Indian Council of World Affairs

Almost after a decade of diplomatic deadlock between Egypt and Turkiye, both countries have decided to restore diplomatic ties, and they have appointed Ambassadors to each other’s countries in the first week of July this year. This rapprochement process between Egypt and Turkiye began in early 2021 amidst the restoration of diplomatic ties by Turkiye with its former friends-turned-foes like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Israel. President Erdogan called for improving ties with Egypt who also stressed that he (Erdogan) considers Egyptians as brothers with whom Turkiye must reconcile.[i]

The major breakthrough came during the inaugural ceremony of 2022 Qatar World Cup and added momentum to the process when both President Erdogan and his Egyptian counterpart El-Sisi shook hands with each other in the presence of Qatari ruler Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani.[ii] This handshake was followed by the Egyptian Foreign Minister’s solidarity visit to Turkiye in February 2023 following the devastating earthquake in the country, which subsequently paved the way for a full-fledged relationship.[iii]

The relationship between the two had soured after Turkiye denounced the removal of former Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi in July 2013 in the wake of large-scale civilian protests. The removal of Morsi was called a coup by then-Prime Minister Erdogan. Prime Minister Erdogan was the first leader to visit Egypt after the election of Morsi as President to showcase the ideological intimacy between the MBH and Erdogan’s AKP. 

Turkiye even submitted an official request to the UNSC to impose sanctions on El-Sisi as a war criminal, and in retaliatory action, Egypt expelled the Turkish Ambassador and called its own Ambassador back from Turkiye.[iv]Soon both regional rivals not only had faced off on multiple fronts ranging from Syria to Libya, the Gulf blockade (2017), to the demarcation of a maritime border in the Mediterranean Sea.[v] Turkiye also became a safe haven for exiled MBH leaders, owners of anti-regime media outlets, and other Islamist patrons after the MBH was declared a terrorist outfit by the Egyptian government in December 2013.[vi]

It is worth mentioning here that the issue of the presence of MBH in Turkiye has been the principal cause of contention between the two, and their deportation has been the focal point of all past negotiations between Egypt and Turkiye. According to a report, around 8000 MBH members and 3000 other Islamist activists are residing in Turkiye,[vii] and out of those, 2000 have been granted citizenship, while the rest are residing unofficially and are categorised as illegal immigrants.[viii]

Egypt has insisted that all these fugitives who have sought shelter in Turkiye should be handed over to it. In recent weeks, Egypt is reported to have handed over a list to Turkish authorities of those who are wanted in Egypt on several terror charges, many of whom have been sentenced to death in absentia. 

The Turkiye-Egypt rapprochement exercise has coincided with the toning down of anti-Egypt rhetoric in the Turkish national media discourse. Turkiye after 2021 instructed many media outlets, particularly those run by MBH veterans who fled to Turkiye to stop airing anti-Egypt views.[ix]In 2021, Turkiye asked many MBH-affiliated channels like El-Sharq TV and Watan TV to stop airing political shows critical of the Egyptian regime, like the popular one, The Streets of Egypt, and pressed them to confine themselves only to non-political shows.[x]Later, the El-Sharq TV website was even shut down for not abiding by government instructions.[xi] Many members of the MBH were also arrested in 2021 for using their social media accounts to exhort people to come out on the streets in protest against the government in Egypt.  

In the early days of backchannel diplomacy, Egypt showed no enthusiasm towards the anti-MBH action of the Turkish government, and its Information Minister only termed these moves on the part of Turkiye ‘a good gesture’.[xii]Turkiye too refused to change its stance vis-a-vis MBH and continue to consider it a political movement.[xiii]

But following the resumption of full diplomatic ties, the Turkish authority has started a crackdown against the MBH, and not only have the police arrested dozens of top MBH leaders, but seven of its members have been deported to neighbouring countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, and many themselves are reported to have left for the UK, the US, Indonesia, and Malaysia, fearing backlash by the Turkish authorities.[xiv] Others who have been residing in Turkiye for a decade have been asked to leave the country within five month. It is also reported that many of them have been denied renewal of their residency card, and hence they have no option but to leave the country. The AKP has also decided to withdraw the membership to the party of those who are associated with the MBH of Egypt and have acquired Turkish residency[xv]

These stern measures coincided with the denial of citizenship to many prominent MBH leaders, including MBH preacher Wajdi Ghonemi, who was sentenced to death in 2018 in absentia by an Egyptian court.[xvi]This Turkish move was resented by Wajdi Ghonemi, who, in a video recording, expressed his disappointment over the treatment meted out to him. He said that after he was deported by Qatar, he had found refuge in Turkiye; however, he would now have to look for new accommodation. Wajdi Ghonemi is on the terror list in both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and his entry is banned in the UK.[xvii]. In addition, many other prominent Islamist figures belonging to MBH have not been granted citizenship despite past assurances by the Turkish government.  

