Introduction
The remnants of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War gave birth to one of the most complex geopolitical turmoils, wherein the once unified Korean Peninsula became two nations divided at the 38th parallel, also known as the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), after the 1953 armistice. More than 70 years later, the aftermath vividly reflects a new Cold War impasse over the Korean Peninsula. The contesting blocs are reminiscent of the old Cold War, with Russia and China on North Korea’s side while the US and Japan are on South Korea’s.
However, several new dynamics are emerging as the recently restarted South Korea-Japan-China Trilateral Summit on 27 May 2024, along with the 2+2 Diplomatic-Security Dialogue between Seoul and Beijing held on 18 June, have exhibited. Coincidentally, the Russia-North Korea Summit also took place on 19 June 2024 just nine months after Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia in September 2023. This article aims to understand the North Korean dilemma and its impact on the regional peace and stability of Northeast Asia while analysing the newly emerging undercurrents at play, especially with regard to the roles of Russia and China.
North Korea's Military Build-up and the Escalating Tensions
Amidst the perpetual conundrum, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, gradually improved its military, scientific, nuclear and ballistic missile technologies. Pyongyang undertook sophisticated technological advancement along with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to build up its capacity for deterring any unwarranted threats from the West and its allies, as well as to have a seat at the negotiation table. Consequently, it ensued a cascading effect of increased weaponisation and militarisation in the Korean peninsula.
The existential threat from Pyongyang’s uncertain and provocative nature is not only limited to its southern neighbour, the Republic of Korea (ROK), but it also impacts Tokyo to a great extent as the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) tested by the DPRK cover the territories of Japan within its range.[1] With the United States (US) being an ally and treaty partner of the ROK and Japan, Washington has stationed key military outposts in the region to deter or even take remedial measures against threats to the national security of its treaty partners. China and Russia also share borders with North Korea and, ideally, should be concerned with Pyongyang’s increased proliferation. However, Beijing and Moscow have shown in the recent past that they preferred to block the renewal of the UN sanctions panel that monitors the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) nuclear weapon and missile programmes.[2] Both China and Russia have also continued to issue strong statements warning against the increasing presence of Western security forces, such as NATO, expanding into Northeast Asia.
Russia and China’s Strategic Approaches to North Korea
Moscow and Beijing, the two biggest neighbours of North Korea and major players for Northeast Asia’s regional stability, have labelled the sanctions against DPRK as harsh with a negative long-term impact on the humanitarian situation in North Korea.[3] Alternatively, China and Russia have proposed arrangements that exclude sanctions on North Korea while promoting dialogue and diplomacy to engage Pyongyang. On the other hand, the ROK, especially under conservative leadership in governance, and Japan, along with the US, prefer to stipulate UN sanctions for North Korea’s violations of UNSC resolutions for the denuclearisation of the DPRK.
Russia's Deepening Ties with North Korea
It has been suggested that the growing close ties between Pyongyang and Moscow since the beginning of the war in Ukraine have seemingly outpaced China’s relations with North Korea.[4] The then Defence Minister of Russia, Sergei Shoigu, had visited Pyongyang in July 2023, which was considered an inspection of the North Korean artillery shells and other munitions since Russia’s ammunition stocks had been heavily depleted amidst the war in Ukraine.[5] Charges were later made by the G7 that Russia procured North Korea’s ballistic missiles.[6] The visit of Shoigu, the former Defence Minister of Russia, paved the way for DPRK leader Kim Jong-un’s first overseas trip to Russia ever since North Korea opened up from the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown to meet President Vladimir Putin in September 2023.[7] Soon after, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov followed up with a visit to Pyongyang in October 2023.[8]
As compensation for the lack of engagements with North Korea, Zhao Leji, the current chair of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the third-ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), visited Pyongyang in April 2024 for one of the highest-level talks between China and North Korea in years.[9] However, in comparison, the level of engagement between Russia and North Korea has been more frequent and at much higher levels.
