 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf (Accessed 15 July 2023).

[2] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2012. “NATO and the Republic of Korea sign new partnership programme”, 20 Sep 2012, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_90101.htm (Accessed 15 July 2023)

[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2014. “Prime Minister Abe's Meeting with Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO, and Attendance at the North Atlantic Council”, 6 May 2014, https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/ep/page23e_000240.html (Accessed 15 July 2023)

[4] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2010. “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, 19-20 November 2010, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf (Accessed 18 July 2023)

[5] Mirna Galic, 2019, “Navigating by Sun and Compass Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations”, 6 November 2019, https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/190527Policy_Brief-History_of_Japan_NATO_Relationship.pdf (Accessed 18 July 2023)

[6] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 1990. “VERBATIM RECORD of the NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT”, 5 July 1990, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_archives/20141218_C-VR-90-36-PART1.PDF (Accessed 19 July 2023)

[7] Masashi Nishihara. 2006. “Can Japan Be a Global Partner for NATO?”, RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 2, December 2006, https://www.rips.or.jp/en/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/RIPS_Policy_Perspectives_No.2.pdf (Accessed 18 July 2023)

[8] Masashi Nishihara. 2006. “Can Japan Be a Global Partner for NATO?”, RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 2, December 2006, https://www.rips.or.jp/en/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/RIPS_Policy_Perspectives_No.2.pdf (Accessed 18 July 2023)

[9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2006. “Japan and NATO in a New Security Environment”, 4 May 2006, https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0605.html (Accessed 19 July 2023)

[10] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2006. “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in Riga, Latvia”, 20 August 2012, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/opinions_22476.htm (Accessed 19 July 2023)

[11] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2006. “Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons’ ”, 30 November 2006, https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html (Accessed 19 July 2023)

[12] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2013. “Joint Political Declaration between Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”, 12 April 2013, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_99562.htm (Accessed 19 July 2023)

[13] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2013. “Joint Political Declaration between Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”, 12 April 2013, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_99562.htm (Accessed 19 July 2023)

[14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2014. “INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION PROGRAMME BETWEEN JAPAN AND NATO”, May 2014, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000037772.pdf (Accessed 19 July 2023)

[15] Mirna Galic, 2019, “Navigating by Sun and Compass Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations”, 6 November 2019, https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/190527Policy_Brief-History_of_Japan_NATO_Relationship.pdf (Accessed 18 July 2023)

[16] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2023. “Individually Tailored Partnership Programme between NATO and Japan for 2023 – 2026”, 12 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217797.htm?selectedLocale=en (Accessed 20 July 2023)

[17] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2023. “Individually Tailored Partnership Programme between NATO and Japan for 2023 – 2026”, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100527274.pdf (Accessed 20 July 2023)

[18] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2023. “Japan’s Security Policy”, 5 April 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000079.html (Accessed 20 July 2023)

[19] Ken Moriyasu. 2023. “NATO and Japan to cooperate in 16 areas, align defense equipment”, Asia Nikkei, 6 July 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/NATO-and-Japan-to-cooperate-in-16-areas-align-defense-equipment (Accessed 20 July 2023)

[20] Gabriel Dominguez. 2023. “Japan and NATO usher in new era of cooperation amid China concerns”, The Japan Times, 12 July 2023. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/07/12/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-nato-new-cooperation-agreement/ (Accessed 20 July 2023)

[21] Amy Hawkins. 2023. “Nato appears to shelve plans to open Japan liaison office in Tokyo”, The Guardian, 12 July 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/12/nato-appears-to-shelve-plans-open-japan-liaison-office-tokyo (Accessed 18 July 2023)

[22] Ken Moriyasu. 2023. “Why is NATO edging into Asia?”, Nikkei Asia. 19 July 2023.  https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Why-is-NATO-edging-into-Asia (Accessed 18 July 2023)

[23] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2023. “Vilnius Summit Communiqué”, 11 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm (Accessed 18 July 2023)

[24] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2022. “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, 29 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf (Accessed 15 July 2023).

