Tajikistan is facing internal and external security challenges. To address them the country has been taking domestic measures and also reaching out to its partner countries to strengthen capabilities. In recent months, Tajikistan has been dealing with protests and violence in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO). It had to launch a military operation to control the situation. On the other hand, the country has been facing tense situation on the border with the Kyrgyz Republic as violent clashes there resulted in loss of life and property on both sides. The collapse of the Ghani government in Afghanistan in mid-August 2021 and the subsequent takeover of Kabul by the Taliban have brought new challenges for Tajikistan. Unlike other neighbours of Afghanistan in Central Asia, Tajikistan is not engaging with the new dispensation in Kabul. Further, the January 2022 demonstrations and deaths in Kazakhstan[1] and subsequent ‘peacekeeping’ intervention by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) forces on the invitation of Kazakhstan must have convinced Tajikistan to take a holistic approach to the emergent security challenges. This paper tries to understand the security issues faced by Tajikistan within the country, on its borders and discusses the efforts made by the Tajik government to strengthen its capability, including through bilateral cooperation with partner countries.
I
Situation in Gorno-Badakhshan
The GBAO is the largest region of Tajikistan covering about 45 per cent of its territory with rich mineral and abundant fresh water resources. This hilly area in Tajikistan’s east is sparsely populated but strategically located. Tajikistan’s long borders with Afghanistan (about 1,333 kms) in the south and with China in the east (about 495 kms)[2] pass through Gorno-Badakhshan and it is separated from the Indian subcontinent by a narrow strip of Wakhan corridor of Afghanistan. Apart from its unique geography, the GBAO is culturally different from other parts of Tajikistan. People there generally follow Ismaili tenets (a Shi’ite sect), and speak varied local languages though the lingua franca of the area remains Tajiki. Many people in GBAO have grievance over the perceived treatment to the region by the administration at Dushanbe.[3]
Since the civil war days (1992-97), Dushanbe had to deal with the local ‘informal leaders’ of GBAO, who exerted considerable influence there - many of whom at times have been accused of being involved in terror and drug trafficking related incidents. Violent protests have been occurring at regular intervals in GBAO, including in 2012, 2014 and 2018. Experts believe that economic factors are primarily fuelling the discontent in the region. Though the GBAO, which is just about 2.4 per cent of Tajikistan’s total population of 9.5 million, the poverty and unemployment rates are considered much higher than the national average and official figures.[4]
Source: bbc.com
The current security situation in Gorno-Badakhshan region escalated following the death of a native in November 2021 in an operation by the security force in Roshtkala district.[5] It led to further protests, and included the demand for fair investigation into the incident, release of activists and replacement of the governor of GBAO. The protesters blocked a road connecting Tajikistan to China. The Interior Ministry of Tajikistan, in a statement, said that about 200 members of ‘organised criminal groups’ had blocked a road linking Tajikistan and China to ‘destabilise the social and political situation’.[6]
A new dimension to the demonstrations in the GBAO this time was the extension of support to the protesters by the Tajik expatriates living abroad, especially by the people from Gorno-Badakhshan region. The demonstrations in their support were organised in Russia, at the UN Headquarters, UK, Germany, Canada and Austria.[7] They expressed dissatisfaction over the handling of the situation by Tajikistan authorities and demanded a peaceful solution to the issues.
Tajikistan security forces launched an operation in May 2022 to control the situation in GBAO. The government claimed that in the operation, nine ‘militants’ were killed who had reportedly ambushed a convoy. A security official was also killed in the violent clash while 13 others were injured. The situation at present seems to be returning to normalcy, internet service has been restored after about a month.[8]
Apart from taking security measures, the Tajikistan government is also trying to address the economic causes of the discontent in GBAO. The Tajik government ministries have been asked to focus on creating more jobs and employment in the region. Investment in the region is being encouraged. A Chinese company is commissioning work on the GBAO’s road link to Xinjiang of China.[9]
II
Situation on Tajikistan’s northern and southern borders
Unstable border condition between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan was observed. Tajikistan shares its northern borders with Kyrgyzstan while its southern border is with Afghanistan, which has long been a source of concern not only for Tajikistan but the wider region.
