Introduction
The Northeast Asia region, a critical hub for global economic activity and international security, is grappling with one of the most severe and increasingly complex security imperatives following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the constant North Korean provocations, and the spiralling of tensions between the United States (US) and China. Particularly, the Korean Peninsula with its history of being rendered strategically vulnerable during the Cold War is once again facing a charged security environment accelerated and consolidated by the geopolitical divide between the West and the Sino-Russian poles.
Given the shifting geopolitical landscape and the resultant escalations, the Northeast Asia region as a whole is witnessing growing cooperation between the US-Japan-South Korea (ROK) on one side, and Russia-China-North Korea (DPRK) on the other side. The institutionalised US-Japan-ROK trilateral and the possible Russia-China-North Korea mechanism have not come into existence in a strategic vacuum but emerged due to the sense of threat that the countries in question have created for each other. On one side, the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral is seeking to maintain the status quo and uphold the rule of law in the region, which it believes is being upended by China, Russia and North Korea. On the other hand, the possibilities of an emerging Russia-China-North Korea axis can be stated as gearing up to challenge the growing military influence of the US and its allies in Northeast Asia.
Such a scenario is in stark contrast with the abandoned Six-Party Talks that was started in 2003. The Six-Party Talks, which included China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia and the US, was a multilateral forum to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the security concerns as a result of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. In retrospect, before the negotiations derailed in 2009 it was an ideal model that had included the regional security stakeholders of Northeast Asia, including North Korea to have an attempt at peace.
However, in the current context, the institutionalised US-Japan-ROK trilateral and the possible emergence of Russia-China-DPRK mechanism in question are exclusive and adversarial, which would indicate the deepening strategic divisions and mistrust brewing in the region. There is a growing perception that is seemingly prioritising individual national interests and capabilities over multilateral cooperation. This shift away from open dialogue and towards sectarian coalition-building raises concerns about the potential for escalation and miscalculation in the region, especially given the unresolved issues surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the increased militarisation of the region.
Meanwhile, the China-Japan-South Korea trilateral has been seeking a revival since the last Trilateral Leaders’ Summit in 2019. The APEC Leaders’ Summit at San Francisco held from 11 to 17 November 2023, was speculated to host their first trilateral meeting in four years. However, the anticipated meeting could not be scheduled at the APEC Summit. Nevertheless, on 26 November 2023, the Tenth Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was convened in Busan, South Korea,[i] four years after the last meeting on 21 August 2019.[ii] Experts recommend that the Foreign Ministers’ meeting should be followed up with a trilateral Leaders’ Summit possibly in 2024.
This particular trilateral involving China, Japan and South Korea can be considered as the most significant remnant of the disbanded Six-Party Talks that could actually revive the negotiations for the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula as well as other regional security issues. With the stakeholders being primarily major powers from within the Northeast Asia region itself, the trilateral can be even boasted as the most legitimate cooperation mechanism for the region. However, due to underlying differences stemming from historical disputes between China, Japan and South Korea along with Beijing’s strategic competition with Washington DC (an ally of Tokyo and Seoul), the trilateral cooperation has been facing hindrances.
Amidst the geopolitical uncertainties, the position of Mongolia, a landlocked nation situated between two major powers Russia and China, and the only Northeast Asian state to enjoy stable relations with all the regional parties also requires exploration to understand its strategic balancing act and its potential role to add value to Northeast Asia’s regional stability initiatives. The bona fide of Mongolia to become a stakeholder in the Northeast Asia regional peace and security initiatives is also served well from its self-designation as a “single-State nuclear weapon free zone”, announced during the 47th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1992.[iii]
This research delves into the intricate nature of the security environment in the Northeast Asia region, the resultant complex interplay of the major powers and the formation of individualistic mechanisms in the Northeast Asia region. The research analyses whether the Northeast Asia region can achieve lasting peace and stability, avoid escalation of existing conflicts, develop a sustainable regional security architecture, integrate economically and politically, and navigate the increasingly complex power dynamics among major players.