Putin’s Visit to North Korea and the Signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
To further bolster the deepening engagements, Vladimir Putin landed in North Korea on 19 June 2024, marking his first ever visit to the country in 24 years since July 2000, when he met with the then DPRK leader Kim Jong-il.[10] The meeting between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un concluded with an agreement to elevate ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership.[11] Putin was quoted by Russia’s state news agency, TASS, as saying that the “comprehensive partnership agreement signed provides for mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of the parties to this agreement.”[12]
The current treaty can be considered as a recall of the original treaty signed between the former Soviet Union and the DPRK on 6 July 1961, which also resolved to extend mutual assistance and support in the event of military attack upon either of the contracting parties.[13] However, with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the treaty became void but was replaced with the “Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness, and Cooperation” in 2000, without the clause on mutual military assistance.[14] Therefore, taking into context the shifting geopolitics, Kim Jong-un praised the conclusion of the 2024 agreement, which he termed as a treaty that “befits a changed international situation and the strategic nature of new DPRK-Russia relations.”[15] The diplomatic move has been coined a watershed moment for East Asian politics and the world order.[16] Kim Jong-un highlighted that their relationship has now entered a period of “new prosperity,” and he expressed full support for Russia’s role in maintaining strategic stability in the world.[17]
China and DPRK also have the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” which was signed on 11 July 1961, just days after the Soviet Union-DPRK treaty.[18] The 1961 China-DPRK treaty also states that “the contracting parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to prevent aggression against either of the contracting parties by any state”.[19] In 2021, the two countries renewed the 1961 China-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance for the third time (previously in 1981 and 2001) for another twenty years.[20]
The signed agreement between DPRK and Russia, issued as the “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” is indeed a historic document since it also recalls the mutual assistance clause from the original treaty of 1961, which the North Korean side describes as a declaration of an official alliance.[21] The two sides have jointly blamed the US and its allies for the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. It also potentially opens the door for Russia to further share military technology with North Korea. Russia has highlighted the treaty as a tool to resist Western sanctions and pressure. The treaty is expected to embolden North Korea and complicate efforts towards denuclearisation. North Korea’s support of Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine also signals how Pyongyang sees itself as a central player in the conflict impacting Europe.
China's Diplomatic Stance and Renewed Talks with Japan and South Korea
In May 2024, the ninth edition of the South Korea-Japan-China Trilateral was restarted after its last meeting in December 2019. The meeting was an alternative platform to address issues relating to Northeast Asia’s economic ties and regional stability, involving only the three key stakeholders. The trilateral in the past had also been an avenue to discuss North Korea’s denuclearisation. However, the recent Trilateral Summit witnessed a subdued tone from China with regard to Pyongyang.
Just a day before the leaders of the three countries had gathered for the Summit, the DPRK announced its plan to launch another spy satellite, following the first one, in November 2023. Although the launch failed, the ROK and Japan issued strong statements against the attempt. China, on the other hand, remained silent on the subject, even though certain experts have commented that the DPRK’s action could have been a signal of frustration towards Beijing as well.[22] Subsequently, the joint declaration of the trilateral Leaders’ Summit also omitted the mention of North Korea, which can be attributed to China’s reluctance.
China-South Korea 2+2 Vice-Ministerial Level Diplomatic and Security Dialogue
Meanwhile, on 18 June 2024, South Korea hosted China for their first 2+2 Vice-Ministerial Level Diplomatic and Security dialogue since 2015, following the agreement between President Yoon Suk-yeol and Premier Li Qiang during the bilateral Summit between ROK and China held on the sidelines of the Japan-ROK-China trilateral Summit on 26–27 May 2024.[23] The 2+2 dialogue was first created at a bilateral Summit in 2013, which had another meeting in 2015. On both occasions, the talks were at the Director General level.