Kyrgyzstan: In recent months, there have been reports of clashes on the border between the forces of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The two countries share over 950 kilometres long border, about half of it is still unmarked and contested.[10] The two countries witnessed the most violent clashes in April-end of 2021 when around 45 people were killed and thousands were displaced.[11] Again there were reports of clashes on the borders in recent months. The conflict recurred in January 2022 causing loss of life and injury. Though a ‘complete cease-fire’ was reached on 28 January 2022[12] but firing was again exchanged in March 2022[13]. The most recent clashes have reportedly occurred in early June 2022, after the two countries had agreed in April to pull back some forces from the frontier.[14] Among the causes of contention are the access to water resources and use of roads, which crisscross each other’s territory in border regions. It can be said that both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan need to resolve the issues on priority, which otherwise may impact the regional cooperation in Central Asia, which has been gaining traction in recent years.
Afghanistan: In the south, Tajikistan continues to be concerned about the emerging situation with the advent of Taliban in Kabul in August 2021. Afghanistan has a large percentage of ethnic Tajik population and in the past the Taliban have been accused of targeting ethnic Tajiks.[15] Central Asian countries are wary that the Taliban in Afghanistan can lead to rise in radicalism, drug trafficking and refugee inflow in Central Asia in case of escalation. Among Central Asian countries, Tajikistan is believed to have no prior engagement with the Taliban before their takeover of Kabul nor has it reached out to them till now. Soon after the takeover of Kabul, President Emomali Rahmon said that Dushanbe wanted to see all ethnic groups of Afghanistan represented in the cabinet along with a ‘worthy role’ for Tajiks. He said Dushanbe would not recognise a government that is disregarding the interests of Afghans, including indigenous Tajiks and Uzbeks. The resistance to the Taliban continued in pockets of Afghanistan and there were reports of support from Tajikistan side.[16] As the Taliban are now consolidating their position and a growing number of countries are establishing contacts with them, it is to be seen how Tajikistan deals with the system in Kabul.
III
Tajikistan’s Cooperation with Partners to Strengthen Capability
In view of the evolving situation, Tajikistan is making efforts to shore up its capabilities with assistance from partner countries. A number of high-level visits to and from Tajikistan were made in a short period aimed at boosting cooperation, especially in the security sphere.
Iran
Though Tajikistan and Iran have no common borders but both share their boundaries with Afghanistan. Tajikistan is considered ethnically and linguistically close to Iran, which was the first country to recognise its independence and establish diplomatic relations. Iran considers Tajikistan as an important partner in Central Asia. Tehran had also played a role in concluding a deal between Tajik government and opposition in the 1992-97 civil war. However, the bilateral relationship has been passing through waxing and waning phases. Due to hosting of the banned Tajik opposition leader Mohiuddin Kabiri in Tehran by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in December 2015, the bilateral relationship became tense.
In the backdrop of regional geopolitical shifts, the relationship is currently improving. President of Iran Ebrahim Raisi visited Tajikistan to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in September 2021. Iran hopes to join the Organisation soon and enhance its engagement with the East. It was his first foreign visit after becoming President. He also held bilateral talks with the Tajik President, which played an important role in easing the strained ties. President Raisi termed the visit as a ‘turning point in Iran-Tajikistan relations’.[17] The current thaw between the two is accentuated by developments in Tajikistan, its neighbourhood as well as the Russia-Ukraine military crisis. Russia has security presence in Tajikistan and reports indicate that hundreds of Russian troops from its military base in Tajikistan have been redeployed in Ukraine conflict.