Turkiye is likely to stop the process of naturalisation and humanitarian residency that the government had enunciated following the ouster of Morsi. 

Perhaps Turkiye has realised that MBH as a political force is no longer relevant in its own country, and its presence in Turkiye can no longer be used as a political ploy to influence Egyptian policy. Instead, their presence has served no national cause, has become a burden for the national economy, and is likely to be misused by Erdogan’s political opponents. It can be recalled here that the opposition Turkish nationalist party in the recently concluded presidential elections raised the immigration issue, and they might raise it again when the local elections are around. Hence, President Erdogan is not keen to let his opponents take political mileage out of the presence of the MBH while the other key issue of presence of millions of Syrian refugees in Turkiye continues to remain a critical issue in Turkish politics.

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*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui is a Senior Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes

[i]Khalil Al-Anani, Egypt-Turkey Relations: Challenges and future Prospects, Arab Centre Washington DC, October 18, 2022, Accessed https://tinyurl.com/yc4k95pyJuly 10, 2023.

[ii]Umut Urus, Turkey and Egypt Appoint Ambassadors to Restore Diplomatic Ties, Aljazeera English, July 4, 2023, Accessed https://tinyurl.com/3j9rpnnsJuly 7, 2023.

[iii]A Look at Two decades of Tues as Turkey Egypt Move to End Rift , Aljazeera English, April 13, 2023, Accessed https://tinyurl.com/3h3dfa38July 10, 2023.

[iv]Maged Atef, Turkish-Egyptian relation after Erdogan’s Sacrifice of Muslim Brotherhood, Fikrah Forum, March 25, 2021, accessedhttps://tinyurl.com/bdjjcvad, July 11, 2023.

[v]Umut Urus, Turkey and Egypt Appoint Ambassadors to Restore Diplomatic Ties , Aljazeera English, July 4, 2023, Accessed https://tinyurl.com/3j9rpnns, July 7, 2023.

[vi]Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Declares terrorist Group, BC English, 25 December 2013, Accessed https://tinyurl.com/47ff6rvp, July 2, 2023

[vii]Fahim Tastekin, Muslim Brotherhood in Exiles Face Uncertain Future, Al-Monitor, November 10, 2021, Accessed https://tinyurl.com/3nybrvmp, July 11, 2023.

[viii]Did Turkiye Turn its Back on MBH after its Closeness with Egypt, Ashrqal Awsat ( Arabic ), July 10, 2023, Accessed https://tinyurl.com/mudvdp9h, July 11, 2023.

[ix]Maged Atef, Turkish-Egyptian relation after Erdogan’s Sacrifice of Muslim Brotherhood, Fikrah Forum, March 25, 2021, accessed https://tinyurl.com/bdjjcvad, July 11, 2023.

[x]Turkiye Orders Muslim Brotherhood TV Channels to Stop Airing anti-Egypt Rhetoric , Al-Arabiya, March 18, 2021, Accessed https://tinyurl.com/9j39h892, July 17, 2023.

[xi]Turkey Shuts Down Muslim Brotherhood TV Channel, Asharqal Awsat English, December 18, 2021, Accessed https://tinyurl.com/4d23jktw,July 16, 2023.

[xii]Maged Atef, Turkish-Egyptian relation after Erdogan’s Sacrifice of Muslim Brotherhood, Fikrah Forum,     March 25, 2021, accessed https://tinyurl.com/bdjjcvad, July 11, 2023.

[xiii] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-egypt-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-label-cavusoglu

[xiv]Crackdown is on Against MBH for the Sake of Egypt, Al-Arabiya Arabic, July 10, 2023, Accessed https://tinyurl.com/23ctyhzd, July 17, 2023.

[xv]Reconciliation is at its Pace, Turkiye is preparing List of MABH to handover to Egypt, Al-Arabiya Arabic, May 13, 2022, Accessed https://tinyurl.com/4s6mep2p  July 13, 2023.

[xvi]Turkiye Refuses to Grant Citizenship to Wajedi Ghoneim, The Eastern Herald, June 2, 2023, Accessed https://tinyurl.com/3m2xys98, July 5, 2023.

[xvii]https://rb.gy/apn7t