Analysis of the Current Security Landscape
As the world experienced the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic, the social and economic implications of the fallout was not lost to the Northeast Asia region, the hub of global economic activity. The region was cast into disarray through loss of lives and livelihood, and the disruption to regional supply chains severely impacted health systems, economies and societies. Eventually the world started reopening from the pandemic but North Korea which had insisted upon its long self-imposed isolation under the guise of Covid-19 restrictions since 2020 had a belated opening as late as in September 2023.
Experts perceived that the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un utilised the long self-imposed Covid-19 restrictions as a calculated strategy to further tighten control on internal movements and restrict the flow of information to minimise threats to his regime’s stability from any external interferences. When the North Korean leader opened up his country in September 2023, the world was once still in the midst of a Ukraine-Russia conflict, which offered an opportunity for Kim Jong-un to replenish its state coffers and strengthen diplomatic engagements with Russia and China.
Emerging Frameworks of Cooperation and Potential Threats
The famous idiom ‘out from the frying pan into the fire’, very well suits how the world transitioned from a global pandemic to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. The supply chains were only reviving and the economies just started recovering when Russian President Vladimir Putin on 24 February 2022 in a televised speech authorised a “special military operation” vis-à-vis Ukraine.[iv] Moreover, the growing strategic cooperation between Russia and China with its “no limits” friendship announced on 4 February 2022, just prior to the special military operation had already been simmering uncertainties.[v]
The declaration of the no limits friendship can be stated to have originated from Russia and China’s shared grievances towards the United States and its allies. In fact, the joint statement for the “no limit” friendship had also articulated Russia and China’s concerns over the AUKUS partnership on how it could “increase the danger of an arms race in the region, and pose serious risks of nuclear proliferation”.[vi] Additionally, the joint statement also opposed the further enlargement of NATO alliance, which as per Russia and China was giving rise to closed bloc structures and establishing opposing camps in the Asia-Pacific region.
The US-Japan-ROK trilateral camp and the possible emerging Russia-China-DPRK camp can be stated as prospering in the Northeast Asia region especially after the commencement of the Ukraine-Russia conflict in 2022. The regional major powers, such as Japan and South Korea already dealing with the North Korean threat grew more concerned about the fallout of the conflict in Eastern Europe. Questions regarding sovereign territorial integrity became a reason for apprehension when it came to Japan, which already has a dispute over the northern territories with Russia. Similarly, the threat of use of nuclear weapons and Russia’s old alliance with North Korea raised several more uncertainties for South Korea.
As a result, the year 2022 ushered in an enhanced US, Japan and South Korea trilateral security cooperation. In fact, the leaders of the three countries held two meetings in 2022 itself. First at the side-lines of the NATO Summit in June 2022, and the second at the East Asia Summit in November 2022. The frequency of the meetings has since then increased and on 18 August 2023 the trilateral security cooperation was institutionalised at the Camp David Summit.[vii]
It is also pertinent to note that the concerns regarding NATO’s enlargement, raised by Russia and China in their February 2022 joint statement, were accelerated in June 2022 when Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan and President Yoon Suk-yeol of Republic of Korea (ROK) were invited for the first time as participants for the NATO Leaders’ Summit at Madrid.[viii] In order to adapt to the new security reality emerging from the Ukraine crisis, and with the adoption of the 2022 Strategic Concept by NATO, the members of one of the largest military alliance considered it important to deepen cooperation for addressing the emerging global challenges.
Therefore, the NATO alliance decided to strengthen its “out of theatre” partnerships during the Vilnius Summit in July 2023.[ix] Hence, the NATO alliance announced an Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) with both Japan and South Korea that signals not only a deepening relationship but also reflects the challenges in a new era of a multi-polar world which acknowledges the growing entanglement between the security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific region.[x]
Consequently, it was after this strengthening of NATO’s partnership with Japan and South Korea that the trilateral partnership between the US, Japan and South Korea underwent institutionalisation into a new era of security cooperation on 18 August 2023 at Camp David. While the primary driver for this partnership is to tackle regional security challenges against DPRK’s aggravations, it can also be considered as a coordinated response to uphold their security interests against China and Russia’s attempts to support or finance North Korea’s military capabilities and nuclear ambitions.