While the security operation by Tajik forces was underway in GBAO, Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri was visiting Tajikistan for ‘boosting military and defence cooperation’.[18] He met President Rahmon on 17 May 2022 and said ‘strengthening, upgrading and developing the level of joint military interaction between the two countries and increasing cooperation in various military fields are among the important priorities of Iran's armed forces with Tajikistan.’[19] He added that by developing military and regional cooperation the forces of Iran and Tajikistan can help Afghanistan establish security and peace. President Rahmon responded that Tajikistan’s armed forces welcome the expansion of military and defence cooperation with Iran.
Notably, during the visit, Iran and Tajikistan inaugurated a military drone Ababil-2 manufacturing facility near Dushanbe,[20] which was built with Iranian assistance. It is the first such drone manufacturing facility based outside of Iran. It has been termed a ‘milestone’ in military cooperation between Iran and Tajikistan. Having a range of 200 kilometres and 1.5 hours fly time, the Ababil-2 is considered a low-cost tactical drone capable of reconnaissance, surveillance and attack missions.[21] The UAV can reach an altitude of about 11,000 feet and monitor an area of 750 square kilometres.
President Rahmon also undertook a visit to Tehran on 30 May 2022 and met President Raisi and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The two sides discussed issues of security and stability in the region as well as the situation in Afghanistan. Bilateral cooperation was considered necessary to deal with terrorism, extremism, arms and drug trafficking, transnational organised crime and cybercrime. They also discussed ways to improve economic relations, and increase cooperation on regional and international issues of common importance.
The potential of the Chabahar port, where India is making substantial investments, was referred to as an important tool for expanding trade and economic cooperation.[22] Iran and Tajikistan are to undertake ‘joint efforts’ to build land roads connecting the two countries. Tajikistan is interested in accessing seaports of Iran and using its Chabahar and Bandar Abbas ports for transportation of goods and products.[23] The two countries also signed 16 cooperation documents, including on technology, youth affairs, oil and gas sector, expansion of international road transport, tourism, environment, museums and between think tanks.
Uzbekistan
Soon after returning from Iran, President Rahmon paid a two-day visit to neighbouring Uzbekistan on 2-3 June 2022. President Rahmon was received at the airport by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who also came to the airport to see him off next day. The two countries have blossoming relationship since President Mirziyoyev came to power in Uzbekistan in 2016, reversing the neighbourhood policy pursued by former President Islam Karimov. During the meeting, the issues of strengthening ties in key areas of bilateral cooperation were reviewed and views on regional and international agenda were exchanged.[24] Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to confront the threats of terrorism, extremism, illegal arms and drug trafficking, cybercrime, and transnational organised crime, and expressed readiness to expand cooperation in the field of regional security, especially on the Afghan problem.
During the visit, 15 documents were signed, including the Declaration on Strengthening Eternal Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan, as well as on economic and trade, environment and industrial cooperation.
Russia
Besides making foreign visits, Tajikistan President also hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin on 28 June 2022 at Dushanbe on a working visit. President Putin was received at the airport by the Tajik President. It was the first visit of Russian President following the launching of military operation against Ukraine. He chose to visit two Central Asian countries of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. In Tajikistan President Putin held bilateral talks, while in Turkmenistan; he attended the sixth Summit of Caspian Sea littoral states in Ashgabat along with Presidents of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
In his meeting with President Rahmon, President Putin discussed Tajik-Russian strategic partnership and relevant issues. During the talks, a major focus was on the current situation in Afghanistan and on the Tajik-Afghan border.[25] The two leaders also discussed expansion of cooperation in the field of security, including through military and military-technical cooperation, defence construction, modernising the armed forces of Tajikistan and strengthening the security of the Tajik-Afghan border.