[25] Takahata Akio. 2023. “France’s Opposition to Tokyo’s NATO Liaison Office: Deferring to China?”, Nippon.com, 7 July 2023,  https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00914/ (Accessed 20 July 2023)

[26] Takahata Akio. 2023. “France’s Opposition to Tokyo’s NATO Liaison Office: Deferring to China?”, Nippon.com, 7 July 2023,  https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00914/ (Accessed 20 July 2023)

[27] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. n.d. “FRANCE AND NATO”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_160672.htm (Accessed 21 July 2023)

[28] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. n.d. “THAT FRANCE DID NOT LEAVE NATO IN 1966 BUT CONTINUED TO PLAY A VERY ACTIVE ROLE IN THE ALLIANCE?”, https://shape.nato.int/page214871012 (Accessed 21 July 2023)

[29] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2023. “Relations with partners across the globe”, 11 April 2023,  https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49188.htm (Accessed 21 July 2023)

[30] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2023. “Relations with the Republic of Korea”, 20 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50098.htm (Accessed 21 July 2023)

[31] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2023. “Relations with the Republic of Korea”, 20 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50098.htm (Accessed 21 July 2023)

[32] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2012. “NATO and the Republic of Korea sign new partnership programme”, 20 September 2012, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_90101.htm (Accessed 21 July 2023)

[33] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2012. “NATO and the Republic of Korea sign new partnership programme”, 20 September 2012, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_90101.htm (Accessed 21 July 2023)

[34] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2022. “Republic of Korea opens diplomatic mission to NATO”, 23 November 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_209320.htm (Accessed 21 July 2023)

[35] Jo He-rim. 2022. “South Korea’s intelligence agency joins NATO’s cyber defense center as first in Asia”, The Korea Herald, 5 May 2022, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220505000162 (Accessed 21 July 2023)

[36] Jo He-rim. 2022. “South Korea’s intelligence agency joins NATO’s cyber defense center as first in Asia”, The Korea Herald, 5 May 2022, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220505000162 (Accessed 21 July 2023)

[37] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2022. “Alliance agrees the Republic of Korea’s Mission to NATO”, 26 September 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_207639.htm?selectedLocale=en (Accessed 24 July 2023)

[38] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2022. “Republic of Korea opens diplomatic mission to NATO”, 23 November 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_209320.htm (Accessed 21 July 2023)

[39] Office of the President of the Republic of Korea. 2023. “'Tailored partnership' with NATO to boost security cooperation”, 12 July 2023, https://eng.president.go.kr/briefing/D8vhNAG5 (Accessed 24 July 2023)

[40] Lee Haye-ah. 2023. “S. Korea, NATO establish new partnership for cooperation in 11 areas”, Yonhap News Agency, 11 July 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230711008400315 (Accessed 24 July 2023)

[41] Lee Haye-ah. 2023. “S. Korea, NATO establish new partnership for cooperation in 11 areas”, Yonhap News Agency, 11 July 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230711008400315 (Accessed 24 July 2023)

[42] Park Chan-kyong. 2023. “South Korea sets sights on boosting NATO ties with new strategy to tackle growing China clout”, South China Morning Post, 16 June 2023, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3224173/south-korea-sets-sights-boosting-nato-ties-new-strategy-tackle-growing-china-clout (Accessed 24 July 2023)

[43] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2023. “Secretary General welcomes NATO’s deepening partnership with South Korea”, 11 July 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_217034.htm (Accessed 24 July 2023)

[44] Ellen Kim. 2023. “What is Yoon’s NATO strategy?”, CSIS, 19 July 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-yoons-nato-strategy (Accessed 25 July 2023)

[45] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. 2022. “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region”, 28 December 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322133&page=1  (Accessed 25 July 2023).

[46] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2023. “Press release on the results of the NATO summit in Vilnius, July 11-12, 2023”, 12 July 2023, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1896645/ (Accessed 25 July 2023)

[47] The Russian Government. 2022. “The Government approves the list of unfriendly countries and territories”, 7 March 2022. http://government.ru/en/docs/44745/ (Accessed 25 July 2023)

[48] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2023. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on July 12, 2023”, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202307/t20230712_11112244.html (Accessed 25 July 2023)

[49] Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union. 2023. “Spokesperson of the Chinese Mission to the EU Speaks on a Question Concerning China-related Content in the NATO Vilnius Summit Communiqué”, 12 July 2023, http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/fyrjh/202307/t20230712_11112008.htm (Accessed 25 July 2023)

[50] DW. 2023. “North Korea launches long-range missile amid NATO summit”, 13 July 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/north-korea-launches-long-range-missile-amid-nato-summit/a-66195891 (Accessed 25 July 2023)

[51] Sue Mi Terry & Kayla Orta. 2022. “South Korea’s Important Achievement at the NATO Summit”, Wilson Center, 30 June 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/south-koreas-important-achievement-nato-summit (Accessed 25 July 2023)

[52] David Scott. 2016. “NATO and Japan: A strategic convergence? Post cold-war geopolitics: Russia, China, anti-piracy and anti-terrorism”, International Politics, 53, 324–342 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2016.1 (Accessed 25 July 2023)