North Korea, as a response, started to politically signal to the West and its allies that Pyongyang is also going forward deepening its relations with Russia. As soon as North Korea opened its Covid-19 restrictions, Kim Jong-un made his first overseas visit to Russia for a six-day tour in September 2023.[xi] The visit along with the meeting between Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin took place in the backdrop of initial contacts at the Defence Minister level and North Korea’s own missile and nuclear ambitions.
In fact, Defence Minister Shoigu’s visit to Pyongyang in July 2023 had been touted as an inspection of the North Korean artillery shells and other ammunitions since Russia’s ammunition stocks had been heavily depleted due to the special military operation in Ukraine. Kim Jong-un in his talks with Vladimir Putin underscored the further strengthening of “strategic and tactical cooperation between the two countries and extending strong support and solidarity with each other on the common front to frustrate the imperialists' military threat and provocation”.[xii]
One outcome of Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia in September 2023 and the consequent meeting with President Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome,[xiii] was the offer of support for Pyongyang’s space programme.[xiv] It was also noted that the name of the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA)[xv] of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was changed to the National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATA) when it successfully launched the reconnaissance satellite ‘Malligyong-1’ on the new-type carrier rocket ‘Chollima-1’ from the Sohae Satellite launching ground in Cholsan County, North Pyongan Province on 21 November 2023.[xvi]
The breakthrough in successfully launching the satellite came after the two previous failed attempts, the second of which was in August 2023.[xvii] This successful launch within a span of two months of the visit suggests that Russia may have indeed assisted North Korea in this latest attempt. In reciprocity of the assistance by Moscow, there have been news reports on how North Korea’s supplied ballistic missiles may have been used by Russia to attack Ukraine.[xviii] There are reports indicating that the September 2023 visit might have led to an actual transfer of technology, arms and ammunition between the two countries in contravention of international sanctions.[xix]
Moreover, North Korea has now warned that a “physical clash, war” on the Korean Peninsula is only a matter of time, not just a possibility.[xx] This warning came in the backdrop of South Korea partially suspending implementation of one provision[xxi] of the 2018 DPRK-ROK Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA).[xxii] The partial suspension was in response to the reconnaissance satellite launched by North Korea. As a result, South Korea decided to restore surveillance and reconnaissance activities along the South Korean side of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) separating the two Koreas, thus improving the South's ability to monitor North Korean threats.[xxiii] Following South Korea’s partial suspension, on 23 November 2023, the North Korean side announced a complete suspension of the historic 2018 inter-Korean CMA and restoration of all military activities bounded earlier by the Agreement.[xxiv]
In South Korea’s defence, it can be stated that they had no other choice because even with the 2018 agreement, North Korea had been constantly provocative through testing of its ballistic missiles, launching of its first tactical nuclear attack submarine,[xxv] and the launching of their spy satellite[xxvi]. Thus, the effectiveness of the inter-Korean CMA had been called into question as North Korea intensified military provocations. The change in stance can also be attributed to how South Korea has abandoned its “peace first” policy of previous administration under Moon Jae-in, for a more hardliner approach under President Yoon Suk-yeol.