This was the second meeting of the two presidents in two months as President Rahmon was in Moscow to attend the Summit timed to coincide with 30th anniversary of the Collective Security Treaty and the 20th anniversary of the CSTO on 16 May 2022.[26] President Putin and President Rahmon had held bilateral talks in Moscow and discussed issues of modernisation of Tajik armed forces and the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border.[27]
The visit of Russian President to Tajikistan took place after the tour of the US Army General Michael Kurilla, Commander of the US CentCom, to Tajikistan on 15-16 June 2022.[28] General Kurilla had also met with President Rahmon and discussed bilateral cooperation on security and the Tajik-Afghan border.[29] Experts believe that situation in Tajikistan, assistance of the country in dealing with the western sanctions on Russia might have been discussed between President Putin and President Rahmon along with Russian assurances to Tajikistan with regard to its contacts with the Taliban in Afghanistan.[30]
Conclusion
Stability within Tajikistan is utmost important for security and development of the country and the government is taking security and economic measures at the domestic level to deal with the situation in the GBAO. It is important that to resolve the recurring problems in Gorno-Badakhshan, Dushanbe addresses the local concerns through fruitful economic initiatives accompanied by long term security measures.
Tajikistan is reaching out to neighbouring and regional countries that have stakes in the stability in Central Asia and its neighbourhood. Adopting a pragmatic approach, Dushanbe mended its relations with Iran. The exchange of visits between Tajikistan and Russia as well as Uzbekistan indicates that the countries are willing and cooperating to augment Tajikistan’s security capabilities. To further strengthen its capacity in facing Afghan challenge, it is likely that Dushanbe will reach out to its partners in South Asia.
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* Dr. Athar Zafar, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views are of the author.
Endnotes
[1] For details see ‘Unprecedented Situation in Kazakhstan: Causes & Implications’ by Athar Zafar at:https://icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=7041&lid=4782
[2] Ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, “General information,” 26 January 2021, https://mfa.tj/en/main/tajikistan/general-information, accessed 1 July 2022.
[3] Farangis Najibullah, “Explainer: What's Going On In Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan?,” 29 May 2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-explainer-gorno-badakhshan/25403342.html, accessed 3 July 2022.
[4] Catherine Putz, “Tajikistan Lifts Internet Block on GBAO. What’s Next?,” The Diplomat, 29 June 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/tajikistan-lifts-internet-block-on-gbao-whats-next/, accessed 30 June 2022.
[5] CABAR.asia, “Endless Conflicts in GBAO. Causes and Effects,” Editorial, 7 December 2021, https://cabar.asia/en/endless-conflicts-in-gbao-causes-and-effects, accessed 2 July 2022
[6] Reporting NazaraliPirnazarov, and Writing by OlzhasAuyezov; Editing Robert Birsel, and Angus MacSwan, “Nine killed in clash in eastern Tajikistan,” 18 May 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tajikistan-starts-anti-terror-operation-near-china-afghan-borders-ria-2022-05-18/, accessed 2 July 2022.
[7] CABAR.asia, “Endless Conflicts in GBAO. Causes and Effects,” Editorial, 7 December 2021, https://cabar.asia/en/endless-conflicts-in-gbao-causes-and-effects, accessed 2 July 2022
[8] Catherine Putz, “Tajikistan Lifts Internet Block on GBAO. What’s Next?,” The Diplomat, 29 June 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/tajikistan-lifts-internet-block-on-gbao-whats-next/, accessed 30 June 2022.
[9] Eurasianet, “Tajikistan: As dust settles on Pamir conflict, Chinese roadworks begin,” 29 June 2022, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-as-dust-settles-on-pamir-conflict-chinese-roadworks-begin, accessed 30 June 2022
[10]Matveeva, Anna. “Divided we fall … or rise? Tajikistan–Kyrgyzstan border dilemma,” Cambridge Journal of Eurasian Studies, vol. 1, 2017, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313686396_Divided_we_fall_or_rise_Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan_border_dilemma, accessed 10 January 2022
[11] Kramer, Andrew E. “Over 40 Dead in Tajik-Kyrgyz Border Clash as Death Toll Rises.” The New York Times, 30 April 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/30/world/asia/tajik-kyrgyz-deaths-border-clash accessed 13 February 2022
[12] “Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan agree ceasefire after clashes kill two.” France 24, 28 January 2022.https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220128-kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-agree-ceasefire-after-clashes-kill-two, accessed 13 February 2022
[13]“Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Hold New Talks After Shooting At Border Leaves One Dead,” Radio Free Europe, 10 March 2022, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Hold New Talks After Shooting At Border Leaves One Dead (rferl.org) accessed 14 March 2022
[14] Reporting by David Ljunggren; Editing by David Gregorio, “Tajikistan accuses Kyrgyzstan of provoking latest border clash,” Reuters, 5 June 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tajikistan-accuses-kyrgyzstan-provoking-latest-border-clash-2022-06-04/, accessed 3 July 2022
[15] Lynne O’Donnell, “The Afghan Resistance Is Still Fighting,” Foreign Policy, 12 May 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/12/afghanistan-resistance-taliban-clashes/, accessed 3 July 2022.
