The 56th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM) was held in Jakarta, Indonesia between 11-12 July, 2023. The joint communiqué issued after the AMM reiterated a number of past commitments made by this regional grouping and also identified new avenues for cooperation as key deliverables for the regional grouping. Issues of significance discussed at the meeting included the inclusion of Timor-Leste into the ASEAN fold, reviewing the regional forum’s policy on Myanmar and concluding an arrangement on managing the sea lanes of communication in the South China Sea.
Timor-Leste as the 11th member of ASEAN?
This is the first time that Timor-Leste participated in AMM since being given an observer status in November 2022 ASEAN Summit. A pertinent reference in the AMM communiqué was on the adoption of the “criteria-based Roadmap for Timor-Leste's full membership”[i] made during the 42nd ASEAN Summit of May 2023.
The 2022 criteria-based roadmap had called upon the ‘ASEAN Member States and external partners to fully support Timor-Leste to achieve the milestones through the provision of capacity building assistance”.[ii] The stumbling block in the inclusion of Timor-Leste into the ASEAN fold in 2011 was its fragile statehood, poor infrastructure and human resources, and limited diplomatic presence.[iii] What has changed in the past decade has been the steady progress that has been made by Timor-Leste on all aspects. Additionally, on most issues of common concern, Timor-Leste has been adopting a position that is similar to its ASEAN neighbours.
The Myanmar Question
Pertaining to Myanmar, the AMM communiqué had reaffirmed ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC) and pointed out that the consensus acts as the main reference point when it comes to deliberating the internal situation in that nation since the military coup of February 2021. The AMM had also made a reference to the challenges that the Rohingya community was facing when it spoke about the situation in the Rakhine State of Myanmar. The AMM has reiterated their call for ‘facilitating the voluntary return of displaced persons in a safe, secure, and dignified manner’ and also took note of the ongoing repatriation of 7,000 individuals from Bangladesh back to Myanmar.[iv]
However, the return of the military administration in Myanmar has caused a rift within the ranks of ASEAN. This rift, according to some observers can be noted in the “annoyance among Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines that Thailand” backed by Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam[v] is pursuing its Myanmar policy that is not in sync with the stated position or keeping with the sentiments of ASEAN. This annoyance can be attributed to the fact that Don Pramudwinai, the caretaker Foreign Minister of Thailand, on the sidelines of the AMM had confirmed his visit to Myanmar and his interaction with the imprisoned ‘democratic icon’ Aung San Suu Kyi just prior to 56th AMM. According to the Thai Minister, who had also met the Generals, Suu Kyi seems to be healthy and is in favour of engaging with the Generals and to settle the vortex of challenges that the nation has spilled into.[vi] Thailand has also expressed its desire for ASEAN to reengage with the junta[vii], which again is not in line with ASEAN’s stated position.
For a section within ASEAN, Myanmar extending this exclusive courtesy to Thailand does not sit well. This is so as the regional grouping since the coup has been repeatedly requesting access for its representatives and Envoy to the reclusive nation and the same has been turned down. For some of the members, the 5PC is not only a cornerstone of ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar but the same is also a de facto yardstick to tailor their engagement with the military regime. Resultantly, ASEAN has seriously been contemplating to limit their engagement with Myanmar nation until visible progress is made with respect to the 5PC.
Managing the South China Sea dispute
According to media reports, nations’ party to the maritime territorial dispute in the South China Sea have expressed their intent to conclude a pact within the next three years[viii]. The salience of this announcement lies in the fact that it seems to be another effort to address tensions over the disputed waters.
The intention to formulate guidelines to complete the Code of Conduct (CoC) negotiations by 2026 raises its own set of implications. For one, by setting a timeline gives hope of concluding an arrangement that has not made any significant progress since the 2002 informal agreement between ASEAN-China on the Declaration of Conduct of Parties (DoC). Resultantly, for want of an institutional mechanism, the South China Sea dispute has come to be a serious bone of contention both in the eastern Asian region as well as within ASEAN. In the context of the latter, it was over South China Sea, that ASEAN was unable to come out with communiqué in 2012, a first for this regional forum.