However, the hardliner approach at the moment has not produced desired results as North Korea instead of climbing down, is seemingly dialling up on its rhetoric. On 15 January 2024, the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during his speech at the 10th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) of the DPRK proposed revising some contents of their Constitution.[xxvii] In particular, Kim Jong-un stated that they can specify in the Constitution “the issue of completely occupying, subjugating and reclaiming the ROK and annex it as a part of the territory of our Republic in case a war breaks out on the Korean peninsula.”[xxviii] Moreover, he emphasised on intensified education to instil amongst their people the firm idea that ROK is their “primary enemy state” and “invariable principal enemy”.[xxix] Consequently, the SPA of the DPRK issued a decision on abolishing the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country of the DPRK, the National Economic Cooperation Bureau and the Kumgangsan International Tourism Administration on 15 January 2024.[xxx] This decision to abolish the three agencies for inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation was undertaken as the SPA stated that achieving reunification of Korea was not possible when ROK’s policy of “unification by absorption” and “unification of systems” runs counter to the line of “national reunification based on one nation, one state and two systems,” which DPRK had adhered to for nearly 80 years.[xxxi]
Similarly, the US, Japan and South Korea trilateral is also launching operational capabilities for real-time data sharing,[xxxii] and intensifying defence cooperation[xxxiii] through joint naval and air exercises.[xxxiv] At the moment, the security situation appears equivalent to two freight trains on a course for a head-on collision. Furthermore, the growing closeness of Russia-North Korea and Russia-China has the potential to transform into an official Russia, China, North Korea trilateral. So far, China has been ambiguous about Russia’s growing cooperation with North Korea. However, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during his visit to Pyongyang on 19 October 2023 had proposed regular security talks between Russia, China and North Korea to deal with increasing US-led regional military threats.[xxxv]
Departure from Diplomacy
The situation therefore unveils what will be one of the most significant departures from an attempt at peace through the abandoned Six-Party peace talks of 2003 to the emergence of two exclusive and adversarial trilateral frameworks in the Northeast Asia region. The trilateral between the US, Japan and South Korea which earlier was troubled with the cold tensions between Seoul and Tokyo has now recalibrated ties to institutionalise the partnership for security of the region.
On the other hand, Russia, China, and North Korea are on the verge of gradually deepening their relations as a response to the growing threat from the West and its allies. Participants of once a historic engagement to negotiate peace through the Six-Party Talks are now facing-off for an unsettling predicament in the Northeast Asia region. With the goals and motivations on both sides being deterrence for the other to avert any antagonistic campaign, the situation has given rise to one of the most complex dilemmas.
The emerging security landscape now consists of at least four nuclear-weapon armed countries, namely the US, Russia, China and North Korea which can trigger a full-blown conflict if any miscalculated action is undertaken by any of the parties. Japan and South Korea being the only countries with no nuclear-arsenal are relying upon the US nuclear umbrella for its protection from any adversarial measure that may originate from North Korea, Russia and China.
Even if Japan and South Korea sought to forego their alliance with the US as a measure of an independent foreign policy approach to give peaceful co-existence a chance, the existential threat of being neighbours to three nuclear-weapons armed countries that have been antagonistic in their approaches to territorial integrity would continue to create further misgivings. At the current juncture, the potential for conflict dominates the potential for cooperation between the two adversarial trilaterals.
As the evolving security landscape in the Northeast Asia region advances in the direction of a potentially dangerous nuclear-armed confrontation, it is also pertinent to analyse how one country namely Mongolia located in the middle of Russia and China is perceiving the developments. It is immensely consequential for Mongolia also to have a say as the fallout of a full-blown conflict involving possible nuclear weapons will have immediate repercussions for its territory as well.
Role of Mongolia in Regional Security
In 1992, during the 47th Session of the UN General Assembly, Mongolia had declared its territory as a “single-State nuclear weapon free zone”.[xxxvi] This instance can be considered as one of the rare moments in the history of geopolitics especially for a country from the Northeast Asia region enmeshed with regional players competing for influence through nuclear-weapon ambitions. Mongolia has been successful so far in fending off any regional influences by following the policy of strategic balancing through the revised 2010 National Security Concept of a “Balanced Investment Strategy” designed to limit foreign investment of any foreign country to one-third of overall foreign investments in Mongolia.[xxxvii]
In addition, Mongolia seeks to maintain its sovereignty and independence, via the “Third Neighbor” policy, which refers to the development of cooperative relations with countries other than Russia and China, such as Japan, the US, India, Turkey, Germany, South Korea, Canada, Australia.[xxxviii] This policy is aimed to reduce the sphere of influence that Moscow and Beijing may have on Mongolia with regard to economic and security reliance.