The latest 2+2 diplomatic and security dialogue was elevated to the Vice-Ministerial level for the first time. South Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong attended the meeting as chief delegates.[24] From the military side, Lee Seung-beom, Director General for International Policy at the South Korean Defence Ministry, and Zhang Baoqun, Deputy Director of the Office of International Military Cooperation of China’s Central Military Commission, participated.[25] The ROK-China 2+2 high-level meeting, coinciding with Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea, presented a stark contrast of attempts to enhance cooperation between Seoul and Beijing amidst deepening strategic cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang.
The first 2+2 Vice-Ministerial Level Diplomatic and Security Dialogue between China and ROK, which has now restarted after its last meeting in 2015, is an effort to bolster their bilateral relations amidst a complex regional and international backdrop. The emphasis of the dialogue was on the importance of stability in both economic (global supply chains) and geopolitical terms (Korean Peninsula).[26] The dialogue covered the complex issue of the Korean Peninsula, with China emphasising the need to avoid escalation and pursue a political settlement. China also noted that the ongoing DPRK-Russia engagements were legitimate and matters of sovereign policy decision processes.[27]
Russia-China-DPRK Consultations
Russia and China as permanent members of the UNSC have been working together to lift UN sanctions against the DPRK.[28] In terms of issues regarding DPRK, there had been expert calls for Russia-China consultations with North Korea in 2016.[29] Thereafter, it was in October 2018 that the first ever trilateral talks between senior diplomats of North Korea, Russia and China took place at Moscow.[30]
This meeting was attended by North Korea's then Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, Russia’s then Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov and China’s then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kong Xuanyou.[31] The meeting was held ahead of the former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit to Pyongyang, during the push for the second Summit between North Korea and the US.[32] As such, in the first Trilateral talks between the Deputy Foreign Ministers of DPRK, China and Russia, the three diplomats called for easing of the UN sanctions in response to “significant and practical steps” that the North has taken in denuclearisation.[33] The talks have not been revived, and North Korea’s position on denuclearisation has also evolved into a different trajectory since then.
In October 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during his visit to Pyongyang amidst the heightened tensions in Europe with the Special Military Operation in Ukraine, had proposed regular security talks between Russia, China and North Korea to address the increased defence cooperation of the US, ROK and Japan.[34] It is to be noted that the agenda of the latest proposal was entirely different from the earlier focus on denuclearisation of the DPRK. China has so far remained ambiguous on the proposal. North Korea has also not commented publicly on the potential revival for any three way talks between DPRK, Russia and China.[35]
Questions remain whether there have been any closed-door consultations outside of the public purview between the three parties trilaterally or even bilaterally (DPRK-Russia or DPRK-China or Russia-China), and whether the agendas have included discussions on DPRK’s denuclearisation, especially in context of the geopolitical shifts in the post-Covid as well as the Russia-Ukraine conflict era.
North Korea: A Strategic Variable Reflecting the Old Cold War
North Korea has become a matter of core interest in the larger power equation between Russia and the West, reflecting the old Cold War impasse, the outcome of which will unveil the future outlook for Northeast Asia’s peace and stability. China and Russia, as traditional partners of North Korea, are being observed to be adopting different strategic approaches towards Pyongyang. In the case of Russia, it is openly deepening its cooperation and upgrading ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership with North Korea.
The increased frequency of engagements at the highest levels in the past year itself has now led to a mutual assistance treaty envisaging military cooperation between North Korea and Russia in a situation where one party may find itself under aggression from external parties. With the signing of the treaty between the DPRK and Russia, there are mounting fears about the undermining of any UN sanctions imposed upon North Korea. It would further intensify tensions with the West.
On the other hand, China has revived its stalled talks with Japan and South Korea, as witnessed through the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit in May 2024 and the 2+2 Vice-Ministerial Level Diplomatic and Security Dialogue with South Korea in June 2024. In both meetings, the Korean Peninsula was deliberated, and the discussions ensued, suggesting that China is expressing concern regarding the prevailing situation but has been cautious enough not to instigate DPRK with its statements while acknowledging Japan and ROK’s apprehensions.