Additionally, this maritime dispute can be considered as questioning the sanctity of the rule based international order that has come to be the guiding principle of the international community since the formation of the United Nations (UN). In this regard, the South China Sea question is a litmus test of the global order as it contradicts both in letter and in sprit the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Secondly, given the sensitivity and the centrality of the South China Sea, both in the terms of eastern Asia and the Indo-Pacific Region, any mechanism reached between the parties would be a fait accompli for the international community. This would not only be a reflection of the regional dynamics in play with respect to China and its engagement with Southeast Asia but would also be reflected in the evolving architecture of the Indo-Pacific beginning with AOIP.
Third, subject to the outcome of the negotiations, ASEAN’s stated position in the AOIP too will be reshaped. This is so as the AOIP, in no uncertain terms has said that the “Outlook is not aimed at creating new mechanisms or replacing existing ones; rather, it is an Outlook intended to enhance ASEAN’s Community building process and to strengthen and give new momentum for existing ASEAN-led mechanisms to better face challenges and seize opportunities arising from the current and future regional and global environments”.[ix] The mechanisms that have been mentioned in the AOIP includes ASEAN initiated institution like the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) and others.
What has been left unsaid has been other mechanism and forums, independent of ASEAN that have evolved over the past many years. All these platforms have the stability of Southeast Asian nations in terms of being free and open region that is not limited by narrow interests of any hegemon at their core; as well as acknowledging the ‘community building process’ of ASEAN. Subject to the outcome that is expected in 2026, the very sprit of a ‘community building process’ could be put to test. This is so as the South China Sea is not only a dispute between maritime neighbours but is a dispute over rule based international order that guides international engagement within the global commons.
Thus, any advancement with respect to the dispute of the South China Sea will leave a lasting impact not only in terms of the regional architecture but also that of the Indo-Pacific region.
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*Dr. Sripathi Narayanan is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] ASEAN Leaders' Statement on the Application of Timor-Leste For ASEAN Membership, ASEAN, November 5, 2022, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/05-ASEAN-Leaders-Statement-on-the-Application-of-Timor-Leste-for-ASEAN-Membership.pdf, accessed on July 19, 2023.
[ii] ASEAN Leaders' Statement on the Application of Timor-Leste For ASEAN Membership, ASEAN, November 5, 2022, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/05-ASEAN-Leaders-Statement-on-the-Application-of-Timor-Leste-for-ASEAN-Membership.pdf, accessed on July 19, 2023.
[iii] Roberto Soares, “Timor-Leste’s Aspiration for ASEAN Membership”, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, March 9, 2023,https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/timor-lestes-aspiration-for-asean-membership/, accessed on July 19, 2023.
[iv] Joint Communiqué of the 56th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, ASEAN, July 11-12, 2023, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/The-56th-AMM-Joint-Communique.pdf, accessed on July 17, 2023.
[v] Gurjit Singh, “How major challenges mar the unity and centrality of ASEAN”, Firstpost, July 17, 2023,
https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/how-major-challenges-mar-the-unity-and-centrality-of-asean-12875352.html, accessed on July 17, 2023.
[vi] Hariz Baharudin, “Some Asean members view Thailand’s activities in Myanmar positively, but stress unity in joint communique”, The Straits Times, July 17, 2023, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/some-asean-members-view-thailand-s-activities-in-myanmar-positively-but-stress-unity-in-joint-communique, accessed on July 18, 2023. o
[vii] Kate Lamb and Stanley Widianto, “ASEAN chair urges unity as top diplomats meet amid Myanmar discord”, Reuters, July 11, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/article/asean-indonesia-idAFKBN2YQ1LA, accessed on July 14, 2023.
[viii] Niniek Karmini and Jim Gomez, “China and ASEAN agree to try to conclude nonaggression pact on sea feud in 3 years”, Associate Press, July 13, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/asean-south-china-sea-disputes-7ec76375646cd692c525be7ab2a6290b , accessed on July 18, 2023.
[ix] “ASEAN Outlook on The Indo-Pacific”, ASEAN, https://asean.org/asean2020/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf, accessed on July 20, 2023.