Since the 1990s Mongolia’s reputation has only increased because of its endeavours aimed at “creating conditions for carrying out independent policies and becoming an active player, both in the regional and international arena.”[xxxix] As a result of its independent and sovereign policy towards foreign relations, Mongolia is recognised as the only nation to have diplomatic and friendly relationship with all Northeast Asian countries, including the DPRK. In fact, Mongolia developed its diplomatic relations with DRPK in 1948, becoming the second country in the world after the former Soviet Union to recognise North Korea.[xl]
This long-established relationship between Mongolia and North Korea has stood the test of time and remains robust even till date. Its policy towards North Korea had remained neutral and it plays a vital role in North Korean diplomacy. However, Mongolia was not directly involved in the Six-Party Talks but had consistently supported the forum for a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. It also actively supports the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, as a valuable platform to contribute significantly to the potential path of denuclearisation.[xli]
Even though Mongolia was not a participant in the Six-Party Talks, Ulaanbaatar was host as a neutral venue for the first meeting of the high-level Working Group on Normalization of Japan-North Korea relations, back in September 2007 as part of the Six-Party Talks framework established in February 2007.[xlii] Another instance of how Mongolia has attempted to increasingly engage in contributing towards constructive peace and stability initiative for the region can be observed through the “Ulaanbaatar (UB) Dialogue on Northeast Asia Security” proposed in 2013. Upon the suggestion of then President of Mongolia, Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, the UB Dialogue based on the Helsinki project model was officially announced at the Seventh Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies in April 2013 at Ulaanbaatar.[xliii]
After the Six-Party Talks were abandoned in 2009, Mongolia considered it important to open a new platform to carry forward the stalled negotiations and establish new channels of dialogue between countries in the region including the United States and North Korea.[xliv] The “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asia Security”, an international Track 1.5 dialogue[xlv] with its long term goal of bringing peace to Northeast Asia and resolve tensions in the Korean Peninsula, therefore held its first meeting in June 2014. The first dialogue boasted of 35 representatives including those from Mongolia, Russia, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands showcasing the importance of the international coalition and its dedication to solving the prolonged nuclear issue.[xlvi] As per available open source records, India also had its representatives at the second (2015),[xlvii] third (2016)[xlviii] and fifth (2018) dialogue.[xlix]
In terms of representation from North Korea itself, the UB Dialogue since its inception has had an adequate rate of participation from Pyongyang. The North Koreans were not present during the second UB Dialogue held on 25 to 26 June 2015.[l] However, in the third meeting held on 16-17 June 2016, the North Korea Foreign Ministry sent a delegation headed by a Director and a Deputy of the Institute for American Studies.[li] At the fourth dialogue on 14–15 June 2017, the North Koreans were present for the discussions despite an increasingly tense international situation featuring additional UN sanctions on North Korea.[lii] The North Korea Foreign Minister also attended and held bilateral meetings on the side-lines with some of the other governments’ representation, including Canada and Japan.[liii] For the fifth dialogue held on 14-15 June 2018, the North Korean Foreign Ministry sent a delegation comprising of the Director General and the Director of the Disarmament Division, The Institute of Disarmament and Peace.[liv]
Afterwards for the sixth (held in 2019)[lv], the seventh (held in 2022 after Covid-19),[lvi] and the eighth UB Dialogue held in June 2023,[lvii] North Korea remained absent from the dialogues even though invitation was extended to them for participation.[lviii] Their absence in 2022 and 2023 was also likely due to the fact that North Korea had undergone a more prolonged lockdown and travel restrictions under their Covid-19 regulations, which was opened up only in September 2023. Considering the latest rounds of developments in terms of security engagements especially between Russia-North Korea, Russia-China on one side and the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral on the other side, the ninth edition of the UB Dialogue in June 2024 could lead towards certain important deliberations if North Korea were to send representatives after six years since 2018.