Conclusion
Russia’s direct and extensive outreach with North Korea, specifically in the past year, is indicative of shifting geopolitics. Comparatively, China needs to increase its interactions with the DPRK if it wants to maintain North Korea’s geopolitical importance as a strategic buffer state against the US and its East Asian allies. However, China, is seen focusing on attempting to address the Northeast Asia security and stability issue with Japan and South Korea as regional stakeholders without any tangible results so far. With Pyongyang becoming increasingly pivotal in the power dynamics of Northeast Asia, the deciding factor regarding peace in the Korean Peninsula and the region seems more likely to reside in North Korea’s actions, especially in how Pyongyang balances Moscow and Beijing.
*****
*Dr Tunchinmang Langel, Research Fellow, ICWA.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[1] Jesse Johnson, 2024, “North Korea launches intermediate-range missile as elections loom for South,” The Japan Times, April 2, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/04/02/asia-pacific/politics/north-korea-missiles-april-2/ (Accessed June 19, 2024).
[2] Kelsey Davenport, 2024, “Russia Ends North Korean Sanctions Panel,” May 2024, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-05/news/russia-ends-north-korean-sanctions-panel (Accessed June 19, 2024).
[3] United Nations, 2024, “General Assembly debates Russia’s veto of DPR Korea sanctions panel,” April 11, 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/04/1148431 (Accessed 19 June 2024).
[4] Tunchinmang Langel, 2024, “Restarting South Korea-Japan-China Trilateral Leaders’ Summit 2024,” ICWA, June 4, 2024, https://icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=10948&lid=6958 (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[5] Kim Tong-Hyung, 2023, “North Korean leader Kim Jong Un meets with Russian defense minister to discuss military cooperation,” AP News, July 27, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-kim-jong-un-shoigu-parade-037cb0dca2dda580dbdb3037dfd724a5 (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[6] The White House, 2024, “G7 Leaders’ Statement,” February 24, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/02/24/g7-leaders-statement-7/ (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[7] Helen Regan, Gawon Bae, Jake Kwon, Jessie Yeung, Brad Lendon and Rob Picheta, 2023, “Armored train carrying North Korea’s Kim Jong Un crosses into Russia ahead of Putin meeting”, CNN, September 13, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/11/asia/kim-jong-un-north-korea-russia-meeting-intl-hnk/index.html (Accessed June 19, 2024).
[8] Josh Smith and Guy Faulconbridge, 2023, “Russia's Lavrov arrives in North Korea as cooperation deepens”, Reuters, October 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russias-lavrov-arrive-north-korea-cooperation-deepens-2023-10-18/ (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[9] Tunchinmang Langel, 2024, “Restarting South Korea-Japan-China Trilateral Leaders’ Summit 2024,” ICWA, June 4, 2024, https://icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=10948&lid=6958 (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[10] Kim Soo-yeon, 2024, “Putin, N. Korea's Kim set to hold summit amid concerns over deepening military cooperation,” Yonhap News Agency, June 19, 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240619001800315?section=nk/nk (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[11] Kwak Yeon-soo, 2024, “Russia, North Korea upgrade partnership to deepen military and security ties,” June 19, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/06/103_377012.html (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[12] Ji Da-gyum, 2024, “Putin, Kim sign treaty for mutual military support against 'aggression' “, The Korea Herald, June 19, 2024, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20240619050656 (Accessed 20 June 2024).