[16] Nastassia Astrasheuskaya,“How Tajikistan became hub for Afghanistan’s resistance,” Financial Times, 29 September 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/c49a6f04-8fd0-4253-af14-dd1bd2d9dbeb, accessed 2 July 2022
[17] Islamic Republic News Agency, “Iran president: Bilateral ties with Tajikistan can grow into good regional, int'l relations,” 30 May 2022, https://en.irna.ir/news/84772339/Iran-president-Bilateral-ties-with-Tajikistan-can-grow-into, accessed 3 July 2022
[18]Tasnim News Agency, “Iran’s Top General in Tajikistan to Broaden Military Ties,” 16 May 2022, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/05/16/2712035/iran-s-top-general-in-tajikistan-to-broaden-military-ties, accessed 1 July 2022.
[19] Tasnim News Agency, “Iran, Tajikistan Can Help Security in Afghanistan: Top Commander,” 18 May 2022, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/05/18/2712820/iran-tajikistan-can-help-security-in-afghanistan-top-commander, accessed 1 July 2022.
[20] Tasnim News Agency, “Iran Opens Military Drone Factory in Tajikistan,” 17 May 2022, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/05/17/2712404/iran-opens-military-drone-factory-in-tajikistan, accessed 1 July 2022.
[21] Gabriel Honrada, “Iran unveils new drone factory in Tajikistan,” Asia Times, 20 May 2022, https://asiatimes.com/2022/05/iran-unveils-new-drone-factory-in-tajikistan/, accessed 28 May 2022
[22] President of the Republic of Tajikistan website, “Top-level talks between Tajikistan and Iran,” 30 May 2022, http://www.president.tj/en/node/28409, accessed 2 July 2022
[23] President of the Republic of Tajikistan website, “Statement at the press conference following the talks with the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi,” 30 May 2022, http://www.president.tj/en/node/28411, accessed 2 July 2022
[24] President of the Republic of Tajikistan website, “Top-level talks between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,” 2 June 2022, http://www.president.tj/en/node/28441, accessed 1 July 2022
[25] President of the Republic of Tajikistan website, “Meeting with the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin,” 28 June 2022, http://www.president.tj/en/node/28632, accessed 2 July 2022
[26] President of Russia website, “The Kremlin hosted a meeting of the heads of state of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation,” 16 May 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68418, accessed 3 July 2022.
[27] President of Russia website, “Meeting with President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon,” 16 May 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68417, accessed 3 July 2022.
[28] Caravanserai, “US CENTCOM commander holds security talks in Central Asia,” 20 June 2022, https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2022/06/20/feature-02, accessed 3 July 2022.
[29] US Central Command website, “READOUT: U.S. CENTCOM Commander meets with Tajikistan President, Defense Minister, and Chief of General Staff, June 17th, 2022,” 17 June 2022, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/STATEMENTS/Statements-View/Article/3067141/readout-us-centcom-commander-meets-with-tajikistan-president-defense-minister-a/, accessed 5 July 2022.
[30] Eurasianet, “What was Putin doing in Tajikistan?,” 29 June 2022, https://eurasianet.org/what-was-putin-doing-in-tajikistan, accessed 2 July 2022.