Mongolia's role as host to this crucial event underlines its commitment to accountability and transparency in the international political sphere. The representation from Pyongyang in the said dialogue, at least four times (2014, 2016, 2017, and 2018) out of eight Dialogues till 2023 since its inception in 2014 also reflects how effective Mongolia has been in their North Korean diplomacy. In fact, as per the obtained documents, North Korea attempted reaching out to the United States through Mongolia in 2009 after the Six-Party Talks were abandoned.[lix] Pyongyang had wanted the Mongolians to host disarmament talks between North Korea and the US,[lx] which showcases the immense faith North Korea places on Mongolia.
Mongolia can therefore be considered as the diplomatic hub of Northeast Asia and with its history of neutrality it has the potential of becoming a valuable space for fostering communication and understanding between regional powers in Northeast Asia. Mongolia is a stable democracy with a well-functioning government. This makes it a reliable partner for international organisations and countries seeking to conduct diplomacy in the region. However, it would require a sustained commitment to regional peace and dialogue, combined with economic and political development from Mongolia to enhance its influence and build trust among regional powers.
Exploring Paths to Security and Stability
At the rate in which the security environment of Northeast Asia is evolving, the region is faced with paucity of time. The most practical mode of de-escalation is embedded in the Six-Party Talks. However, the feasibility of reviving or restarting the negotiations means to tackle certain obstacles. Pyongyang’s demands constantly evolved, making long-term agreements elusive. It initially sought economic and security guarantees, then pivoted toward nuclear recognition, making trust-building difficult. No party possessed enough leverage to compel North Korea to fully comply with agreements. Economic sanctions, for instance, proved ineffective due to China's reluctance to impose severe measures. Monitoring and verifying North Korea's nuclear activities remained a contentious issue due to limitations in access and transparency. Historical animosity and the legacy of the Korean War made trust-building between North Korea and the other parties a constant hurdle. North Korea's nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches, despite agreements to the contrary, undermined commitment and triggered sanctions, further straining the process.
The situation remains fluid, and future engagement with North Korea may take different forms. While the Six-Party Talks model might not have reached its desired goal, it provided valuable experience in managing the DPRK nuclear issue and could inform future diplomatic efforts. As stated before, one such measure already in place is through Mongolia’s UB Dialogues based on the Helsinki project model. The UB Dialogues could help build the trust and confidence that was lacking in the Six-Party Talks and for that to transpire there are three countries which could play a major role, i.e., China, Japan and South Korea.
The resumption of the China-Japan-South Korea trilateral will further build the foundation for creating a conducive atmosphere that motivates North Korea to at the least ponder about coming back to the negotiation table. In addition, as revealed by the September 2009 cable from the US Embassy in Mongolia, North Korea was open for negotiations despite the abandonment of the Six-Party Talks.[lxi] Moreover, the US-North Korea Leaders level meetings in 2018 and 2019 had also led to a brief agreement to resume working-level talks. However, post-Summit there has been little advancement and with the Biden administration, there is now a difference in approach as there has been no diplomatic engagements[lxii] and no visible effort to restart talks with Pyongyang.[lxiii] Consequently, if all parties are in agreement then there could perhaps be a different form of engagement in the near future with only the US and North Korea involved directly where Mongolia acts as the intermediary.