[13] United Nations, 1961, “UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS and DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA: Treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance”, July 6, 1961, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20420/volume-420-I-6045-English.pdf (Accessed June 26, 2024)
[14] Khang Vu, 2024, “Why China and North Korea decided to renew a 60-year-old treaty”, July 30, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-china-north-korea-decided-renew-60-year-old-treaty (Accessed June 26, 2024)
[15] Kim Seung-yeon, 2024, “Kim declares N. Korea's relations with Russia upgraded to alliance,” Yonhap News Agency, June 19, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240619001854315?section=nk/nk (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[16] Hankyoreh, 2024, “Kim and Putin to fortify anti-West cooperation on security, economics,” June 19, 2024, https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/1145559.html (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[17] Kwak Yeon-soo, 2024, “Russia, North Korea upgrade partnership to deepen military and security ties,” June 19, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/06/103_377012.html (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[18] China Embassy in DPRK, 2007, “China-DPRK Relations”, April 3, 2007, http://kp.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zcgx/zcgxgk/ (Accessed June 26, 2024)
[19] Chinese Communism Subject Archive, 1961, “Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea”, July 11, 1961, https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/china_dprk.htm (Accessed June 26, 2024)
[20] Khang Vu, 2024, “Why China and North Korea decided to renew a 60-year-old treaty”, July 30, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-china-north-korea-decided-renew-60-year-old-treaty (Accessed June 26, 2024)
[21] KCNA (Korean Central News Agency), 2024, “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation Signed,” June 20, 2024, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/642528cc5ab43213fbe8830604f641b0.kcmsf (Accessed June 21, 2024).
[22] Steven Borowiec, 2024, “North Korea's latest provocations signal frustration with Beijing,” Nikkei Asia, May 31, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/North-Korea-s-latest-provocations-signal-frustration-with-Beijing (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[23] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, 2024, “Korea and China to Hold Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue,” June 17, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322599 (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[24] Hankyoreh, 2024, “Will China use diplomatic, security dialogue with Seoul to check Russia’s cooperation with N. Korea?” June 18, 2024, https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1145387 (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[25] Kim Seung-yeon, 2024, “S. Korea, China hold 2+2 diplomatic security talks amid Putin's visit to N. Korea,” Yonhap News Agency, June 18, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240618001051315 (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[26] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2024, “China and the ROK Hold the First 2+2 Vice-Ministerial Level Diplomatic and Security Dialogue,” June 19, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbxw/202406/t20240620_11438888.html (Accessed 20 June 2024).
[27] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2024, “China and the ROK Hold the First 2+2 Vice-Ministerial Level Diplomatic and Security Dialogue,” June 19, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbxw/202406/t20240620_11438888.html (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[28] Edith M. Lederer, 2024, “Russian veto brings an end to the UN panel that monitors North Korea nuclear sanctions”, March 29, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/un-us-north-korea-russia-sanctions-monitoring-72f8cbac116dea7c795d9a3357fc45f3 (Accessed June 26, 2024)
[29] TASS Russian News Agency, 2016, “Expert calls for Russia, China holding security consultations with North Korea”, January 12, 2016, https://tass.com/world/848953 (Accessed June 26, 2024)
[30] Yonhap News Agency, 2018, “N. Korea, China, Russia call for 'corresponding' measures in denuclearization talks”, October 11, 2018, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20181011003700315 (Accessed June 26, 2024)
[31] Yonhap News Agency, 2018, “N. Korea, China, Russia call for 'corresponding' measures in denuclearization talks”, October 11, 2018, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20181011003700315 (Accessed June 26, 2024)
[32] Lee Jeong-ho, 2018, “North Korea looks to get China, Russia on side before denuclearisation talks with US”, South China Morning Post, October 5, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2167215/north-korea-looks-get-china-russia-side-denuclearisation-talks (Accessed June 26, 2024)
[33] Yonhap News Agency, 2018, “N. Korea, China, Russia call for 'corresponding' measures in denuclearization talks”, October 11, 2018, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20181011003700315 (Accessed June 26, 2024)
[34] Kyodo News, 2023, “Russia proposes regular security talks with North Korea, China”, October 19, 2023, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/10/5344e62d2ad2-n-korea-russia-agree-to-deepen-cooperation-during-lavrov-visit.html (Accessed June 26, 2024)
[35] Timothy W. Martin, 2023, “Russia Pushes Security Talks With North Korea, China”, The Wall Street Journal, October 19, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/russia-pushes-security-talks-with-north-korea-china-ffb76901 (Accessed June 26, 2024)