China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral
When it comes to the China-Japan-South Korea trilateral, it is one mechanism in the Northeast Asia region with an uncertain future due to the historical and contemporary differences arising from territorial sovereignty issues. Also, with Japan and South Korea being allies of the US in the midst of the US-China strategic competition, the cooperation between Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo has restricted elbow room to manoeuvre. Nevertheless, in November 2023, the three Foreign Ministers of South Korea, China and Japan had their first meeting since the 2019 Busan meeting, marking the Tenth Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.[lxiv]
Aside from the routine call for deepening the partnership and advancing efforts to institutionalise the framework, the press releases from the three countries did refer to the situation in the Korean Peninsula. Japan and South Korea were more vocal towards North Korea’s provocations and launch of the “military reconnaissance satellite” while stressing on the need to make efforts towards complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.[lxv] Whereas China took a more subdued stand as it stressed that “the continued tension in the Korean Peninsula serves no one’s interests and the priority was to cool the situation down to create necessary condition for the resumption of dialogue and take meaningful actions”.[lxvi]
The Foreign Ministers of the three countries agreed on expediting preparations for holding the China-Japan-South Korea Leaders’ Summit at the earliest mutually convenient date. However, it will be quite complicated to expect a Summit soon with domestic issues plaguing each of the three leaders. Xi Jinping having to shakeup and replace his ministers, Fumio Kishida firefighting a corruption scandal within his cabinet while holding on the leadership of his party at least till the next LDP elections in September 2024, and South Korea facing an upcoming election in April 2024 for the National Assembly, that is, the country’s legislative branch.
Regardless, the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit which could potentially take place in 2024 has already built up a certain amount of expectations due to the prevailing situation in Northeast Asian geopolitics. Once the Summit is underway it holds prospects for the trilateral FTA negotiations as well as the peace and stability initiatives in the Korean Peninsula. The Summit would also offer an opportunity for Beijing to see if it can influence Seoul and Tokyo from their deepening engagements with the US and its allies on regional security issues. The potentially successful congregation of the China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral could also pave way for a future round of negotiations with North Korea in perhaps a Three plus one format. The format comprising of China, Japan, South Korea and North Korea has the prospects of building confidence and trust without any extra-regional influence.
Once these hurdles can be overcome, the benefits range from economic growth, infrastructure development, regional stability and cultural exchange. However, challenges would still arise as success hinges on building trust, addressing historical baggage, and finding ways to accommodate the interests of all stakeholders. Navigating the region's power dynamics also requires a delicate balance between promoting cooperation and managing competition, ultimately aiming for a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia for all.
Conclusion
While North Korea has taken a further leap towards advancing its military capabilities through the launch of the “reconnaissance satellite”, there remains anxiety within the region especially from South Korea and Japan regarding whether Russia has been fuelling Pyongyang’s developments. When it comes to the growing tactical cooperation between Russia and North Korea, there is not much being said by China. Such a scenario does not boost confidence for the likes of Japan and South Korea for reviving the China-Japan-ROK Trilateral Leaders’ Summit. Similarly, North Korea is not too keen on seeing the deepening engagements between the US, Japan and South Korea, resulting in Pyongyang rushing to carry advancements in its military technology which could be through assistance from foreign partners’ adversarial towards the US and its allies.
The flashpoints in Northeast Asia region are only resulting in either military or diplomatic standoffs, wherein North Korea’s nuclear capability is only adding to the volatility. There is an arms race fuelled by distrust and a perceived need for deterrence. The two adversarial and exclusive trilateral of the US-Japan-South Korea and the emerging Russia-China-North Korea trilateral could exacerbate tensions and increase the risk of miscalculation.
Mongolia, the only country friendly towards all in Northeast Asia has been advocating for regional peace and security through various platforms. The North Koreans have historically also showcased their faith upon Mongolia by being receptive towards their dialogue mechanisms. At the moment, it would bode well if forums mediated by Mongolia such as the UB Dialogue could be utilised for trust and confidence building leading towards conflict prevention and resolution in the longer term. The China-Japan-South Korea trilateral is also very much a prospective platform for multilateral diplomacy that can later include North Korea in a Three plus one format to offer avenues for dialogue and collective action on important regional issues.
There is an urgent need to recognise the influence of external powers and work towards shaping a regional security initiative that accommodates diverse interests while prioritising the well-being of Northeast Asian nations. Northeast Asia faces a complex security landscape, but opportunities for peace and stability exist alongside the challenges. By prioritising diplomacy, building trust, and fostering regional cooperation, policymakers and stakeholders can navigate the region towards a more secure and prosperous future.
*****
*Dr Tunchinmang Langel, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal
Endnotes
[i] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023, “The Tenth Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, November 26, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page6e_000402.html (Accessed 26 December 2023)
[ii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019, “The Ninth Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, August 21, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page3e_001060.html (Accessed 26 December 2023)
[iii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, 2021, “Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status”, https://mfa.gov.mn/en/documentation/61400/ (Accessed 18 December 2023)
[iv] President of Russia, 2022, “Address by the President of the Russian Federation”, February 24, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (Accessed 26 December 2023)
[v] President of Russia, 2022, “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development”, February 4, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770 (Accessed 15 December 2023)
[vi] President of Russia, 2022, “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development”, February 4, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770 (Accessed 15 December 2023)
[vii] The White House, 2023, “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States”, August 18, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/ (Accessed 21 December 2023)
[viii] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2022, “2022 NATO Summit”, July 1, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_196144.htm (Accessed 27 November 2023)
[ix] Mirna Galic, 2019, “Navigating by Sun and Compass Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations”, JIIA, November 6, 2019, https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/190527Policy_Brief-History_of_Japan_NATO_Relationship.pdf (Accessed 18 December 2023)
[x] Tunchinmang Langel, 2023, “Strengthening and Expansion of Japan and ROK Partnership with NATO”, ICWA, 31 July 2023, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=9799&lid=6270 (Accessed 22 December 2023)
[xi] Tunchinmang Langel, 2023, “Decoding Kim Jong-Un’s visit to Russia 2023”, ICWA, September 20, 2023, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=9944&lid=6353 (Accessed 23 November 2023)
[xii] KCNA.kp, 2023, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Has Talks with Russian President”, September 14, 2023, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/12825c828f2c19519cdc394bec9a51d9.kcmsf (Accessed 15 September 2023)
[xiii] Tunchinmang Langel, 2023, “Decoding Kim Jong-Un’s visit to Russia 2023”, ICWA, September 20, 2023, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=9944&lid=6353 (Accessed 23 November 2023)
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[xxi] South Korea's military decided to suspend the effectiveness of a no-fly zone prescribed in the Article 1(3) of the 19 Sep 2018 Inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) as of 22 Nov 2023 at 3 p.m., and stepped up surveillance of the North by reinstating surveillance and reconnaissance assets at the front line.
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[lii] Jaehyuk Jang and Kisun Kim, 2022, “The Role of Mongolia in Multilateral Security Cooperation in Twenty-First Century Northeast Asia: Relevance of the 'Ulaanbaatar Dialogue (UBD)' Initiative”, Asian Perspective, 46(2), 377-400, https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/855087/pdf (Accessed 4 January 2024)
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[lxi] Joshua Keating, 2010, “North Korean diplomat: Six-party talks are dead, Bill Clinton and Kim Jong Il have ‘good personal understanding’ ”, Foreign Policy, December 2, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/02/north-korean-diplomat-six-party-talks-are-dead-bill-clinton-and-kim-jong-il-have-good-personal-understanding/ (Accessed 9 January 2024)
[lxii] Anthony Zurcher, 2023, “Latest US-North Korea spat is high-risk moment for Biden”, BBC News, July 18, 2023, https://bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-66190848 (Accessed 16 January 2024)
[lxiii] Josh Rogin, 2023, “The Kim-Putin summit highlights Biden’s failed North Korea policy”, The Washington Post, September 15, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/09/15/north-korea-russia-biden-diplomacy/ (Accessed 16 January 2024)
[lxiv] Associated Press, 2023, “South Korea, Japan and China Agree to Resume Trilateral Leaders' Summit, but Without Specific Date”, VOA News, November 26, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-japan-and-china-agree-to-resume-trilateral-leaders-summit-but-without-specific-date-/7370772.html (Accessed 9 January 2024)
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